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ABSTRACT
Traditional economic analysis assumes that consumers are fully rational and con-
sumer preferences are independent of consumers’ social context. Research has shown am-
ple evidence that consumer preferences may vary by the social context of consumption, and
social and psychological factors influence consumers’ decision making. This dissertation
examines the effects of social and psychological factors on consumers’ decision making
and how firms make strategic product and pricing decisions to respond to these effects. In
the first chapter of the dissertation, I examine how firms selling repeated-purchased prod-
ucts price discriminate consumers based on consumers’ purchase history data, given that
consumers are concerned about price fairness. In the second chapter, I examine how firms
selling durable goods introduce product upgrades, given that consumers’ utility from con-
suming a product depends on the relative standing of the product in the marketplace. In the
third chapter, I examine how firms selling status products make the design differentiation
decision for their product lines, given that product design reveals consumers’ social group
and consumers have status considerations. In the above research, I provide qualitatively
new insights on the impact of psychological and social factors on firms’ strategic decisions
and offer important implications for managers and public policy makers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Firms tracking consumer purchase information often use behavior-based pricing
(BBP), i.e., price discriminate between consumers based on preferences revealed from pur-
chase histories. However, behavioral research has shown that such pricing practices can
lead to perceptions of unfairness when consumers are charged a higher price than other
consumers for the same product. The first essay of the dissertation studies the impact of
consumers’ fairness concerns on firms’ behavior-based pricing strategy, profits, consumer
surplus, and social welfare. Prior research shows that BBP often yields lower profits than
profits without customer recognition or behavior-based price discrimination. In contrast,
we find that firms’ profits from conducting BBP increase with consumers’ fairness con-
cerns. When fairness concerns are sufficiently strong, practicing BBP is more profitable
than without customer recognition. However, consumers’ fairness concerns decrease con-
sumer surplus. In addition, when consumers’ fairness concerns are sufficiently strong, they
reduce inefficient switching and improve social welfare.
Behavioral literature has established that consumers exhibit context-dependent pref-
erences, i.e., a consumer’s preference for a product is influenced by products that other
consumers use in the choice context. Compared to other consumers, using a superior prod-
uct induces a psychological gain and using a superseded product induces a psychologi-
cal loss. Context-dependent preferences are of particular relevance for firms introducing
successive generations of product upgrades because the presence of consumers using the
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upgraded product alters the choice context and shifts preferences. The second essay of
the dissertation investigates how firm’s upgrade introduction strategy changes to take into
account consumers’ context-dependent preferences. We find that context-dependent prefer-
ences increase firm’s incentive to introduce low-cost upgrades while decreasing incentive
to introduce high-cost upgrades. The reason is that low-cost upgrades with minor qual-
ity improvement target low-valuation consumers who did not buy the base product and
context-dependent preferences motivate these consumers to buy the upgrade. In contrast,
high-cost upgrades with major quality improvement also attract existing consumers of the
firm’s base product to buy upgrades. However, context-dependent preferences discour-
age existing consumers from purchasing upgrades. We also find that sometimes context-
dependent preferences can decrease profits from introducing upgrades but yet lead to higher
overall profits for a firm. This is because firm may suffer from a commitment problem:
ex post it prefers to introduce upgrades, but strategic consumers anticipate this and wait
for the upgrade, which makes it ex ante more profitable for firm not to introduce upgrades.
Context-dependent preferences can resolve this commitment problem by rendering future
introduction of upgrades unprofitable. As a result, the firm obtains a higher profit from
selling a base product over time than the profit it receives from selling sequentially up-
graded products. We also show that the firm may not want to offer a discounted price for
existing consumers to buy upgrades, even though this upgrade pricing is preferred with-
out context-dependent preferences. We also discuss several extensions of our models such
as endogenous quality improvement, alternative formulations of reference points, settings
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with more than two time periods, and firm introduces two products simultaneously.
Should brands selling status goods design high-end and low-end products to look the
same or different? In the third essay of the dissertation, we study how brands make this
exterior design differentiation decision. We first analyze the impact of a brand’s exterior
design differentiation decision on consumers’ preferences for the brand’s products using
ten years of data of a status good (cars). We find that consumers prefer high-end products
of a brand to look more differentiated but prefer low-end products of the brand to look
less differentiated, which seems to present brands a product design dilemma, i.e., neither
design unification nor diversification within a brand can enhance the appeal of the brand’s
high-end and low-end products at the same time. Based on this finding, we set up a game-
theoretic model to analyze brands’ equilibrium design strategies. Interestingly, we find that
the opposing preferences for design differentiation can lead symmetric brands to choose
asymmetric design strategies, i.e., one brand unifies design while another brand diversifies
design, which can be a win-win outcome. We also give conditions where both brands
unify design or both brands diversify design while the latter can be a prisoner’s dilemma.
In addition, we show that the exterior design decision has important implications on how
brands should set prices and functionalities of products.
3
2 BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICING:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF PEER-INDUCED
FAIRNESS*
2.1 Introduction
Firms often use internet cookies, IP addresses, loyalty cards, user logins to track
and store information about individual customer’s purchase history. This enables them to
charge a customized price based on purchase history. Practice of such behavior-based pric-
ing (BBP) is common in a wide range of industries (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; Fudenberg
and Villas-Boas 2006). For example, cash registers print out customized coupons based on
the content of customers’ grocery cart (Woolley 1998). Airlines want passengers to iden-
tify themselves before they see fares so that airlines can charge passengers based on their
booking history (Seaney 2013, WWID 2013). Amazon, the largest e-commerce vendor
sold the same DVD movies for different prices to different customers based on purchase
history (Streitfeld 2000). Behavioral-based pricing is also commonly used by competing
firms. For example, phone, internet, and insurance providers offer discounts for new cus-
tomers to switch from a competitor. Credit card companies offer zero interest rate for new
*Reprinted with permission from “Behavior-Based Pricing: An Analysis of the Impact of Peer-Induced
Fairness” by Krista Jiaoyang Li and Sanjay Jain, 2016. Management Science, 62, 9, 2705-2721, Copyright
[2016] the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 5521 Research Park Drive, Suite
200, Catonsville, Maryland 21228 USA.
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customers to transfer balance from a competing company (Chen 2005). However, past
customers who continue to stay with the same company are not qualified to receive these
favorable offers. Prices of the same product are effectively different between new and past
customers who differ in purchase history.
The prevalence of behavior-based price discrimination has raised significant con-
cerns about price fairness. Consumers dislike buying a product and finding out that their
friends or neighbors or someone on the Internet are getting exactly the same product for
a lower price. According to a survey of American shoppers online and offline, 76% of
American adults said they would be bothered to learn that other people pay less for the
same products (Turow et al. 2005). Consumers perceive price discrimination to be unfair,
especially if they pay higher prices than others (Huppertz et al. 1978, Haws and Bear-
den 2006, Jin et al. 2014), and therefore firm’s behavior-based price discrimination can
backfire. For example, Amazon angered customers, who discussed DVDs at the website
DVDTalk.com and noticed that they were charged as much as 40% more than other con-
sumers (Streitfeld 2000, Taylor 2004). Consumers’ resentment about firms’ BBP practice
has also caught the attention of public policy makers. There has been a debate among
policy makers about forcing firms to disclose BBP practice to customers. For instance, in
2012, an E-STOP (Ensuring Shopper Transparency in Online Pricing) Act was suggested
to promulgate rules requiring Internet merchants to disclose to consumers whether their
personal information was accessed for price discrimination. A violation of this Act would
be deemed unfair or deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission Act (112th Congress
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2012).
As the public becomes increasingly aware of firms’ BBP practice and concerned
about fairness of price discrimination, firms cannot be blind to such concerns. Customers’
fairness concerns have important implications for firms, as consumers may not buy prod-
ucts sold at “unfair” prices, even though the material value of products exceeds the “un-
fair” prices (Rabin 1993, Campbell 1999, Anderson and Simester 2010). Therefore, firms
serving fairness-minded consumers need to carefully think about the following questions:
How should firms adjust BBP strategies to respond to consumers’ fairness concerns? How
would consumers’ fairness concerns affect firms’ profits? When consumers exhibit fair-
ness concerns, is BBP a profitable business practice? For public policy makers who aim to
protect consumers and improve welfare, it is important to understand the implications of
consumers’ fairness concerns on consumer surplus and social welfare. Despite the impor-
tance of these questions, existing research on behavior-based pricing has not incorporated
consumers’ fairness concerns into a formal analysis. In this paper, we attempt to fill this
gap.
One common finding in the BBP literature is that when firms recognize customers
and condition prices on purchase history, profits are lower than when firms can credibly for-
sake customer recognition or behavior-based price discrimination (Fudenberg and Villas-
Boas 2006). This is because when purchase history information is available, each firm
is better off when it unilaterally uses this information for price discrimination: it offers a
higher price to its past customers and a lower price to poach the competitor’s customers.
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However when all firms use purchase history information and poach each other’s cus-
tomers, behavior-based pricing works to the detriment of all firms. This is because firms
cannot extract surplus from past customers as much as when poaching is banned. Price
competition becomesmore intense and profits are lower than without customer recognition.
Therefore, firms would be better off if they could commit to abandoning behavior-based
price discrimination. There is some research which has attempted to show conditions under
which BBP can be profitable. This has been primarily achieved by augmenting the strategy
space of firms. For example, Acquisti and Varian (2005) allow sellers to provide enhanced
services to previous customers and show that sometimes BBP can be profitable. Pazgal
and Soberman (2008) show that the firm that has more capability to provide benefits for
its past customers can benefit from behavior-based discrimination. Shin and Sudhir (2010)
allow firms to charge different prices to high-value customers and low-value customers.
They again find that BBP can sometimes be more profitable. In this paper, we incorporate
consumers’ fairness concerns in a standard dynamic pricing model and investigate whether
fairness concerns can make BBP a business practice that yields higher profits than without
customer recognition.
We build a two-period model with horizontally differentiated firms selling non-
durable products. Consumers have heterogenous valuations and are uniformly distributed
on a Hotelling line. In the first period, consumers’ valuations are private information,
which can be partially revealed by their purchase decision made in this period. At the be-
ginning of the second period, firms observe individual consumer’s purchase history and
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recognize whether a consumer purchased from itself or the competitor. Based on this
information, firms can charge different prices to its past customers and the competitor’s
customers. We model fairness concerns by assuming that in any period if a customer is
charged a higher price than the firm charges other customers, the customer who pays the
higher price experiences a negative utility because of perceived unfairness of the price dis-
crimination (Ho and Su 2009, Chen and Cui 2013). In the second period, past customers
who stay with the same firm pay a higher price than competitor’s customers who receive a
switching discount. Hence, past customers exhibit fairness concerns. We analyze how the
degree of the fairness concerns affects consumer decision and firms’ competitive pricing
strategy. In addition, we examine the implications of fairness concerns on firm’s profits,
consumer surplus, and social welfare.
We find that firms’ total discounted profits from conducting BBP increase with con-
sumers’ fairness concerns. This result arises despite the fact that fairness concerns lead
to lower profits in the second period. However, our results show that fairness concerns
soften price competition and reduce price sensitivity of demand in the first period. As re-
sult, fairness concerns allow firms to charge higher prices and increase profits in the first
period. The increase in the first period profits offsets the decrease in the second period
profits, and total discounted profits over two periods increase with the degree of fairness
concerns. Furthermore, when fairness concerns are strong enough, the total discounted
profits with BBP exceed the total discounted profits without customer recognition. In
addition, intuition suggests that past consumers who are unfairly price discriminated by
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a firm would be motivated to switch to the competing firm. In doing so, the consumer
would receive a switching discount from the competing firm and avoid the uneasy feeling
of being unfairly charged by the original firm. However, this intuition ignores the strate-
gic impact of fairness concerns on firms’ prices. In contrast to this intuition, we find that
fairness concerns discourage switching, because fairness concerns lead to lower prices for
past customers but higher poaching prices for switching customers. These price changes
encourage consumers to stay with their original firm even though they are unfairly dis-
criminated. We also show that as consumers become more concerned about price fairness,
consumer surplus decreases. This result implies that although public policies that require
firms to disclose their practice of BBP to consumers can raise consumers’ awareness of
price discrimination, growing concerns of price fairness can hurt consumers. Lastly, fair-
ness concerns discourage inefficient switching, enhancing social welfare when consumers
are sufficiently concerned about price fairness. These findings can guide firms to design
BBP strategies in today’s marketplace with fairness-minded consumers, shed light on the
public policy implications of growing concerns about price fairness, and add new insights
to the literature.
We extend our main model to verify the robustness of our results and examine the dif-
ferences between fairness concerns and alternative behavioral mechanisms. Specifically,
we consider a more general framework that allows for several alternative behavioral fac-
tors. First, we allow consumers to form price perception based on historical prices they
paid. Second, we capture the potential utility gain experienced by consumers who switch
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and receive a deal or possible fairness concerns expressed by these advantageously dis-
criminated consumers. Third, we allow consumers’ fairness concerns to be endogenously
determined by the number of consumers who receive a discount. Lastly, we extend our
base model to allow for switching costs. Our results hold in these extensions and reveal
the unique role played by fairness concerns.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our work is closely related to the behavior-based pricing literature (see Fudenberg
and Villas-Boas 2006 for a comprehensive review). Villas-Boas (2004) analyzes a market
with an infinitely lived monopolist and overlapping generations of consumers who each
lives for two periods. In his model, the firm can recognize past customers but cannot dif-
ferentiate between customers who did not buy last period and customers who just entered
the market. He shows that the monopolist is worse off than if it could not recognize its
previous customers. Villas-Boas (1999) studies competition in a similar setup. He shows
that firms lower prices to attract competitor’s previous customers and prices are lower than
when there is no customer recognition. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) study competing
firms’ poaching behavior and show that poaching reduces total discounted profits. Even
though fairness is not incorporated in their model, the authors acknowledge that “loyal
customers may feel resentment if they know that others receive better terms” (p.643). Ac-
quisti and Varian (2005) study the optimality of conditioning prices on purchase history
when firms can commit to doing so or not. They show that if competitive sellers offer
enhanced services to previous customers, conditioning prices on purchase history can be
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profitable. However, in the standard framework with constant product offerings, a seller
will not find it optimal to price discriminate between high-value and low-value customers
even though it is feasible to do so. Pazgal and Soberman (2008) allow differentiated firms
to be able to make a credible commitment about whether to conduct BBP and offer addi-
tional benefit to past customers. They show that BBP generally leads to lower profits for
firms with identical ability to add value to the second-period offer. Shin and Sudhir (2010)
allow consumer preferences to change over time and consumers are heterogeneous in pur-
chase quantity. They allow firms to charge different prices to high-value and low-value
past customers. They show that if consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous in purchase
quantity and preferences are sufficiently stochastic over time, BBP can be profitable for
firms. Zhang (2011) examines endogenous location choice in a two-period poachingmodel,
in which firms can offer customized products and prices to consumers based on purchase
history. She shows that behavior-based personalization reduces design differentiation and
intensifies price competition between firms. Our work attempts to make a contribution
to this body of literature by examining the implications of consumers’ fairness concerns
on firms’ behavior-based pricing strategy and showing that when consumers are fairness-
minded, BBP can generate higher profits than without customer recognition.
This paper is closely related to the growing stream of literature that incorporates fair-
ness concerns into firms’ optimal strategies. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a model
of “inequity aversion” to capture the notion that consumers experience a disutility from
receiving a payoff that is different from the others. Disadvantageous inequity affects con-
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sumers more strongly than advantageous inequity. Particularly, fairness concerns that arise
from situations in which agents’ preferences depend on payoffs of peers are categorized as
peer-induced fairness, and those depend on payoffs of other economic agents such as firms
are categorized as distributional fairness. Cui et al. (2007) examine optimal channel coor-
dination when channel members have distributional fairness concerns. Guo (2015) studies
firms’ optimal selling strategies and welfare implications when buyers are concerned about
distributional fairness and ex-ante uncertain about seller’s variable cost. The author shows
that seller’s ex-ante profits may increase as more buyers become inequity averse. Guo and
Jiang (2015) examine a firm’s quality and pricing decisions when consumers have distri-
butional fairness concerns and are uncertain about firm’s costs. They find that inequity
aversion may benefit an efficient firm and hurt an inefficient firm and reduce consumers’
monetary payoffs. Ho and Su (2009) analyze ultimatum games played sequentially by a
leader and two followers. They find that peer-induced fairness between followers is two
times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Chen and Cui
(2013) show that a uniform price for branded variants may arise in equilibrium because of
consumers’ concerns of peer-induced fairness. We study firm’s behavior-based price dis-
crimination, where consumers are mostly concerned about the discriminatory prices they
pay in comparison to prices other consumers pay. Therefore, we consider the impact of
peer-induced fairness on firms’ BBP strategy. We also develop a model which incorporates
fairness concerns in a dynamic setting.
Feinberg et al. (2002) also examine situations in which consumers care about prices
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that are available to other consumers. In their framework consumers are less likely to
purchase from firms which offer a better deal to other consumers. Their results suggest
that as more consumers become aware of prices that are offered to switchers, firms will
not find it profitable to offer better deals to switchers. In contrast to their research, we
develop a utility-based model with endogenous pricing in a dynamic setting. We find that
endogenizing prices changes the results substantially. In particular, we show that with
endogenous prices, fairness concerns can decrease switching because firms adjust second-
period prices to alleviate fairness concerns which encourage consumers to stay with their
original firm. Furthermore, we find that fairness concerns can make BBPwith lower prices
to switchers more profitable because past customers’ fairness concerns allow firms to raise
first-period prices when purchase history data are produced.
Another stream of related research is the literature on switching costs (see Klemperer
1995, and Farrell and Klemperer 2007 for extended surveys). Klemperer (1987a) studies
a two-period duopoly model where consumers are partially locked-in by switching costs
in the second period. He shows that switching costs soften price competition and increase
profits in the second period but could make first period price competition more intense.
Klemperer (1987b) shows that noncooperative behavior in the presence of switching costs
can lead to collusive outcomes in mature markets (i.e., the second period). However, com-
petition in the new market (i.e., the first period) becomes more intense. The author finds
that firms are worse off paying customers to switch than offering uniform pricing. Shaf-
fer and Zhang (2010) study firms’ price discrimination between own customers and their
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rivals’ customers when consumers face endogenous switching costs. They find that some-
times it may be profitable to charge a lower price for one’s own customers. Our paper
differs from this stream of research by focusing on the impact of consumers’ fairness con-
cerns on firms’ behavior-based pricing strategy, which in turn affects consumers’ switching
decision and firms’ profits.
Our paper also adds to the burgeoning research in marketing that incorporates con-
sumers’ psychological behaviors into quantitativemodels. This stream of research enriches
traditional economic models and provide new insights (e.g. Amaldoss and Jain 2005, Cui
et al. 2007, Villas-Boas 2009, Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010, Chen et al. 2010, Guo and
Zhang 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §4.3, we introduce the model setup
and present the benchmark model. In §2.3, we present the main model and analysis. In this
section, we investigate how fairness concerns impact firms’ BBP strategy in a duopoly. In
§2.4, we extend the base model in several aspects. We conclude with managerial implica-
tions and directions for future research in §2.5.
2.2 Model
We consider a two-period model of a duopoly.* In each period, two horizontally
differentiated firms sell a non-durable product to consumers. Each consumer demands at
most one unit of the product in a period. Let r denote the base value of the product. We
*For completeness, in the Technical Appendix B, we analyze how fairness concerns affect a monopolist
that conducts behavior-based pricing.
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assume r is sufficiently high so that the market is fully covered and two firms compete for
the marginal consumer. Consumers are uniformly distributed over a Hotelling line with
range [0;1]. Firm A is located at 0 and firm B is located at 1. A consumer’s location
on the line is denoted by q . Without fairness concerns, if a consumer at q purchases a
product from A at price pa, his utility in that period is r  tq   pa, where t represents the
transportation cost. If the consumer purchases a product from B at price pb, his utility
is r  t(1 q)  pb. To focus on the effect of fairness concerns, we assume there are no
switching costs. In §4.4.4, we will incorporate switching costs into the model. Finally, the
respective discount factors for firms and consumers are d f and dc.
2.2.1 No Customer Recognition
First consider the benchmark model without customer recognition or behavior-based
price discrimination. Behavior-based price discrimination may not exist either because it
is illegal and banned by law, or because firms do not have the ability to store or utilize
purchase history information. In this case, firms cannot charge customized prices. The
two-period game becomes a repetition of a static game. We summarize the equilibrium of
this benchmark model in the lemma below (see the Technical Appendix A for the proof).
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Without Customer Recognition) Without customer recognition,
in each period, two firms simultaneously charge a price of t. Each firm serves half of the
market and earns a profit of t2 . Over two periods, each firm earns a total discounted profit
of (1+d f )t2 .
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Since firms do not price discriminate among consumers, all consumers pay the same
price and do not exhibit fairness concerns.
2.3 Customer Recognition
Now consider situations in which firms can recognize consumers and use purchase
history collected in period 1 to price discriminate consumers in period 2. We solve for
the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium backwards. We will discuss consumer choice and
firms’ pricing decisions in each period separately.
2.3.1 The Second Period
In the second period, firms have information of consumers’ purchase history. The
purchase history indicates if a consumer purchased the product from firm A or B in period
1, which reveals the consumer’s relative preference for two firms’ products. From a firm’s
perspective, the purchase history partitions the second-period market into two segments:
a segment of past consumers who purchased from the firm in period 1, and a segment
of consumers who purchased from the competitor in period 1. Given this information, a
firm can charge all consumers the same price. However, such uniform pricing is (weakly)
dominated by a customized pricing scheme. As a result, each firm has an incentive to
charge two different prices to customers in the two segments.
Now let us understand how fairness concerns affect firms’ pricing strategy in the
second period. Let ao and ac denote the prices firm A charges its own customers and the
competitor’s customers in the second period. Similarly, bo and bc denote the second pe-
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Figure 2.1: Consumer Choices in Periods 1 and 2
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riod prices B charges its own customers and competitor’s customers. In equilibrium, high-
valuation customers located near the two firms purchase repetitively from their preferred
firms, whereas low-valuation customers near the center of the line switch (see Figure 2.1).
The consumer at qa is indifferent between buying from firm A at price ao and switch-
ing to buy from firm B at the poaching price bc. When consumers care about the fairness
of firms’ pricing strategy, having to pay a higher price than others for the same product is
perceived as unfair. With such fairness concerns, the consumer at qa is characterized as
follows.
r  tqa ao l max(ao ac;0) = r  t(1 qa) bc l max(bc bo;0) (2.1)
The left hand side of (2.1) is the utility of buying from firm A at the past-customer price
ao. If this past-customer price is higher than the price ac that switchers pay, paying the
price premium of (ao  ac) induces negative feelings of unfairness and the magnitude of
disutility is l max(ao  ac;0).† The parameter l represents the degree of consumers’
†An alternate approach would be to assume that consumers care about the prices that they pay in period
2 relative to what they paid in period 1. If period 2 prices are higher, then consumers experience fairness
based disutility. However, as we will see later in our analysis and as has been shown in the prior literature,
prices under behavior-based pricing decrease over time. Therefore, under this approach the analysis reduces
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fairness concerns and ranges from [0;1].‡ If l = 0, fairness concerns do not exist and
consumption utility is not affected by price differential relative to other consumers. Here
we assume that all consumers share the same l , i.e., consumers are homogeneous in their
concerns about price fairness. We will relax this assumption and consider heterogeneity in
consumers’ fairness concerns.
The right hand side of (2.1) is the utility of switching to firm B to buy at B’s poach-
ing price bc. If the poaching price bc is higher than B’s past-customer price bo, consumers
who switch would exhibit fairness concerns. The decrease in utility due to this fairness
concern is l max(bc  bo;0). Consumers who pay a lower price than others may also
perceive firms’ price discrimination to be unfair. However, research has shown that disad-
vantageously discriminated consumers are more concerned about price fairness than those
who are advantageously discriminated (Lowenstein et al. 1989, Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Consistent with prior research, we model the disadvantageous fairness concerns (Ho and
Su 2009, Guo 2015, Guo and Jiang 2015). However, we relax this assumption in §2.4.1
and find that our results are even stronger when we allow for advantageous inequity aver-
sion. Alternatively, one may argue that these consumers may experience a utility gain from
paying less for the same product than other consumers. Although this utility gain is not
driven by fairness concerns, it may arise as a result of the behavioral pricing scheme. In
to the standard model. Alternatively, since the first period prices are higher than the second period prices,
consumers may experience a gain when they use the price they paid in the first period as a reference price to
evaluate the second period prices. In §2.4.2, we will extend our base model to consider this situation.
‡We assume that l is bounded by 1. If l exceeds 1, it would imply that consumers would be willing to
give up more than one dollar to avoid one dollar price difference that he overpays in comparison to prices
other consumers pay, which seems implausible.
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§2.4.1, we will consider a general setup to account for both these effects.
From (2.1) it follows that:
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2t
  l max(ao ac;0)
2t
+
l max(bc bo;0)
2t
(2.2)
The first two terms give the representation of the marginal consumer in the absence of
fairness concerns. The last two terms reflect the shift in the marginal consumer driven
by consumers’ fairness concerns. In the equilibrium that poaching prices are lower than
past-customer prices, we can see that if prices do not change, l shifts qa to the left, i.e., the
direct effect of fairness concerns is to encourage switching. However, l also affects the
past-customer price ao and the poaching price bc. The total impact of l on switching will
also depend on how fairness concerns affect firms’ strategic pricing decisions, which in
turn affects switching. We will discuss the total impact of fairness concerns on consumer
switching after solving for the second period prices and present the result in Proposition
14.
The consumer who is indifferent between staying with firm B and switching to firm
A is characterized by qb where
r  t(1 qb) bo l max(bo bc;0) = r  tqb ac l max(ac ao;0) (2.3)
qb =
1
2
+
bo ac
2t
+
l max(bo bc;0)
2t
  l max(ac ao;0)
2t
(2.4)
Each firm’s second period profits consist of profits generated by selling to the firm’s
past customers and the competitor’s customers who the firm poaches from the competi-
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tor. Firms’ profit functions in the second period are:
Pa2 = aoqa+ac (qb q1) (2.5)
Pb2 = bo (1 qb)+bc (q1 qa) (2.6)
In Appendix A we show that for q1 2
 1
3 ;
2
3

, in any pure strategy equilibrium, poaching
prices must be lower than past-period prices. Furthermore, we show that for a symmetric
first period pricing equilibrium, a second period pure strategy pricing equilibrium exists
where ao > ac .§ Therefore, old customers express fairness concerns as they pay higher
prices than switching customers. Table 2.1 provides the equilibrium second-period prices
as functions of the first period market share (q1). As q1 increases, i.e., firm A’s first period
market share expands, prices in this segment (ao and bc) increase. At the same time, firm
B’s first period market share shrinks, and prices in this segment (ac and bo) decrease. In
the symmetric equilibrium, q 1 = 12 and the equilibrium prices in the second period are a

o =
bo = 2+l3(1+l )t, a

c = b

c =
1+2l
3(1+l )t. It is important to note that these behavior-based prices
are lower than the equilibrium price of t in the static game without price discrimination
(see Lemma 3). The second period profit is Pa2 = Pb2 =
5+5l l 2
18(1+l ) t. This profit is also
lower than the profit of t2 in the static game. These results reinforce the standard finding
in the literature that conditioning firm decisions on purchase history results in lower prices
and profits in the second period than in the case without recognition (Fudenberg and Tirole
2000, Zhang 2011).
Proposition 1 (Second Period Pricing and Switching) As consumers become more con-
§We use this result that poaching prices are lower than past-customer prices in the rest of the paper.
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cerned about fairness (i.e., l increases), prices charged to past consumers decrease and
poaching prices increase. As l increases, fewer consumers switch.
Table 2.1: Period 2 Prices and Profits
General Form q 1 = 12
ac
h
  4(1+l )3+3l 2l 2q1+ 9+21l+10l
2 4l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2)
i
t 1+2l3(1+l )t
ao
h
2(1 l )
3+3l 2l 2q1+
3+9l+2l 2 2l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2)
i
t 2+l3(1+l )t
bc
h
4(1+l )
3+3l 2l 2q1  3+3l+2l
2+4l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2)
i
t 1+2l3(1+l )t
bo
h
  2(1 l )3+3l 2l 2q1+ 9+9l 4l
2 2l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2)
i
t 2+l3(1+l )t
q a 1 l
2
3+3l 2l 2q1+
3+9l+2l 2 2l 3
6(3+3l 2l 2)
2+l
6
Pa2 q

a a

o+(1 q a  q 1 )ac 5+5l l
2
18(1+l ) t
Intuition suggests that consumers’ fairness concerns constrain the degree to which
firms can price discriminate among customers. This intuition is valid. Any price difference
among consumers decreases past consumers’ willingness to buy from the same firm. In
order to mitigate this negative impact of price discrimination, firms lower the high prices
charged to past consumers and raise the low poaching prices offered to competitor’s con-
sumers, to reduce the price differential among consumers. As fairness concerns become
stronger, the two customized prices get closer. If l = 1, firms charge the same price from
both the past and new customers.¶
From (2.2), it is easy to see that in the symmetric equilibrium where poaching prices
are lower than past-customer prices, holding prices constant, the direct effect of fairness
concerns is to encourage switching. This is intuitive as when past customers become re-
¶Note that behavior-based prices in the second period are lower than price in the static game. When l = 1,
although firms charge past and new customers the same price, this price is t2 , lower than the static price t that
firms charge without customer recognition.
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sentful about being price discriminated, staying with the same firm induces a disutility
because of the perceived unfairness. The marginal consumer who was indifferent between
staying and switching without fairness concerns now prefers to switch, because the utility
of staying decreases with fairness concerns. However, in addition to this direct effect, there
are opposing pricing effects. As the first part of the proposition shows, fairness concerns
affect consumers’ incentives to switch in three ways. First, fairness concerns reduce the
incentives to switch to a competitor since the poaching prices are higher. Second, fairness
concerns increase the incentives to stay with the current firm as the past-customer prices
are lower. Third, by reducing the price differential between the two customized prices,
firms reduce the disutility of being unfairly overcharged. These pricing effects make stay-
ing more bearable and switching less attractive, thereby encouraging past customers to stay
with their current firm. These pricing effects outweigh the direct effect of fairness on in-
ducing switching. As a result, stronger fairness concerns lead to more consumers staying
with their current firm, even though they are unfairly price discriminated for their loyalty.
Proposition 2 (Second Period Profits) As consumers become more concerned about fair-
ness (i.e., l increases), second period profits decrease.
Recall that firms use uniform pricing when purchase history information is not available.
The aforementioned pricing changes driven by fairness concerns appear consistent with
the expected effects due to lack of customer information. It seems to suggest that fairness
concerns act in the same way as lack of customer information, which also dissuades firms
from price discrimination in the second period. If this is the case, we would expect that as
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fairness concerns become stronger, both firms poach each other’s consumers less aggres-
sively, competition becomes softer, and the second period profits increase. However, in
contrast to this intuition, we find that as fairness concerns become stronger, second period
profits decrease. In order to understand this result, note that there are two opposing effects
of l on prices. First, l leads to higher poaching prices. This effect would increase second
period profits. However, an increase in l also leads to a decrease in the prices charged
from past customers. This effect would decrease second period profits. The decrease in
the past-customer price has the same magnitude as the increase in the poaching price, as
j¶ao¶l j= j¶ac¶l j= 3t(1+l )2 . However, the switcher segment is smaller than the loyal segment.ǁ
Furthermore, as Proposition 14 shows, l also leads to fewer switchers and more customers
who choose to pay the past-customer price. Thus, the negative effect of decrease in the past-
customers price is for a larger segment of customers which becomes larger as l increases.
Therefore, overall second period profits decrease as l increases.
This result underlines one important difference between the impact of fairness con-
cerns and lack customer information. In addition to the opposite effect on second period
profits, fairness concerns and lack of customer information also affect the second period
prices differently. Specifically, lack of customer information increases the price offered
to past customers. This is because when customer information becomes available, firms
poach each other’s customers. As a result, firms cannot charge high prices to their loyal
customers who are offered a deal by the competitor. However, when customer information
ǁIn equilibrium, q a = 13 +
l
6 , q

b =
2
3   l6 , and q 1 = 12 . The size of A’s loyal segment isMl = q a and the
size of A’s switcher segment isMs = q b  q 1 . The loyal segment is larger than the switcher segment because
Ml Ms = 16 + l3 > 0, which is positive and increasing in l .
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becomes unavailable, such poaching is impossible and past-customer prices increase. In
contrast, fairness concerns lead to lower prices charged to past customers, because past
customers exhibit fairness concerns when paying the higher price than new customers who
switch from the competitor. In order to mitigate fairness concerns, firms reduce the price
charged to past customers. In addition, lack of customer information and fairness con-
cerns both increase the poaching price; however, the mechanism is very different. The
poaching price increases with lack of information because competition is softer without
customer information. However, poaching price increases with fairness concerns because
lower poaching prices increase the perception of unfairness. In order to mitigate these
fairness concerns and induce past customers to buy, firms raise the poaching price. Fur-
thermore, lack of customer information leads to lower prices and profits in the first period
(Villas-Boas 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole 2000), while fairness concerns lead to higher
prices and profits in the first period (see Table 2.2 for a summary of comparison between
fairness effects and lack of customer information). We will analyze the impact of fairness
concerns on the first period pricing and profits in the next subsection.
Table 2.2: Fairness versus Lack of Information: Relative to BBP without Fairness
Lack of Information Fairness Concerns
Period 2 Profits Increase Decrease
Past-customer Price Increase Decrease
Poaching Price Increase Increase
Period 1 Price Decrease Increase
Period 1 Profits Decrease Increase
Total Discounted Profits Increase Increase
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2.3.2 The First Period
Now let us analyze consumer choice and firms’ price competition in the first period.
Consider the marginal consumer located at q1. This consumer rationally anticipates that
he will switch firm in the second period. Therefore, his choice in period 1 is determined
by prices in period 1 as well as the poaching prices he will face when he switches firm in
period 2. If this consumer buys from firm A at price a1 in period 1, he will switch to firm
B at price bc in period 2.** The corresponding utility in two periods is:
r  tq1 a1+dc [r  t(1 q1) bc(a1;b1)] (2.7)
where bc(a1;b1) and bo(a1;b1) are the consumer’s rational expectation of the poaching
price and past-customer price in the second period by firm B, given the first period prices.
Similarly, if this consumer buys from firm B at price b1 in period 1, he will switch to firm
A at price ac in period 2. The utility for doing so is:
r  t(1 q1) b1+dc [r  tq1 ac(a1;b1)] (2.8)
where ac(a1;b1) and ao(a1;b1) are the rational expectation of the poaching price and past-
customer price that firm A charges in the second period. Since this marginal consumer
at q1 is indifferent between these two options, the terms in (2.7) and (2.8) must be equal.
Imposing the rational expectations conditions and from Table 1 it follows that (details are
in the Technical Appendix A):
q1 =
1
2
  a1 b1
2t

1+ 1+l+2l
2
3+3l 2l 2dc
 (2.9)
**As is standard in the literature, we assume that the consumers have rational expectations about the future
prices.
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At the beginning of period 1, firms set period 1 prices a1 and b1 to maximize the total
discounted profits generated from two periods. The profit functions are
Pa = Pa1+d fPa2(q1) = a1q1+d fP

a2(q1)
Pb = Pb1+d fPb2(q1) = b1 (1 q1)+d fPb2(q1) (2.10)
First order conditions with respect to a1 and b1 give the equilibrium outcome. Since
results for the two firms are symmetric, we report the equilibrium results for firm A only.
Table 2.3 provides the equilibrium outcome. If l = 0, the model and equilibrium outcome
reduce to those without fairness concerns as in the conventional poaching model. We have
a1 =
3+dc
3 t, a

o =
2
3t, a

c =
t
3 , P

a =
9+3dc+5d f
18 t, P

a2 =
5
18t, and q

a =
1
3 . When fairness
concerns exist, i.e, l > 0, we will analyze how the degree of fairness concerns (l ) affects
firms in the first period. We will first present our findings and then explain the intuitions
in detail.
Table 2.3: Period 1 Price, Period 1 Profits, and Total Discounted Profits
a1
3dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f l (7+7l 2l 2)+3(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
Pa1
3dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f l (7+7l 2l 2)+3(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
6(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
Pa
9dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f (15+51l+23l 2 19l 3+2l 4)+9(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
18(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
Proposition 3 (First Period Prices and Profits) As l increases, i.e., consumers become
more concerned about fairness, first period prices and profits increase.
The result therefore shows that while fairness concerns decrease firms’ second pe-
riod profits, they increase profits in the first period. Since firms split the market equally,
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profits increase because prices increase. Let us understand why first period prices increase
with consumers’ fairness concerns. Given that two firms are symmetric, let us take firm
A’s perspective. The derivative of firm A’s total discounted profits over two periods with
respect to A’s first period price is
¶Pa
¶a1
=
¶Pa1
¶a1
+d f
dPa2(q1)
dq1
¶q1
¶a1
(2.11)
where the first term on the right hand side is the marginal impact of the first period price on
the first period profits, and the second term is the marginal impact of the first period price
on the second period profits through altering the first period market share. An increase in
l affects the equilibrium first period prices by directly altering the marginal impact of the
first period prices on both first and second period profits. It turns out that both these effects
are positive (we provide the intuition below). This implies that an increase in l will shift
the reaction curves for first period prices outward. Since prices are strategic complements,
an increase in l therefore leads to higher first period prices.
Marginal Impact of First Period Prices on Second Period Profits. Let us first
consider the impact of first period prices on second period profits. In the standard symmet-
ric poaching model, the second term d f
dPa2(q1)
dq1
¶q1
¶a1
in (2.11) equals zero. This means that
firms’ incentive to manage their second period profits, in particular the incentive to miti-
gate the negative impact of customer recognition, does not affect their first period pricing
strategy. This is because when q1 is around the center of the Hotelling line, the first period
market share has no first-order effect on the second period profits.†† Hence, (2.11) reduces
††This occurs because as a firm’s first period market share expands, the firm in the second period will
serve a larger segment of own customers and a smaller segment of competitor’s customers. This market
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to ¶Pa¶a1 =
¶Pa1
¶a1
, which implies that firms set first period prices to maximize the profit gen-
erated from the first period alone. Although firms are forward-looking, firms do not shift
first period prices for strategic reasons of improving second period profits (Fudenberg and
Tirole 2000, Zhang 2011).
However, this result no longer holds when consumers exhibit fairness concerns.
When consumers care about price fairness, an increase in the first period market share
has a negative first-order effect on the second period profits. Aggressive pricing in the
first period would lead to lower profits in the second period.
To see this, in the symmetric equilibrium, the marginal effect of the first period mar-
ket share on the second period profits is:
dPa2(q1)
dq1

q1= 12
= 

(7+7l  2l 2)l t
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2)

 0 (2.12)
where the equality holds only when l = 0. Note that when there are no fairness concerns,
we get the familiar result that second period profits are not affected by the first period mar-
ket share (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Zhang 2011). However, in the presence of fairness
concerns, i.e., when l > 0, a firm’s first period market share has a negative impact on its
profit in the second period. Furthermore, this effect becomes stronger as l increases, as
can be easily seen using (2.12).‡‡
This effect arises because an expansion in a firm’s first periodmarket share affects the
partition allows the firm to make more profits from its own segment but less profits from the competitor’s
segment. When q1 is around the center of the Hotelling line, the marginal gains from the firm’s own segment
are exactly canceled out by the marginal losses in the competitor’s segment. Therefore, first period market
share has no direct impact on second period profits.
‡‡The derivative of the right hand side of (2.12) with respect to l is   t(12l 4+4l 3+17l 2+42l+21)3(1+l )2(3+3l 2l 2)2 < 0.
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firm’s second period pricing in two ways. First, since the firm has a larger customer base
in the second period, its price for past customers to repurchase should be higher. However,
fairness concerns do not allow the firm to raise this price as much as without fairness
concerns. Second, given that the market is fully covered and does not expand, the firm
that prices more aggressively in the first period would face a smaller competitor in the
second period, and the customers to poach would lie closer to the competitor. The firm
would have to poach with a lower price. However, a lower poaching price makes the
price for past customers appear more unfair. By lowering the poaching price, the firm
may lose past customers to the competitor and the second period profits would decline.§§
Therefore, in the presence of fairness concerns, pricing aggressively to gain market share
in the first period, negatively affects profits in the second period. Furthermore, this impact
becomes stronger as l increases. Consequently, as l increases, firms have lower incentives
to compete aggressively in the first period.
Marginal Impact of First Period Prices on First Period Profits. Now consider the
impact of first period prices on first period profits. Note that without customer recognition,
q1 = 12   pa pb2t as in the standard static model of horizontal competition (see proof of
Lemma 1 in Technical Appendix A). The marginal impact of a change in prices on sales
is ¶q 1 =¶ pa =   12t . With customer recognition, the marginal impact of a change in first
§§To see how second period prices change with first period market share, we have ¶a

o(q1)
¶q1
= 2(1 l )3+3l 2l 2 t > 0
and ¶a

c(q1)
¶q1
=   4(1+l )3+3l 2l 2 t < 0. Hence, as the first period market share increases, the second period past-
customer price increases and poaching price decreases, which intensifies the perceived price unfairness.
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period prices on first period sales is given from (2.9):
¶q 1
¶a1
=
 1
2t

1+ 1+l+2l
2
3+3l 2l 2dc
 < 0 (2.13)
If l = 0, i.e., fairness concerns do not exist, j¶q 1¶a1 j =
1
2t

1+ dc3
  12t and strict inequality
holds as long as dc > 0. It implies that even without fairness concerns, consumers who
are not completely myopic are less sensitive to period 1 prices than without recognition
(Fudenberg and Tirole 2000). To understand this result, first note that the size of the first
period market share determines the poaching price that firms use. A firm which has a
larger market share is more aggressive in poaching and charges a lower poaching price in
the second period. In particular, in equilibrium we have:
ac bc = 4(1 2q1)(1+l )3+3l  2l 2 t (2.14)
If firm A has a smaller customer base (i.e., q1 < 12 ), its poaching price ac is higher than B’s
poaching price bc. Consider the marginal consumer at q 1 = 12 who is indifferent between
buying from A and B when both firms offer the same prices. If this consumer buys from B
due to a slight increase in A’s first period price, the new indifferent consumer is at q 1 < 12 .
Using (2.14) we see that in this case ac  bc > 0. Hence, A’s poaching price ac is larger
than B’s poaching price bc and the consumer who buys from B in the first period gets
the poaching price offered by A, which is a worse deal in the second period. Therefore,
for forward-looking customers, a small price increase today increases the discount they
receive upon switching in the next period. Consequently, anticipating better switching
deals, consumers are less sensitive to an increase in first period prices. This result holds
even without fairness concerns.
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Now, let us examine how fairness concerns affect consumers’ price sensitivity in
the first period. Intuition might suggest that fairness would make consumers in the first
period more price sensitive since poaching prices increase due to fairness concerns (see
Proposition 1). However, this intuition is not correct and in fact, we have:
¶ 2q 1
¶a1¶l
=
4dcl (2+l )
1+ 1+l+2l
2
3+3l 2l 2dc
2
t
> 0 (2.15)
The above relationship implies that consumers with stronger fairness concerns are less
price sensitive in the first period. The reason for this is that the marginal consumer always
switches and therefore what determines his price-sensitivity is how the difference in the
switching price, i.e. (ac bc), changes with l . We have:
¶
¶l
(ac bc) = 8(1 2q1)(2+l )l t
(3+3l  2l 2)2 (2.16)
The above relationship implies that as fairness concerns increase, the larger firm provides a
relatively better switching deal. The reason is as follows. Suppose q1 decreases from 12 as a
result of a slight increase in firmA’s first period price. This change in market share requires
the smaller firm A to raise its poaching price and the larger firm B to cut its poaching price.
When consumers have fairness concerns, A has a stronger incentive to raise its poaching
price than B’s incentive to cut its poaching price, as a lower poaching price makes their
past-customer price appear more unfair. As a result, fairness concerns lead to relatively
higher switching price offered by A and better switching deal offered by B, which gives
more incentives for consumers to stay with A to receive B’s switching deal. Thus, an
increase in fairness concerns makes consumers even less price sensitive. Consequently,
an increase in fairness concerns makes the first period profits less sensitive to first period
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prices.
The analysis of the impact of first period prices on profits show that the effect on first
period profits is driven by consumer expectations of future poaching prices while the effect
on second period profits is driven by firm expectations of the negative impact of first period
market share on second period profits. It is important to note the role of consumer and firm
discount factors. As consumers become more patient, the marginal impact of first period
profits on first period prices becomes stronger. On the other hand, as firms become more
patient, the effect of second period profits on first period prices becomes more important.
It is also useful to note that in equilibrium the first period prices are higher than the
second period prices, even for firm’s own customers. Hence when firms conduct behavior-
based pricing, prices decline over time. In particular, we have
a1 ao =
3dc(1+2l +3l 2+2l 3)+ld f (7+7l  2l 2)+3+9l +4l 2 4l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) t > 0(2.17)
a1 ac =
3dc(1+2l +3l 2+2l 3)+ld f (7+7l  2l 2)+6+9l  l 2 2l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) t > 0(2.18)
After discussing each of the two periods separately, we analyze the total discounted
profits each firm makes over two periods. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes with cus-
tomer recognition and fairness concerns in Table 2.2 and the equilibrium outcomes without
customer recognition in §2.2.1, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 (Total Discounted Profits) When consumers’ fairness concerns are suffi-
ciently strong, firms’ total discounted profits with behavior-based price discrimination ex-
ceed the total discounted profits without customer recognition.
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Existing research typically find that firms’ total discounted profits with behavior-
based price discrimination are lower than the total discounted profits without customer
recognition (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Villas-Boas 1999, Acquisti and Varian 2005, Paz-
gal and Soberman 2008). The intuition is that when consumers reveal their preferences
through buying from their preferred firms in the first period, firms offer low prices to
poach the competitor’s customers who reveal lower preferences. Poaching weakens firms’
ability to extract surplus from their high-valuation customers and intensifies competition.
As a result, profits with behavior-based poaching are lower than profits without customer
recognition. This negative impact of customer recognition has also been found in con-
texts where firms make other dynamic decisions such as behavior-based personalization in
product designs (Zhang 2011).
Here, we show that when consumers exhibit fairness concerns, behavior-based pric-
ing can be more profitable than pricing without customer recognition. The intuition fol-
lows from the results and discussions in the two separate periods. On one hand, fairness
concerns reduce firms’ profits in the second period by reducing the price charged to past
customers. On the other hand, fairness concerns increase firms’ profits in the first period
by softening price competition and reducing price sensitivity. The increase in the first pe-
riod profits offsets the decrease in the second period profits and total discounted profits
over two periods increase with fairness concerns¶¶. Furthermore, when fairness concerns
¶¶These results can still hold when the disutility of fairness concerns is a concave or convex function of the
price difference between repeat customers and switchers. With these nonlinear functional forms, all results
from the second period hold. The first period results, i.e., as fairness concerns become stronger, first period
prices increase and total discounted profits exceed total discounted profits without customer recognition, can
hold if the functional form is concave or not too convex (e.g., f (x) = x1:1). With functional forms that are too
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Figure 2.2: BBP Profits Vary with Fairness Concerns (dc = d f )
are sufficiently strong, i.e., l > l , total discounted profits are higher than profits without
customer recognition. In the case that dc = d f , the condition for behavior-based pricing to
be profitable reduces to l > l  0:14 (see Figure 2.2). In the general case that dc 6= d f ,
the threshold l is such that 9(1+2l+3l
2+2l 3)
12+3l 14l 2+l 3 2l 4 =
d f
dc (see the Technical Appendix A for
detailed proof).***
Now let us look at the implications of consumers’ fairness concerns on consumer
surplus and social welfare. We measure consumer surplus using two different approaches.
In the first approach, we measure the monetary payoff of consumers without the direct
convex, first period prices and total discounted profits of behavior-based pricing can decrease with fairness
concerns.
***As l increases from 0 to 1, 9(1+2l+3l
2+2l 3)
12+3l 14l 2+l 3 2l 4 increases to infinity. The threshold l decreases if con-
sumers are more forward-looking because profits of BBP increase with both qc and q f , where the profits
without customer recognition is (1+d f )t2 , increasing with d f only and are independent of qc.
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effect of fairness concerns on consumer utility. Note that even in this case, we incorporate
the indirect effect of fairness concerns on prices. With this approach, for a customer located
at q who purchases from firm A in both periods, his surplus would be (1+dc)(r  tq) 
a1 dcao. The second approach to compute surplus is to include the fairness component,
i.e, the direct disutility of being unfairly price discriminated. In this way, the customer in
the previous examplewould receive a surplus of (1+dc)(r tq) a1 dcao dcl (ao ac),
where the term  dcl (ao  ac) captures the disutility of experiencing price unfairness in
the second period. In the following discussion, to simplify exposition, we focus on the
case that d f = dc and t = 1. In the Technical Appendix A, we show that these results hold
for a broader range of parameters.
Proposition 5 (Consumer Surplus) Consumers’ fairness concerns decrease consumer
surplus.
Public policy makers aim to raise public awareness of firms’ practice of behavior-
based price discrimination, with the best intention of protecting consumers from being un-
fairly price discriminated by firms. The hope is that as consumers become more conscious
about price fairness, consumers can make better choices that are good for consumers as a
whole. However, such an analysis misses out on the fact that firms would optimally adjust
to such changes in the environment. Once we incorporate these strategic price adjustments,
we find that consumer surplus derived using both approaches decreases with the degree of
consumers’ fairness concerns. Thus, as consumers become more informed about firms’
price discrimination and more concerned about price fairness, consumers as a whole are
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worse off.
To understand this result, first consider the monetary consumer surplus where we
do not consider the disutility of fairness concerns in deriving consumer surplus. Fairness
concerns affect this measure of consumer surplus in several ways. On the positive side, fair-
ness concerns decrease inefficient switching to less preferred firms and lower the prices
that past customers pay. These effects enhance consumer surplus. On the negative side,
fairness concerns increase poaching prices and the first period prices. In addition, with
fairness concerns, consumers who would previously switch to enjoy the lower poaching
price now stay with their past firms and pay the higher price. These shifts lead to lower con-
sumer surplus. The negative aspect dominates the positive aspect and therefore consumer
surplus decreases with fairness concerns.
Incorporating the disutility of fairness concerns into the computation of consumer
surplus generates two more effects. Consumers who do not switch experience the disutil-
ity of fairness concerns. As l increases, fewer consumers switch (as given in Proposition
14). Hence, more customers would feel unfairly treated. On the other hand, as l increases,
the price difference between the past-customer price and the poaching price shrinks, which
decreases the disutility of unfairness. When l is less than l¯  0:47, the negative impact
dominates. If l > l¯ , the positive aspect dominates. However, even in this case, as l
increases, the positive aspect associated with adding the fairness component cannot out-
weigh the aforementioned negative changes in the monetary consumer surplus. Therefore,
consumer surplus including the fairness component also decreases with fairness concerns.
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Now let us analyze how fairness concerns affect social welfare. From the perspective
of social planners, if firms and consumers discount future payoff at the same rate, pricing
only determines the transfer between consumers and firms, and does not affect the overall
welfare. In this case, the impact of fairness concerns on social welfare excludes its impact
on prices. Proposition 14 shows that in equilibrium, as consumers become more concerned
about fairness, fewer consumers switch. Such switching is socially inefficient because
consumers switch to their less preferred firms. Since consumers’ fairness concerns reduce
inefficient switching, we expect that social welfare would increase with fairness concerns.
This intuition is true if we compute social welfare without incorporating the disutility of
fairness concerns in deriving consumer surplus. If we include the disutility of experiencing
price unfairness, social welfare can increase with the degree of fairness concerns when such
concerns are sufficiently strong.
Proposition 6 (Social Welfare) Fairness concerns increase the social welfare derived
based on monetary payoff. Fairness concerns increase the social welfare including the
disutility of price unfairness if such concerns are sufficiently strong such that l > lˆ  0:26.
The intuition is as follows. Including the disutility of unfairness directly reduces social
welfare. As l increases, it does two things. First, it reduces inefficient switching which en-
hances the monetary social welfare. Second, it magnifies the disutility of price unfairness.
When l is small, its impact on reducing switching is not enough to offset its disutility on
social welfare. In this case, social welfare decreases with l . When l is sufficiently large,
its impact on reducing switching dominates and social welfare increases.
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2.4 Model Extensions
In this section, we relax some assumptions made in the main analysis to generalize
our results and seek new insights. In the base model, consumers form price perception
by comparing their own price with other consumers’ prices. However, we only consider
fairness concerns for those consumers who pay a higher price than their peers. In addition,
we modeled fairness concerns by capturing the utility loss of paying a higher price than
other consumers, while the utility gain of paying a lower price than others is assumed
away. In §2.4.1, we incorporate fairness concerns or utility gain for those consumers who
get a favorable price relative to their peers. In §2.4.2, we consider situations where price
perception is also affected by prices that consumers paid in the first period. In the base
model, we assumed that all consumers exhibit the same degree of fairness concerns about
price discrimination. In §2.4.3, we consider the case where consumers’ fairness concerns
are endogenously determined by the number of consumers who are offered a lower price
to buy the same product. In §4.4.4, we allow consumers to face switching costs when they
switch firms in the second period. To focus on the new insights generated by the extensions,
we set dc = d f = 1 and t = 1. We summarize the key findings and discuss intuitions below.
Detailed analysis can be found in Technical Appendix A.†††
†††In addition to these extensions, we also investigated how heterogenous fairness concerns among con-
sumers affect our results. We show that when 14% or more consumers are aware about prices that other
consumers pay and have fairness concerns, BBP can be more profitable than the case without customer
recognition. Details are in the Technical Appendix §A-4.3. In addition, we extend the base model to allow
consumer preferences to change over time and show that our main results still hold (see §A-4.4).
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2.4.1 Consumers Who Pay Lower Prices Gain
In our base model, we captured the psychological phenomenon that past customers
experience a utility loss when they pay higher prices than others. New customers receive
the same product at a discounted price and may experience a utility gain for getting a deal.
To incorporate this in the model, we modify the base model and allow for this possibil-
ity. Let the parameter g represent the degree of utility gain of receiving a deal. Then the
marginal consumer at qa is characterized by:
r qa ao l (ao ac) = r 1+qa bc+g(bo bc)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2
  l (ao ac)
2
  g(bo bc)
2
(2.19)
where the term g(bo bc) is the utility gain received by the consumer when he switches to
firm B and pays a lower price bc while other consumers pay a higher price bo for the same
product. The marginal consumer at qb is analogously defined.
With this utility gain alone and without fairness concerns, first period market share
has a positive effect on second period profits. This is because having a larger market share
or customer base motivates the firm to charge a higher price for past customers, which
enhances the gain for switching customers. Meanwhile, the larger firm faces a smaller
competitor whose customers have stronger preferences for the competitor’s product. In or-
der to poach these consumers, the firm reduces the poaching price, which further enhances
the gain experienced by switching customers. For these reasons, firms price aggressively
in the first period for the purpose of improving second period profits. This force drives
first period prices to decrease, opposite to the effect of fairness concerns that drives first
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period prices to increase. In addition to this effect of second period profits on first period
prices, there is an opposing effect of first period profits on first period prices. Note that
the marginal consumer in the first period switches firms in the second period. When get-
ting a deal induces a gain, a decrease in firm A’s market share leads to a decrease in B’s
poaching price to a larger degree than without the utility gain, as B has incentives to lower
the poaching price to enhance the gain experienced by switching customers. The prospect
of receiving a lower poaching price and a better deal makes the marginal consumer in the
first period less sensitive to first period prices. This effect motivates firms to charge higher
prices in the first period, against the force to reduce first period prices for the benefits of
second period profits. When the strength of the utility gain is small, the impact of second
period profits on prices dominates and first period prices decrease. When the utility gain
is sufficiently strong, the impact of first period profits on prices dominates and first period
prices increase. However, total profits with the utility gain alone are lower than profits
without customer recognition.
If the utility gain of getting a deal and the utility loss of paying higher prices co-
exist, results in our main model still hold, though the impact of the utility loss driven by
fairness concerns are softened by the presence of utility gain associated with getting a deal.
Specifically, as fairness concerns become stronger, the poaching price increases and the
past-customer price decreases, to a smaller degree than in the absence of the utility gain of
getting a deal. This is because firms need to balance the need to manage fairness perception
and the need to exploit the gain perceived by switching consumers. The benefit of fairness
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Figure 2.3: BBP Profits with Utility Gain of Getting a Deal (g)
concerns on improving overall profits is attenuated by the presence of the utility gain, as the
utility gain alone leads to lower profits. As consumers value the utility gain more, fairness
concerns need to be stronger for behavior-based pricing to be profitable (see Figure 2.3).
In the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), inequity-averse consumers also exhibit
fairness concerns and experience a utility loss when they receive a better deal than their
peers. This can be easily modeled in the current framework by assuming that g< 0. Hence,
an alternative interpretation of g< 0 is that it captures the degree of fairness concerns expe-
rienced by new customers who pay lower prices than past customers. Our analysis shows
that our results become even stronger in this case. This is intuitive since the parameter g
makes it even less attractive for firms to price discriminate between past and new customers,
because price discrimination leads to fairness concerns and lower utility for not only past
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customers who pay higher prices but also new customers who pay lower prices. Therefore,
the effects we identified in the base model become stronger. In such cases, behavior-based
pricing can increase firms’ profits in a larger range of situations.
2.4.2 Consumers’ First-Period Price Serves as a Reference Price
Our main model has focused on the peer-induced fairness where peer consumers’
prices serve as reference prices to judge the fairness of one’s own price. Since consumers
purchase repetitively over two periods, the price that a consumer pays in the first period
may also influence how the consumer perceives prices in the second period. As discussed
in the main model, second period prices with behavior-based poaching are lower than first
period prices. Hence, consumers may experience a gain when they pay lower prices in the
second period with reference to the higher prices they paid in the first period. Let g denote
the degree of this reference price effect, the marginal consumer at qa in the second period
satisfies the condition that
r qa ao l (ao ac)+ g(a1 ao) = r 1+qa bc+ g(a1 bc)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2
  l (ao ac)
2
  g(ao bc)
2
(2.20)
qb can be obtained analogously. With this reference price effect, results in our main model
still hold. Moreover, as consumers value the reference gains more strongly, there is a larger
range of situations for behavior-based pricing to be more profitable than without customer
recognition (see Figure 2.4). This is because this reference effect alone also increases firms’
total profits.
The intuition is that with first period prices as a reference price, consumers perceive
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Figure 2.4: BBP Profits with Period 1 Price as Reference
the low poaching pricemore favorably because it offers a larger gain than the past-customer
price does. As consumers value the reference gains more strongly, consumers are more
motivated to switch, which leads to lower prices in the second period. Now the marginal
consumer in the first period anticipates receiving a lower poaching price. First period
demand becomes less sensitive to first period prices. Consequently, firms can raise first
period prices to make more profits. If the reference effect does not exist (i.e., g = 0 in
Figure ??), the model reduces to the base model. BBP is profitable when fairness concerns
are sufficiently strong. As the reference effect becomes stronger, for a smaller degree of
fairness concerns, BBP can be profitable. Therefore, fairness concerns operate in a more
general context where historical prices impact consumers’ price perceptions.‡‡‡
‡‡‡In this setup, when an old customer of firm A switches to firm B in period 2, we assume the price
that the customer paid for product A in period 1 serves as the reference price. Since the two products are
43
It is also important to understand how fairness concerns and historical reference price
impact firms differently. With the reference price alone, first period prices do not have a di-
rect effect on second period profits if fairness concerns do not exist. This is because the first
period reference price impacts perceptions of the second period past-customer prices and
poaching prices to the same degree. As first period prices increase, the marginal gain from
the competitor’s segment is canceled out by the marginal loss in a firm’s own segment even
in the presence of the reference price effect. This difference underlines the distinct mecha-
nisms through which fairness concerns and historical reference price influence firms: both
effects lead to less price-sensitive demand in the first period. However, with fairness con-
cerns, first period market share exerts a negative effect on second period profits, whereas
with historical reference price alone, first period market share has no first-order effect on
second period profits.
2.4.3 The Degree of Fairness Concerns are Endogenous
In our main model, we represent the degree of consumers’ fairness concerns with an
exogenous parameter l . The disutility of paying a price premium (ao ac) is formulated
as  l (ao ac). This is consistent with the literature on fairness concerns. However, it is
differentiated, it is also possible that B’s first period price may be the reference price for customers who
switch from A to B. In this case, the indifferent customer at qa becomes:
r qa ao l (ao ac)+ g(a1 ao) = r 1+qa bc+ g(b1 bc)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2
  l (ao ac)
2
+
g(a1 b1 ao+bc)
2
The marginal consumer at qb can be derived analogously. One notable difference is that the first period prices
impact the locations of the second period customers directly. As a result, the optimal prices in the second
period are functions of first period prices. In this case, all results hold qualitatively (see §4-2 of the Appendix
A for details).
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plausible that a consumer may be more resentful in the case where many others receive a
lower price than the case where only a few are offered a lower price. Hence, the degree of
fairness concerns could depend on the number of consumers who are offered the better deal.
As this number increases, consumers experience a higher level of inequity. To represent
this we modify the base model. Let us consider the consumer at q  qa. In equilibrium,
this consumer chooses to stay with firm A, and he will incur fairness based disutility. Since
firmA offers a switching deal to B’s customers whose q  q1, the consumer who stays with
A experiences a higher level of disutility when q1 is lower, i.e., more consumers receive a
better deal from A. Hence, the consumer’s utility is
r q  ao l (1 hq1)(ao ac) (2.21)
The degree of fairness concerns is captured by l (1 hq1), which is decreasing in q1.
Since q1 2 [0;1], we consider h < 1 to ensure that fairness concerns still exist and induce a
utility loss. Also note that if the parameter h = 0, then the model reduces to the base case.
In this setup, the marginal consumer at qa satisfies the following condition:
r qa ao l (1 hq1)(ao ac) = r  (1 qa) bc
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2
  l (1 hq1)(ao ac)
2
(2.22)
Similarly, the consumer who stays with firm B exhibits fairness concerns and the concerns
are stronger as q1 increases, i.e, more consumers receive the offer from firm B. Hence, the
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marginal consumer at qb satisfies the condition:
r  (1 qb) bo l [1 h(1 q1)] (bo bc) = r qb ac
qb =
1
2
+
bo ac
2
+
l [1 h(1 q1)] (bo bc)
2
(2.23)
Using this framework, results in our base model still hold. Specifically, as l increases, the
second period prices offered to past customers decrease, poaching prices increase, fewer
consumers switch, and second period profits decline. Moreover, the total profits of BBP
increase with l and can exceed profits without customer recognition when l exceed a
threshold. It is important to note that in this setup, the first period market share q1 has
another impact on second period profits in addition to what we have discussed in the base
model. Specifically, from firm A’s perspective, as q1 increases, it reduces the segment
of competitor’s consumers who receive the poaching deal and therefore softens past cus-
tomers’ fairness concerns. This effect generates a positive relationship between first period
market share and second period profits, counteracting with the negative relationship in the
base model. Our results show that for h < 1, the overall impact of first period market share
on second period profits is still negative, consistent with the base model.§§§ As a result,
BBP profits increase and can exceed profits without customer recognition.
§§§ In the symmetric equilibrium, q 1 = 12 . If we allow h to exceed 1 but less than 2 so that in equilibrium
fairness concerns still generate a negative utility, then when h is sufficiently large, the overall impact of the
first period market share on the second period profits can be positive. However, an increase in h reduces the
price sensitivity of the first period consumers. The two effects of h roughly cancel out and our main result
still hold (see §A-4.5 of the Technical Appendix A for details).
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2.4.4 Switching Costs
Consumers may face switching costs when they switch to a new firm. Switching
costs can be actual learning costs, inertia or psychological resistance to changes (Klemperer
1987a, Klemperer 1987b). Here we extend the base model by assuming that consumers
incur a cost when they switch firms. Let s denote the switching cost. We assume that
s 2 (0;1) such that some consumers have preferences that are higher than the switching
costs. In this case, the marginal consumer at qa becomes
r qa ao l (ao ac) = r  (1 qa) bc  s (2.24)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2
  l (ao ac)
2
+
s
2
(2.25)
Similarly, we can obtain qb and solve for the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (see
Technical Appendix A for details).
When consumers who express fairness concerns also face switching costs, we find
that the effects of fairness concerns on the second period prices and profits are stronger than
without switching costs. The reason is that switching costs discourage consumers from
switching, leading to a larger segment of past customers who experience fairness concerns.
Therefore, firms need to adjust prices to a greater extent and second period profits decline
more with fairness concerns. The benefit of fairness concerns on raising first period prices
and profits still exist.¶¶¶
¶¶¶We can also examine the case with only switching costs by setting l = 0. Switching costs lead to firms
charging higher prices for the customers who are “locked-in” than the prices offered to the competitor’s
customers. These effects are directionally consistent with the impact of fairness concerns. However, it is
useful to note several distinctions between the effects of switching costs and fairness concerns (see Techni-
cal Appendix A for detailed comparisons). Switching costs increase the price for past-customers who are
“locked-in” with the firm and decrease the price for customers who are “locked-in” with the competitor.
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2.5 Conclusion
As technology allows firms to easily track and store customers’ purchase informa-
tion, the practice of behavior-based pricing (BBP) is increasingly important for online and
offline firms. At the same time, consumers are more knowledgeable about prices paid by
other consumers and more aware of firms’ practices of behavior-based price discrimina-
tion. Consumers who pay a higher price than others feel unfairly treated by firms. Price
(un)fairness has become a serious concern that affects consumers’ purchase decisions. In
this paper, we attempt to understand how firms should adjust behavior-based pricing strat-
egy to take consumers’ fairness concerns into account. We consider a two-period model
with competing firms that recognize own and competitor’s customers from purchase his-
tory and poach the competitor’s customers at a discounted price. Past customers pay higher
prices and exhibit fairness concerns about firms’ price discrimination in the second period.
We show that when consumers exhibit fairness concerns, firms can obtain higher total
discounted profits from conducting behavior-based pricing than without customer recogni-
tion. This is because with fairness concerns, the first period market share has a negative
first-order impact on the second period profits. This effect motivates firms to raise first
period prices for the benefit of second period profits. In addition, consumers’ fairness con-
cerns reduce consumers’ price sensitivity in the first period, which gives more incentives
for firms to raise first period prices. As first period prices increase, first period profits in-
Consequently, switching costs increase second period profits. However, fairness concerns have the opposite
impact. In addition, with switching costs, the first period market share has a positive impact on second period
profits, because firms with a larger customer base can exploit the locked-in customers with higher prices and
make more profits. However, with fairness concerns, the first period market share negatively impacts second
period profits.
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creases and drive the total discounted profits of BBP to exceed the total discounted profits
without customer recognition.
We also show that consumers’ fairness concerns reduce price differential and encour-
age consumers to stay with their preferred firms, which enhances social welfare. Finally,
the growing awareness of price fairness among consumers does not benefit consumers as a
whole. Instead, as consumers become more fairness-minded, consumer surplus decreases.
This finding cautions public policy makers who intend to increase public awareness of
firms’ price discrimination practices in order to protect consumers. Such actions may raise
consumers’ consciousness about price unfairness, but hurt all consumers when firms adjust
their BBP strategies to respond to consumers’ fairness concerns.
In our theoretical analysis, we only considered one decision variable, namely price.
In practice, firms can offer products of customized quality or customized services to cus-
tomers based on revealed preferences in purchase history. Therefore, it would be useful to
explore how fairness concerns influence consumers’ buying decisions and firm’s quality
and price offerings. It would also be interesting to investigate the implications of fairness
concerns on firms’ other strategies. Lastly, researchers can empirically test how fairness
affects consumer decisions in various contexts. It would be interesting to incorporate con-
sumers’ fairness concerns and empirically assess the profitability of behavior-based target-
ing in the presence of fairness concerns.
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3 CONTEXT-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND PRODUCT
UPGRADE
3.1 Introduction
Extensive behavioral research has established that consumers exhibit context-
dependent preferences (Huber et al. 1982; Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992;
Tversky and Simonson 1993; Brenner et al. 1999; Ravi et al. 2000). When consumers
evaluate a product, they consider not only the intrinsic value of the product, but also the
relative standing of the product in relation to products that other consumers use in the
choice context. Compared to other consumers, consuming a superior product induces a
psychological gain while consuming a superseded product induces a psychological loss.
In product categories characterized with frequent product upgrades, context-
dependent preferences influence consumers’ overall satisfaction with products and the in-
fluence changes dynamically as firms introduce upgrades. When firms first introduce a
new product, relative to consumers who have not adopted the product, early adopters may
experience a psychological gain from using the new product that signals social status and
openness to new technology (Jerpi 2012; Rao and Schaefer 2014). As new technology
becomes available, firms introduce upgraded version of the product. Consumers may buy
the upgraded product to enjoy the prestige of using the most advanced product, relative
to consumers who use the older model and consumers who have not adopted the product
(Thompson and Norton 2011). At the same time, compared to consumers who use the up-
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grade, those who continue using the older model may feel less satisfied with their product.
The value of the older model decreases not because of a depreciation in the product’s in-
trinsic value per se but by the rapid change in its context, i.e., introduction of a superior
product. Similarly, consumers who do not own the product may feel pressured to buy to
keep up with the latest technology and avoid the psychological loss of falling behind.
3.1.1 Research Questions
Product upgrades are prevalent in a wide range of industries. For example, soft-
ware manufactures launch new versions of softwares, mobile phone providers introduce
new generations of devices. Product upgrades are also prevalent in industries such as
personal computers, video games, and consumer electronics. Given the important in-
fluence of context-dependent preferences on consumers’ experience in the context that
firms introduce upgrades, we need to understand the following questions: (1) How would
context-dependent preferences affect consumer choice when firms introduce successive
generations of products? (2) How should firms adjust upgrade introduction strategy to
take consumers’ context-dependent preferences into account? Would context-dependent
preferences motivate firms to introduce high-cost major upgrades or low-cost small up-
grades? (3) How would firm’s dynamic pricing strategy change under context-dependent
preferences? (4) How would context-dependent preferences affect firm’s overall profits,
consumer surplus and social welfare? (5) Howwould context-dependent preferences affect
a firm’s upgrade pricing policy? In the presence of context-dependent preferences, should
firms offer a discounted price for existing users of the firm’s older model to upgrade? De-
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spite the importance of these questions, there is almost no research which has examined
firm’s upgrade introduction strategy under context-dependent preferences to shed light on
these questions. The objective of this paper is to attempt to fill this research gap.
Researchers have been interested in studying durable-good firm’s upgrade decision.
One interesting focus of this stream of research is on firm’s commitment problem. Specifi-
cally, when new technology becomes available for improving product quality, firm ex post
sells upgrades to increase profits. However, strategic consumers anticipate the future ar-
rival of upgrades, by-pass the base product, and wait for the upgrade. In this case, firm
would ex ante be better off if it can commit to not introducing upgrades. However, lack
of ability to make a credible commitment, firm’s overall profit decrease. Researchers have
investigated solutions to this commitment problem by augmenting firm’s strategy space,
such as through offering sufficiently high quality into the base product in the first period
(Choi 1994), leasing the base product in the first period (Waldman 1996), or offering free
upgrade warranty for consumers who buy the base product (Sankaranarayanan 2007). Our
paper attempts to add to this stream of research by augmenting consumers’ utility function,
incorporating consumers’ context-dependent preferences into the standard utility function.
We show that context-dependent preferences can resolve the firm’s commitment problem
by rendering future introduction of upgrades unprofitable, thereby increasing firm’s overall
profits.
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3.1.2 Preview of Model and Findings
To address these questions, we build a game theoretic model, in which a durable-
goods monopolist sells successive generations of a product to consumers with continuous
and heterogenous valuations for quality*. We use a standard two-period model in which
the firm sells a base version of the product in period 1 and has the option of introduc-
ing an upgraded version of the product in period 2†. Consumers decide whether to buy
the base product in period 1 and whether to buy the upgrade in period 2. We first exam-
ine the firm’s upgrade strategy in the benchmark model in which consumers’ preferences
are context-independent. This benchmark model represents the classic economic model
that assumes away contextual comparisons and the resulting utility of comparative gains
and losses. Building on this benchmark model, we investigate how the firm’s upgrade
strategy changes when consumer choice is influenced by context-dependent preferences.
In this case, we allow the utility that consumers derive from a product to include two
components: the context-independent utility as in the benchmark model, and the context-
dependent utility arising from the psychological gains and losses in comparison to other
*We consider context in which technology innovation dictates the sequential introduction of successive
generations of improved products over time (Norton and Bass 1987; Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Dhebar
1994; Kornish 2001; Bulow 1982; Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998). In other words, firm
does not have the technology to produce the upgraded product prior to period 2. For example, technological
improvement in designing computer chips allow new generations of computers to increase speed and power.
Restricting our consideration to such context focus our analysis on firm’s decision to introduce upgrades
in period 2 rather than the decision to introduce products simultaneously or sequentially (Moorthy and Png
1992). In §3.6.4, we will consider the case that firm can offer two products in a period.
†The two-period setting has been widely used in the literature to capture the durable nature of the product
and the dynamic impact of firm decision (see for example Bulow 1982; Dhebar 1994; Desai and Purohit 1998;
Kornish 2001; Desai et al. 2004; Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998; Ellison and Fudenberg 2000;
Bala and Carr 2009). In §3.6.5, we will discuss the implications of context-dependent preferences in a setting
with more than two time periods.
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consumers’ choices in the context.
We find several interesting results. We show that when the cost of introducing up-
grades is low, the firm is more likely to introduce upgrades with minor quality improve-
ment and sell them to low-valuation consumers who did not buy the base product in period
1. When the cost is high, the firm would only introduce upgrades with major quality im-
provement and also sell the upgrades to existing consumers of the firm’s base product. In
particular, context-dependent preferences motivate consumers who do not own the base
product to buy upgrades while discouraging existing consumers to do so. The reason
is that introducing an upgrade affects consumers’ context-dependent preferences in two
counteracting ways, and the relative strength of the two effects varies for the two types
of consumers. First, introducing an upgrade shifts the reference quality upward, which re-
duces the comparative utility of the base product and increases the comparative dis-utility
of forgoing consumption. This reference quality effect increases the comparative appeal of
the upgraded product. However, consumers with context-dependent preferences are also
more sensitive to prices. This reference price effect occurs because relative to consumers
who do not buy the upgrade, paying the price of the upgrade imposes a psychological loss
above and beyond the economic cost of the purchase. This increased price sensitivity hurts
the firm’s profit from selling the upgrade as the firm cannot charge prices as high as it does
without this effect. For consumers who do not own the base product, as the reference qual-
ity increases upon the arrival of the upgrade, the loss for not using any products outweighs
the loss for paying for the upgrade. Hence, the reference quality effect dominates the refer-
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ence price effect, motivating these consumers to buy the upgrade. In contrast, for existing
consumers who own the base product, even though the arrival of the upgrade reduces the
relative value of the base product, using the base product is still in the gain domain. How-
ever, for these consumers, purchasing the upgrade induces a loss. Since losses loom larger
than gains, the reference price effect dominates the reference quality effect. As a result,
existing consumers with context-dependent preferences are less willing to purchase the
upgrade.
Our results also show that firm’s overall profits can increase due to context-dependent
preferences, even when its profits from selling an upgrade decrease. The intuition is that
firms may suffer from a commitment problem: ex post firms prefer to introduce upgrades,
but strategic consumers anticipate this and wait for the upgrade, which makes it ex ante
more profitable for firms not to introduce upgrades. Context-dependent preferences can re-
solve this commitment problem by rendering future introduction of upgrades unprofitable.
As a result, the firm obtains a higher profit from selling the base product over time than the
profit it can receive by selling sequentially upgraded products. We also find that context-
dependent preferences can improve consumer surplus. This occurs when consumers’ loss
aversion is not too severe. In a subset of this region, consumers’ context-dependent pref-
erences also increase social welfare. Finally, we show that the upgrade pricing policy,
i.e., selling upgrades to existing consumers at a discounted price, is not always a preferred
upgrade policy when consumers exhibit context-dependent preferences. This is because
offering a low upgrade price can reduce the reference price, imposing a loss for new con-
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sumers who buy the upgrade at the higher new-user price‡. As a result, fewer new con-
sumers would want to buy the upgrade, and the overall profit of selling the upgrade could
decrease. We extend our model in several directions. We consider alternative assumptions
of reference formation, a model with more than two time periods, endogenous quality im-
provement, and a setting that technology for introducing the upgrade is available so that
the firm offers two products in the first period. We show that our main results are robust
to these extensions and discuss new insights.
3.1.3 Contributions
Our findings have important managerial implications. First, we help explain how
context-dependent preferences influence consumer choice, an insight relevant to the wide
range of industries characterized with frequent product upgrades. Second, we point out
that the presence of context-dependent preferences has a significant impact on a firm’s
optimal upgrade introduction. In particular, after accounting for context-dependent pref-
erences, the firm should be more aggressive in introducing low-cost upgrades and more
conservative in introducing high-cost upgrades than in the absence of context-dependent
preferences. Thus, our findings show that context-dependent preferences encourage low-
cost evolutional rather than high-cost revolutionary advancement in product design. Third,
we show that although the firm can extract surplus from existing consumers by offering
them a separate upgrade price, the firm may want to abandon this upgrade pricing policy
‡The low-valuation consumers start to buy the firm’s product in period 2. Therefore, we call these con-
sumers “new consumers”. They are low-valuation consumers who do not buy the base product in period
1. They are new to the firm rather than new to the market. New and existing consumers are endogenously
determined by the firm’s pricing and upgrade strategy in the model.
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after taking consumers’ context-dependent preferences into account. From the perspective
of public policy makers, our results show that context-dependent preferences can increase
consumer surplus and social welfare as long as consumers’ loss aversion is not too severe.
This finding suggests that education programs that help consumers with a strong loss aver-
sion trait to reduce loss aversion using techniques such as emotion regulations need not
always be beneficial (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2012).
This paper contributes to the literature in several important aspects. First, we ex-
amine a firm’s optimal upgrade introduction strategy when consumers exhibit context-
dependent preferences. We show that the presence of context-dependent preferences leads
to a larger range of situations for firms to introduce low-cost upgrades and a smaller
range of situations for firms to introduce high-cost upgrades. Second, our results reveal
that context-dependent preferences can resolve a firm’s upgrade commitment problem, en-
abling the firm to obtain higher total profits. Third, we show that offering upgrade pric-
ing policy may not always be optimal if consumers exhibit context-dependent preferences.
These findings add new insights to existing research on durable-goodmonopolist’s upgrade
strategy and context-dependent preferences. Lastly, this research also adds to the growing
marketing literature that incorporates consumers’ psychological behaviors to enrich stan-
dard economic models and examine firms’ strategies (see for example, Amaldoss and Jain
2005; Villas-Boas 2009; Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Guo 2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We will first review the related litera-
ture in §3.2. We introduce the model setup in §4.3. In §3.4, we solve for the firm’s opti-
57
mal upgrade introduction in the benchmark case where consumers do not exhibit context-
dependent preferences. In §3.5, we incorporate context-dependent preferences in the firm’s
upgrade decision. §4.4 extends our base model and verifies the robustness of our results.
We conclude with managerial implications and directions for future research in §4.5.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to research that examines how context-dependent prefer-
ences affect firms’ marketing strategies. In the traditional economic model, the utility that
consumers derive from a product is a function of only the attributes of the product itself,
and is invariant across context and independent of the attributes of the other alternatives.
Optimal strategies derived under this assumption may not hold when preferences change
with context. For this reason, researchers have shown increasing interest in examining
firms’ optimal strategies that incorporate context-dependent preferences. Orhun (2009)
studies a monopolist’s product line design when consumers’ valuation for a product de-
pends on its attributes relative to the other products in the choice context. Chen and Turut
(2013) investigate firms’ innovation strategy, i.e., whether a late entrant should innovate
on a product’s key performance dimension or on new performance dimension. They found
that context-dependent preferences may encourage the follower to innovate on the new per-
formance dimension and the firm would not do so without context-dependent preferences.
Rao and Turut (2013) study how context-dependent preferences impact firms’ incentive to
preannounce future products. They show that context-dependent preferences dissuade a
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monopolist or a low-quality firm in a duopoly from preannouncing future products while
motivating a high-quality firm to preannounce future products. Our work differs from their
study in two ways. First, we examine firm’s decision to introduce future (upgraded) prod-
ucts whereas they examine preannouncement decision given that future products will be
introduced. Second, we are interested in situations where consumers who buy the base
product can also buy the upgrade, which is not investigated in their model. Wang and
Kuksov (2013) examine how competing firms’ pricing strategy is affected by consumers’
loss aversion when consumers incur a cost in searching for lower prices. They found that
loss aversion can result in higher profits for firms. Lim (2010) studies optimal contest de-
sign when contestants care about their contest outcomes relative to other contestants. To
summarize, the stream of research on context-dependent preferences has not examined the
impact of context-dependence on firm’s product upgrade strategy, which is the focus of
this paper.
Our work is also related to the research on product upgrades. Bulow (1986) exam-
ines a monopolist’s product durability decision. He shows that the firm may introduce new
products too often and in order to mitigate this problem, the firm can shorten the durabil-
ity of its product from the socially optimal level. Levinthal and Purohit (1989) examine
the optimality of strategies such as limiting sales, buy-backs, and announcements of future
upgrades. They model the decrease in an old product’s value by the degree of competi-
tion between the new and the old products. In contrast to this research, we examine the
impact of context-dependent preferences on upgrade strategy. Interestingly, when we in-
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corporate context-dependence the value of the base product decreases in its comparative
value upon the arrival of an upgraded product, even though the functional value of the base
product remains unchanged. Therefore, the extent to which preferences for an older prod-
uct decrease over time is endogenously determined by the quality improvement that the
upgrade represents. Our framework is particularly relevant in today’s marketplace where
consumers purchase upgrades before their old products wear out.
Moorthy and Png (1992) study when a seller facing two segments of consumers with
different valuations of quality should introduce high and low end products sequentially or
simultaneously. They showed that sequential introduction is preferred when cannibaliza-
tion is a problem and customers are relatively more impatient than the seller. Padmanab-
han et al. (1997) showed that when consumers are uncertain about future network base
of a high-technology product, under-provision of introductory quality serves as a signal of
high externality and upgrades implement this signaling strategy. Unlike these studies, we
study the firm’s decision as to whether to introduce an upgrade after introducing a base
product. In our model, technological improvement is exogenous and takes place over time
and technology required for producing the upgrade product is not available in period 1 (see
similar set up in Dhebar 1994; Kornish 2001).
Sankaranarayanan (2007) examines a firm’s decision to upgrade a durable product
that is backward compatible. He shows that by offering consumers who purchase current
products a free upgrade can alleviate a firm’s commitment problem. However, the author
does not consider consumers’ context-dependent preferences and its implications on the
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profitability of introducing upgrades. We show that the firm’s commitment problem can
be mitigated by the presence of context-dependent preferences. Furthermore, offering a
low upgrade pricing (such as free upgrades) for existing consumers to upgrade can be
detrimental as it penalizes new consumers who buy the upgrade at a higher new-user price.
When the quality improvement in the upgrade is low and consumers are sufficiently loss
averse, the firm would want to abandon this upgrade pricing policy.
This paper is also related to literature about Coase conjecture for durable goods.
Coase proposed that when consumers rationally expect that prices will decline, consumers
strategically postpone purchase, which decreases the firm’s profit from using intertemporal
price discrimination. The firm can be better off if it commits to sell the product always at
the same price. Researchers have formally examined Coase’s conjecture and its implica-
tion on dynamic pricing and product introduction. Dhebar (1994) models a durable-goods
monopolist selling sequential versions of a product in a two-period model without second-
hand markets. In his model, the monopolist sells only Version 1 in period 1 and Version
2 in period 2. He shows that no equilibrium exists if technological change is too rapid.
Kornish (2001) uses a similar set up and shows that equilibrium exists as long as the firm
does not offer any upgrade pricing, i.e., special pricing for customers who have purchased
previous versions. Unlike this stream of literature, we study a different type of commit-
ment problem, namely the firm cannot commit to not introducing upgrades. In anticipation
of future upgrades, consumers could withhold purchase of the current product and wait for
the upgrade. This strategic consumer behavior can decrease the firm’s total profit.
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3.3 Model Setup
We consider a two-period model in which a risk-neutral monopolist sells a durable
product§ ¶. Two-period model has been commonly used to capture the durable nature of the
product and to analyze the inter-temporal incentives of consumers and firms (for example
Bulow 1982; Dhebar 1994; Desai and Purohit 1998; Kornish 2001; Desai et al. 2004;
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998; Ellison and Fudenberg 2000; Bala and
Carr 2009). Researchers have also adopted two-period model to study optimal leasing and
selling strategy (Desai and Purohit 1998) and channel coordination (Desai et al. 2004). In
§3.6.5, we will discuss the implications of context-dependent preferences in a model with
more time periods. The product is characterized with a single attribute that is denoted by
quality.
In the first period, the firm sells a base model of the product. Quality of the base
product is q0 that does not depreciate over time.ǁ We normalize q0 to 1. In the second pe-
riod, new technology becomes available which allows the firm to introduce an upgrade i.e.,
an enhanced model of the base product. The assumption that firm can only introduce the
§Studying the setting of a monopoly is a natural first step (see Coase 1972; Bulow 1986; Levinthal and
Purohit 1989; Waldman 1996; Desai and Purohit 1998; Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998;
Ellison and Fudenberg 2000; Bala and Carr 2009). Our analysis focuses on the impact of context-dependent
preferences on firm’s upgrades decision without competition. This analysis applies for industries or local
markets in which one firm dominates as well as situations where consumers exhibit strong brand loyalty and
rarely switch to a competitor.
¶We consider situations in which firms sell rather than lease products to consumers, which is consistent
with observations of firm practice in many high-technology industries such as computers, softwares, electron-
ics, and telecommunication devices. Although we do not explicitly model leasing, prior research has shown
that a durable-goods monopolist might prefer to sell rather than lease because of a moral hazard problem
concerning consumer maintainable decision (Waldman 1996; Mann 1992).
ǁIn durable-good industries, upgrades are sometimes introduced rapidly before the functionality of the
base product depreciates. In such cases, it is reasonable to assume that depreciation is negligible for con-
sumers’ and the firm’s decisions.
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upgrade in the second period has been commonly used in related research (see for example
Norton and Bass (1987); Levinthal and Purohit (1989); Dhebar(1994); Kornish (2001)).
Researchers have studied firm’s decision to introduce high-end product simultaneously or
sequentially when technology is available in period 1 (see Moorthy and Png 1992; Pad-
manabhan et al. 1997). We differ from these studies by focusing on firm’s decision to
introduce upgrades when technology shocks take place after period 1 and technology dic-
tates the firm to introduce successively improved generations of products sequentially. In
§3.6.4, we will extend the model to consider the case that firm can introduce the upgraded
product in period 1. Quality of the upgraded product is 1+w, where w is the quality im-
provement over the base product. The upgraded product is consumed in the second period.
The fixed cost involved for introducing the upgrade is c**.
Given that markets of durable products such as mobile devices, automobiles, and
personal computers are mature, enhancements in upgrades primarily strengthen the current
functionality rather than create innovative features (Today 2013). For example, Apple’s
new iPhone 5 was featured as larger, lighter, and faster (Delevett et al. 2012), Sony’s
PlayStation 3 gaming console had a few minor upgrades such as fixing wireless headset
users’ audio issues (Mlot 2012). For this reason, we consider w < 12 , i.e, the magnitude
of quality improvement is less than half of the utility from the base product. We assume
**We allow c to be independent of w to simplify notation and analysis. Alternatively, we could define c()
to be a convex and increasing function of w to show that the fixed cost of introducing an upgrade increases
with the amount of quality improvement. This formulation can further enhance our main finding as we will
show that with context-dependent preferences, firm’s profits from introducing large upgrades decrease and
profits from introducing small upgrades increase. With the convex cost function c(w), as w increases, the
increasing cost drives the profits of introducing large upgrades to decrease even more. When w is close to 0,
c(w) is small and profits for introducing small upgrades can still increase with context-dependent preferences.
Therefore, the qualitative nature of our results still holds.
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that w is exogenous. This assumption reflects the fact that the extent to which a firm
can improve its product is constrained by technology. Only as technology advances and
knowledge accumulates over time, can the firm offer better quality products (Krishnan
and Ramachandran 2011). By assuming w to be exogenous, we abstract away from the
firm’s R&D decision, and therefore, focus our analysis on the firm’s upgrade introduction
decision. We will relax this assumption and allow the firm to choose w in §3.6.3. We
also assume that the firm only sells one version of the product in a period as operating
two product lines is costly (Levinthal and Purohit 1989) and therefore the firm would not
sell the base model once upgrade becomes available. This assumption implies that if the
firm introduces the upgraded product, it withdraws the base product and sells only the
upgraded product in that period, which is consistent with practice in many industries such
as automobiles, personal computers, and software (Bala and Carr 2009). If the firm does
not introduce the upgraded product, it sells the base product in two periods. We assume that
if a consumer purchases a new product in the second period, the old product is scrapped
and of no value in the second period (Dhebar 1994; Lee and Lee 1998; Kornish 2001). This
is common in product categories with rapid technology innovations such as software††.
3.3.1 The Firm
The firm makes a product upgrade decision and sets prices in both periods. In par-
ticular, in the beginning of period 1, the firm sets the period 1 price to maximize the total
††Firms may offer buy-back and trade-in policies. Such policies lower the upgrading prices for existing
users of the firm’s product to buy the upgraded product. We will extend the model to consider such policy
in §3.6.1.
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profit over two periods. In the beginning of period 2, the firm first decides whether to intro-
duce an upgraded product or continue selling the base product. After making this upgrade
decision, it sets the period 2 price to maximize the period 2 profit. We assume that in each
period, the firm does not price discriminate among consumers. In other words, in each
period, the firm sells the product to existing consumers and new consumers at the same
price (Waldman 1996). One could argue that firms sometimes offer discounted prices for
existing users to buy the upgrade, such as through a special upgrade pricing policy, trade-
in, or buy-backs. In §3.6.1, we extend our base model to account for this possibility. We
assume that the firm has same constant marginal costs for both products, in order to focus
on how the firm’s upgrade strategy changes with context-dependent preferences rather than
changes in production costs (see Rao and Turut 2013). Without little loss of generality, the
constant marginal costs are set to zero (Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Lee and Lee 1998)‡‡.
3.3.2 Consumers
The firm serves risk-neutral consumers with unit mass 1. Consumers are heteroge-
nous in their valuation of quality. Let q index a consumer’s valuation for quality. Without
context-dependent preferences, the indirect utility that the q -type consumer derives from
purchasing a product of intrinsic quality q sold at price p is
Uc(p;q;q) = qq  p (3.1)
We model consumer heterogeneity by assuming that q is uniformly distributed in [0;1].
The term Uc(p;q;q) represents the context-independent utility enjoyed by the consumer
‡‡This assumption is of little loss of generality because prices are interpreted as being net of constant
marginal cost.
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in the traditional economicmodel that assumes away any contextual effects. We denote this
utility the consumption utility, as it represents the utility derived from merely consuming
the product independent of context. If a consumer does not purchase any products, he
receives an outside goodwhose consumption utility is normalized to 0. When a consumer’s
total consumption experience is influenced by the relative standing of the product in the
choice context, in addition to the consumption utility, consumers also experience a context-
dependent utility. We will discuss this context-dependent utility in §3.5.
We assume that consumers form rational expectations about their future actions and
the firm’s decisions. In other words, consumers expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium.
This assumption has been widely used by marketing researchers to study consumers’ strate-
gic responses to firms’ decisions (see for example, Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Amaldoss
and Jain 2005; Sankaranarayanan 2007). Lastly, to simplify notation and analysis, we set
the discount factors of the firm and consumers to 1.
3.3.3 Consumption Patterns
If the firm does not introduce upgrades, the equilibrium consumption pattern consists
of three choices (see Figure 3.1). First, some consumers buy the base product in period 1 at
the price p1 and use it for two periods. We denote this choice by (1;1). The quality of the
base product is 1 and its price p1 is paid in period 1 only. For this case, the consumption
utility is q  p1 in period 1 and q in period 2. Second, some consumers wait to buy the base
product in period 2. Consumers may be willing to wait if prices decline over time (Coase
1972). For example, Apple unveiled the first generation of iPhone for $599 (8 GB). A few
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Figure 3.1: Consumer Choice Pattern Without Upgrades
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months later, Apple slashed this price by $200 (Robertson and Wong 2007). Consumers
who are unwilling to pay $599 can buy this phone at the reduced price after waiting. We
denote this option by (0;1). The consumer who waits receives a consumption utility 0 in
period 1 and q   p2 in period 2, where p2 is the product’s price in period 2. Third, some
consumers do not buy the product. We denote this option by (0;0). The consumption
utility of this choice is 0 in each period. The consumption pattern that reflects these three
choices is shown in Figure 3.1. In this situation, consumers with higher valuations buy
earlier. Specifically, the consumer whose q > qˆ1 buys in the first period, the consumer
whose qˆ2 < q < qˆ1 buys in the second period, and the consumer with a smaller q does not
buy. The firm makes profit in the second period by selling the base product to consumers
in the region (qˆ2; qˆ1).
If the firm introduces an upgrade, four consumer segments can arise. First, some
consumers who buy the base product in period 1 can also buy the upgraded product in
period 2. The consumption utility is q   p1 in period 1 and q(1+w)  p2 in period 2.
Second, some consumers buy the base product only. They buy the base product in period
1 and use it over two periods. The corresponding consumption utility is q   p1 in period
1 and q in period 2. Third, some consumers choose not to buy the base product in period
67
Figure 3.2: Consumer Choice Pattern A With Upgrades
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1, waiting to buy the upgraded product. Then the consumption utility is 0 in period 1 and
q(1+w)  p2 in period 2. Lastly, consumers can forego consumption completely. Again,
the consumption utility for doing so is 0. We denote each choice by (x;y) where x and y
represent the quality of the product consumed in two periods separately.
Depending on the value of w, two consumption patterns can emerge. Figure 3.2
depicts the pattern in which all four consumer segments arise. In this pattern, the firm
makes profit in period 2 by selling the upgraded product to two types of customers: new
consumers in the region (q3;q1) who have relatively low valuations for quality and did
not purchase the base product, and existing consumers in the region (q2;1) who have the
highest valuations for quality and have purchased the base product in period 1. When w
is sufficiently large and the price of the upgrade is sufficiently low, existing consumers
purchase the upgrade to replace their base product. Alternatively, if w is small, the firm
can price the upgrade such that only new consumers buy the upgrade§§. The corresponding
consumption pattern is shown in Figure 3.3. In this case, the firm makes profit in period 2
by selling the upgrade only to new consumers in the region (q3;q1).
§§New consumers refer to consumers who did not buy the base product in period 1 but buy the upgrade in
period 2. These consumers are located in the region (q3;q1) and are new to the firm in period 2.
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Figure 3.3: Consumer Choice Pattern B With Upgrades
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Figure 3.4: Timing of the Game

 Period 1
Period 2
The firm sells the base product for p1 and consumers make purchase decisions.
The firm makes an upgrade decision and posts price p2. The consumers then make purchase decisions.
3.3.4 Timing of the Game
The timing of the game is shown in Figure 3.4. In period 1, the firm posts the price
of the base product, and all consumers simultaneously decide whether to purchase the base
product. Period 2 consists of three stages. First, the firm decides whether to introduce
an upgraded product. Second, the firm posts the price of the product that it decides to
sell. Third, consumers decide whether to purchase the product. We derive the sub-game
perfect equilibrium by solving the game backwards. Details are included in the Technical
Appendix.
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3.4 Benchmark Case
We start by analyzing the benchmark case in which consumer preferences are context-
independent. In this setting, we analyze the firm’s optimal upgrade strategy. It is important
to note that the upgrade decision is made by the firm at the beginning of period 2. Intro-
ducing an upgraded product is optimal if selling it yields a higher profit than selling the
base product. The following proposition gives the condition under which introducing an
upgrade is optimal.
Proposition 7 (Benchmark Model) In the absence of context-dependent preferences, as
long as the cost of upgrade introduction is not too large, there exists a threshold of w such
that the monopolist introduces an upgrade if and only if w exceeds this threshold.
This proposition shows that as long as the fixed cost c is not too large, the firm should
introduce an upgrade if the degree of quality improvement exceeds a threshold. In fact, if
introducing an upgrade is costless (c= 0), the firm in period 2 would always prefer selling
an upgrade over selling the base product. This is because the upgraded product has a higher
quality than the base product. Since the willingness to pay for the upgrade is higher, the
firm can charge a higher price when it sells an upgrade. In addition, when consumers
anticipate that the upgrade will be introduced in period 2, fewer consumers purchase the
base product in period 1 and more wait to buy in period 2. This shift in demand further
increases the profit in period 2. A higher quality improvement (w) leads to a larger increase
in willingness to pay. More consumers are motivated to wait for an upgrade with a larger
quality improvement (w). Therefore, a higher w also leads to a greater shift in demand.
70
Figure 3.5: Period 2 Profit Varies without Context Dependence
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Hence, the period 2 profit (denoted by Pn2 in Figure 3.5) is increasing in w. When c> 0 ,
w needs to exceed a threshold to offset the cost for introducing the upgrade to be profitable.
When w is small (w < w in Figure 3.5), the firm prices the upgrade so that consumers
who own the base product would not upgrade. The firm maximizes profit by selling the
upgrade to new consumers only. When w is sufficiently large (w> w), the firm obtains a
higher profit by selling the upgrade to both new and existing consumers.
3.5 With Context-Dependent Preferences
In this section we examine how the firm’s optimal upgrade strategy changes when
consumers exhibit context-dependent preferences. When consumer preferences are influ-
enced by choice context, in addition to the consumption utility, consumers also obtain a
context-dependent utility from making a choice. The context-dependent utility is derived
from the relative standing of a product compared to the other alternatives in the market.
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Prior researchers have formulated this contextual comparison by forming a context-specific
reference point, in relation to which choices are framed as gains and losses (Orhun 2009;
Chen and Turut 2013; Rao and Turut 2013; Lim 2010). On the quality dimension, consum-
ing a product with a quality that is higher than the reference quality induces a psychologi-
cal gain (Hardie et al. 1993). The psychological gain reflects the incremental satisfaction
above and beyond the enjoyment derived from using the product independent of other alter-
natives in the context. For example, consumers who use the latest version of smart phones
feel prestigious in comparison to other consumers who use older versions or who do not
own a smart phone. Similarly, on the price dimension, in addition to the economic loss,
paying a price that exceeds the reference price in a choice context induces a psychological
cost. Prior research has provided evidence of this reference price effect (see for example,
Monroe 1973; Winer 1986; Jacobson and Obermiller 1990; Putler 1992; Rajendran and
Tellis 1994; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Mazumdar et al. 2005).
Following prior research, we define the reference point for each attribute as the av-
erage value of the attribute available in the market (Orhun 2009; Chen and Turut 2013;
Rao and Turut 2013). The two attributes that we consider are: the level of quality and the
price. When the firm does not introduce upgrades, period 1 consists of consumers who
buy the base product or nothing. The reference price and reference quality are therefore
p1
2 and
1
2 respectively
¶¶. In period 2, the available quality levels remain the same but the
¶¶Note that market is not fully covered. In any period, the market consists of consumers who choose the
outside option, i.e, not buying any product. Behavioral research has shown that choosing a higher-quality
option such as buying a technological product signals consumers’ technological skills and openness to new
experiences (Thompson and Norton 2011). The presence of non-buyers is critical for buyers to experience
relative social gain from using a high-quality product(Iyer and Soberman 2013). Without non-buyers, buyers
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price paid by the consumers is either 0 or p2. Therefore, the reference price becomes p22
as period 2 consists of consumers who buy the product at p2 or who do not buy. Now
consider the case when the firm introduces an upgrade in the second period. In this case,
some consumers will choose to upgrade and experience a quality level of 1+w. However,
some consumers who previously bought will continue to use the old product and enjoy a
product with quality 1. Finally , some consumers will not purchase the product in both
periods. Thus, the reference quality in this case becomes 2+w3 . There are alternative ways
to formulate the reference point. For example, the reference point can be formed by past
and future information (Lattin and Bucklin 1989; Kalyanaraman and Little 1994; Briesch
et al. 1997; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). In §3.6.2 we show that the qualitative nature of
our results is robust to these alternative formulations.
We adopt the linear Loss Aversion Model (LAM) to model consumers’ context-
dependent preferences (Kivetz et al. 2004a; Kivetz et al. 2004b; Koszegi and Rabin 2006;
Orhun 2009; Narasimhan and Turut 2013; Chen and Turut 2013; Rao and Turut 2013). In
this model, consumers’ total utility is the sum of the context-independent utility and the
context-dependent utility. The utility of relative gains and the dis-utility of relative losses
are additively separable. Kivetz et al. (2004b) has shown that this linear LAMmodel with
a reference point defined as the centroid of the choice context can capture a wide variety of
context effects, because the reference point is endogenous to the choice context and incor-
of a technological product cannot obtain such social gain. Similarly, without non-buyers or consumers who
use older models, buyers of an updated product cannot experience the social gain. Therefore, the outside
option needs to be incorporated into the reference point to capture the social comparison between buyers of
the product and non-buyers.
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 S R U D W H V  L Q I R U P D W L R Q  R I  D O O  D O W H U Q D W L Y H V  L Q  W K H  F R Q W H [ W   / H Wqr denote the reference quality
and pr denote the reference price in a choice context. The relative utility of consuming a
product of intrinsic quality q purchased at price p can be written as:
U r(p;q;q ;g ;l ) = q  (q qr)  [g 1(q qr)+l 1(q< qr)]
  (p  pr)  [l 1(p pr)+ g 1(p< pr)] (3.2)
where g and l denote the gain and loss parameters, and 1() is a characteristic function that
equals 1 if the expression in the function is true and 0 otherwise. For example, consuming
a superior product (q > qr) at a premium price (p > pr) induces a gain on the quality
dimension and a loss on the price dimension. The corresponding relative utility is
U r(p;q;q ;g;l ) = g q  (q qr) l  (p  pr) (3.3)
Losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al. 1991;
Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Hence l > g . To conserve notation, we set g = 1 and set
l > 1 to model the idea that losses loom larger than gains. The consumer’s total utility
denoted byU(p;q;q ;g;l ) is:
U(p;q;q ;g;l ) =Uc(p;q;q)+U r(p;q;q ;g;l ) (3.4)
Since the firm makes the upgrade decision at the beginning of period 2, the firm
introduces an upgrade if selling it increases the period 2 profit. Under context-dependent
preferences, consumers’ preferences for the upgrade are influenced by the relative standing
of products. Given that the upgraded product is the most advanced product in the choice
context, the presence of the upgraded product diminishes the comparative value of the base
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Figure 3.6: Period 2 Profit Varies with Context Dependence
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product and imposes a larger psychological loss on consumers who do not buy any products
as they forgo the enjoyment of consuming a higher (reference) quality. In this aspect, con-
textual comparison would seem to favor the upgraded product, and introducing an upgrade
would therefore be more attractive if the firm serves consumers with context-dependent
preferences. Our results show that this intuition is valid in some situations. However, un-
der some conditions, context-dependent preferences lower the profits of selling upgrades
and lead to a smaller range of situations for the firm to introduce upgrades. Proposition 14
summarizes this result.
Proposition 8 (Upgrade Introduction) There exists a positive cˆ such that if c < cˆ then
context-dependent preferences increase firm’s incentive to introduce upgrades. If c > cˆ
then context-dependent preferences decrease firm’s incentive to introduce upgrades.
Proposition 7 shows that without context-dependent preferences, w needs to exceed
a threshold (denoted by w), i.e., w> w, for introducing an upgrade to be profitable. Propo-
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sition 14 reveals that with context-dependent preferences, this threshold (denoted by wr)
is lower if the cost for upgrade introduction is small and higher if the cost is large. In other
words, incorporating consumers’ context-dependent preferences results in a larger range
of situations for the firm to introduce low-cost upgrades and a smaller range of situations
for the firm to introduce high-cost upgrades (see Figure 3.6).
To understand this result, first note that under context-dependent preferences, the
introduction of an upgrade has two counteracting effects that impact new and existing con-
sumers differently. The first effect is a reference quality effect, namely when an upgraded
product is added to consumers’ context, the reference quality in the context shifts upward.
As a result, consumers perceive a smaller gain for using the base product and a larger loss
for not buying. This reference quality effect makes the upgraded product relatively more
appealing. However, we also need to consider the reference effect on the price dimension.
In making payments, consumers experience a psychological loss above and beyond the
economic cost of the purchase. Consequently, consumers with context-dependent prefer-
ences are essentially more sensitive to prices. We refer to this effect as a reference price
effect.
Consumers who do not buy the base product experience a loss on the quality dimen-
sion. This loss is intensified when the arrival of an upgrade increases the reference quality.
Even though these consumers would incur a loss for paying prices if they were to buy
the upgrade, the loss in price is small compared to the loss in quality if they chose not to
buy the upgrade. Therefore, context-dependent preferences motivate consumers who did
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not buy the base product to purchase the upgrade. On the other hand, existing consumers
with context-dependent preferences are less motivated to purchase the upgrade. Existing
consumers own the base product. Even though the relative quality of the base product
decreases when an upgrade arrives, quality of the base product is still in the gain domain.
However, if existing consumers were to buy the upgrade, paying for the upgrade would
lead to a loss, which outweighs the decrease in the relative value in using the base product.
Therefore, existing consumers with context-dependent preferences are less willing to buy
the upgrade.
As analyzed in the benchmark model, whenw is small, the firm targets the upgrade to
new consumers who do not own the base product. When w is large, the firm also sells the
upgrade to existing consumers. Given the diverging impact of context-dependent pref-
erences on new and existing consumers, the region of parameters for introducing low-
and high-cost upgrades change in opposite directions. For example, when c is small and
w 2 (wr;w) (see Figure 3.7 left), context-dependent preferences lead the firm to introduce
the upgrade which otherwise would not be optimal in the absence of context-dependent
preferences. Similarly, when c is large and w 2 (w;wr) (see Figure 3.7 right), ignoring
consumers’ context-dependent preferences can lead the firm to introduce an upgrade that
is unprofitable. This result states the importance of considering context-dependent prefer-
ences when they exist. Our findings show that context-dependent preferences encourage
low-cost evolutional rather than high-cost revolutionary advancement in product design.
Our analysis so far has focused on the second period that is relevant for the firm’s
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Figure 3.7: Context-Dependent Preferences Increase Total Profits (l = 2)
upgrade decision. Now we discuss how context-dependent preferences affect the firm’s
total profit in two periods. Context-dependent preferences increase the period 2 profit from
selling low-cost upgrades. We could expect that the total profit from selling a base product
followed by such upgrades would increase accordingly, which is indeed the case. On the
other hand, context-dependent preferences decrease the period 2 profit of selling high-cost
upgrades, driven by the negative reference price effect on existing consumers. Similarly,
one may expect that the negative reference price effect also decreases the firm’s profit from
selling the base product in period 1. Consequently, the firm’s total profit would be lower.
Surprisingly, under some conditions, the firm can actually benefit from this negative impact
of context-dependent preferences and obtain a higher total profit.
Proposition 9 (Total Profit) As long as c is not too large and l is not too small, there
exists a region ofw in which the monopolist’s total profit is higher under context-dependent
preferences.
The range of parameters that satisfy the conditions in Proposition 15 is shown in Fig-
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ure 3.7 (see Regions A1 and A2) where the degree of loss aversion takes a specific value
(l = 2). This region corresponds to the situations in which context-dependent preferences
mitigate the firm’s commitment problem with respect to introducing upgrades. In the be-
ginning of period 2, the firm decides whether to introduce an upgrade with the objective
of maximizing the profit in period 2 only. After consumers have purchased in period 1,
in the beginning of period 2, the firm has an incentive to introduce an upgrade to boost
profits in period 2. In anticipation of firm’s incentives to introduce an upgrade, consumers
withhold purchase in period 1, waiting for the upgrade. As a result, the profit in period 1
decreases. The firm would be better off if it could commit to not introducing upgrades in
the second period, but the firm is tempted to introduce upgrades when w> w, where w is
the lower threshold for introducing upgrades to increases the period 2 profit. Such upgrade
introductions are not profitable when w < min(w¯; 12), where w¯ is the lower threshold for
introducing upgrades to increase total profits over two periods.
Context-dependent preferences can mitigate this upgrade commitment problem in
two ways. First, as Proposition 1 shows, context-dependent preferences can decrease the
profit of selling an upgrade. When this negative effect is sufficiently strong, it renders
introducing upgrades unprofitable. As a result, the firm obtains profits from selling the
base product over two period, which are higher than the profits from selling sequentially
upgraded products. This case occurs when three conditions are satisfied: the cost of in-
troducing upgrades exceeds the threshold given in Proposition 2 (c> cˆ); the level of qual-
ity improvement is such that the firm would only introduce the upgrade without context-
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dependent preferences (w2 (w;wr)); l is not too small (l > l ) (Region A1 in Figure 3.7).
Context-dependent preferences can also mitigate the firm’s upgrade commitment problem
through directly improving the profit of selling upgrades. The total profit from selling the
upgrade is higher if the firm sells the upgrade to new consumers only and the degree of
loss aversion is not too small.
Let us illustrate this finding with a numerical example. Suppose that losses loom
twice larger than gains, i.e., l = 2. The corresponding cˆ := 0:05 and wˆ := 0:30 (see Fig-
ure 7). We first illustrate the first scenario discussed above (see Region A1). Suppose
c = 0:08 > cˆ. At this cost, the minimal quality improvement required for introducing an
upgrade with and without context-dependent preferences iswr = 0:43 andw= 0:36 respec-
tively. Suppose technological advances allow the firm to introduce an upgrade with 40%
quality improvement over its base product, i.e., w= 0:4. Since w2 (w;wr), the firm would
only introduce this upgrade if context-dependent preferences do not exist. In doing so, the
firm obtains a profit of 0:11 in period 2 and a total profit of 0:36. If the firm considers
context-dependent preferences, introducing an upgrade only generates a profit of 0:08 in
period 2, less than 0:09 that it receives from selling the base product. Hence, the firmwould
sell the base product and the total profit would be 0:45, higher than 0:36. Now we illustrate
the scenario in Region A2 (see Figure 3.7 left). Consider that c = 0:02 < cˆ. At this cost,
w= 0:13 andwr = 0:09. Suppose w= 0:2. Given thatw>w>wr, the firm introduces this
upgrade in either case. Without context-dependent preferences, the firm’s period 2 profit is
0:10 and total profit is 0:43. With context-dependent preferences, the firm’s period 2 profit
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is 0:11 and total profit is 0:46, higher than 0:43. Clearly, the presence of context-dependent
increases the firm’s total profit.
Now let us examine the implication of context-dependent preferences on prices.
Firms use inter-temporal price discrimination to extract surplus from consumers with het-
erogenous willingness to pay (Stokey 1979). In particular, a firm first sells a product at a
high price to early adopters who have high willingness to pay, and then cuts price to sell
the product to consumers whose willingness to pay is lower than the initial price. This
strategy still applies for firms that introduce successive generations of products over time.
It is unclear how consumers’ context-dependent preferences affect a firm’s inter-temporal
price discrimination strategy. We answer this question in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 (Pricing) Context-dependent preferences affect the firm’s prices as fol-
lows:
(a) When the firm also sells the upgrade to existing consumers, both prices decrease.
(b) When the firm sells the upgrade to new consumers only, prices of the base product and
the upgraded product can both increase.
(c) In cases (a) and (b), inter-temporal price dispersion increases.
When the firm sells the upgrade to both new and existing consumers, prices of both
products decline as a result of the reference price effect that we discussed earlier. In par-
ticular, when consumers experience a psychological cost in making payments, consumers
become more sensitive to prices. The increased price sensitivity weakens the firm’s abil-
ity to charge prices as high as that in the absence of the context-dependent preferences.
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Therefore, equilibrium prices decline from the price levels without context-dependent pref-
erences.
If the quality improvement is low so that the firm sells the upgrade to new con-
sumers only, prices of the base product and the upgrade can both increase. The reason
is that context-dependent preferences make purchasing the base product in period 1 more
attractive as consumers who choose this option would only suffer a loss in paying for the
price once. In doing so, the consumer enjoys a gain in consumption utility in both periods.
Furthermore, the consumer experiences a gain in not paying for the upgrade in period 2.
Compared to this option, consumers who wait to buy the upgrade would be hurt by loss
aversion twice, when they forgo consuming the quality of the base product in period 1 and
when they pay the price of the upgrade in period 2. Consequently, the willingness to pay
for the base product is higher in the presence of context-dependent preferences. The firm
can therefore charge higher prices in period 1, which also enables it to charge higher prices
in period 2 as the two products are substitutes.
To understand the last part of the proposition, note that the price of the upgraded
product is impacted more by the reference price effect. This can be seen from the following.
The presence of context-dependent preferences, reflected by an increase in the loss aversion
parameter l , affects the period 2 price in the following way:
dp2
dl
=
¶ p2
¶l
+
¶ p2
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l
(3.5)
¶ p2
¶l represents the reduction in p

2 directly driven by the reference price effect.
¶ p2
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l is
the further reduction in p2 indirectly driven by the reference price effect, through lowering
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the equilibrium price in period 1, which strategically shifts the equilibrium price in period
2 downward. These two effects together reduce the period 2 price by a larger degree than
the price reduction in the period 1 price. Therefore, context-dependent preferences lead
the firm to price discriminate more heavily over time.
Having examined the implication of context-dependent preferences on the firm, we
discuss the implication of context-dependent preferences on consumer surplus and social
welfare. We measure consumer surplus with the integrated total utility, summation of the
context-independent utility and context-dependent utility, received by all consumers. From
consumers’ perspective, context-dependent preferences imply that consumer preferences
for a product are influenced by its comparison to other alternatives in the choice context.
Consumers derive relative utilities from comparative gains and losses which distort choice.
Can context-dependent preferences lead to a higher consumer surplus, or does it always
hurt consumers as a whole? The following proposition answers these questions.
Proposition 11 (Consumer Surplus) There exists a lˆ > 1 such that if l < lˆ , consumer
surplus is higher under context-dependent preferences. Furthermore, when c< cˆ or c> cˆ
but l is in a subset of the region bounded by lˆ , social welfare is also higher than in the
absence of context-dependent preferences.
The proposition shows that consumers’ tendency to make choices based on contex-
tual comparisons among alternatives does not necessarily harm consumers. In fact, this
behavior can actually benefit consumers and increase consumer surplus. This can occur as
long as consumers’ loss aversion is not too severe.
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Let us understand this result. When consumers derive utility from the comparative
gains and losses relative to the reference point in the choice context, consumer surplus
needs to reflect the context-dependent utility. First, we fix prices and the consumption
pattern to be the same as in the absence of context-dependent preferences. This setting
represents the case that l = 1, which reduces to the same consumer and firm decisions
as in the absence of context-dependent preferences. In this case, including the utility of
comparative gains and losses leads to a net increase in consumer surplus (see the Technical
Appendix for details). This result implies that as long as l is close to 1, i.e., consumers
are nearly loss neutral, consumer surplus is higher with context-dependent preferences.
As l increases, consumer surplus with context-dependent preferences decreases. To
see this, an increase in l affects consumer surplus in counteracting ways. Consider the case
that existing consumers also purchase the upgrade. On the positive side, a higher l drives
prices to decline as loss-averse consumers are more sensitive to prices. The reduction in
prices increases consumer surplus. In addition, as l increases, q1 decreases, i.e., more
consumers who otherwise would have postponed consumption purchase the base product
early and consume it over two periods. This shift in consumption also increases consumer
surplus. On the negative side, a larger l directly reduces consumer surplus as it amplifies
the dis-utility of comparative losses. Furthermore, as we have seen in Proposition 14, an
increase in l leads fewer existing consumers to purchase the upgrade. This decrease in
consumption of the upgrade drives consumer surplus to decline. These negative aspects
dominate the positive aspects. Thus, consumer surplus is decreasing in l . As long as l
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is not too large, consumer surplus under context-dependent preferences can be higher than
that without context-dependent preferences.
In a subset of the region specified in Proposition 17, social welfare can also be higher
under context-dependent preferences. This is because when the firm sells the upgrade to
existing consumers, the firm’s profit is lower with context-dependent preferences. Tomake
up for the reduction in the firm’s profit, l needs to be even lower so that the increase in
consumer surplus can offset the decrease in the firm’s profit.
This finding has important implications for public policy makers. Research has
shown that loss aversion can be reduced by means such as emotion regulation (Sokol-
Hessner et al. 2012), thinking like a trader (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009), or thinking in
a foreign language (Keysar et al. 2012). Our results suggest that once we consider strate-
gic responses by firms to context dependent preferences, these techniques can sometimes
hurt consumers and society.
3.6 Extensions
In this section, we will relax assumptions made in the base model to examine the
robustness of our results and seek new insights. In the base model, we assume that the
firm sells the upgraded product to new and existing consumers at the same price. This
assumption may not always hold. In §3.6.1, we consider the case when the firm offers a
separate upgrade price for existing consumers to buy the upgrade. In the base model, we
assume that the reference price and reference quality are the average level in the current
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choice context. One may argue that consumers’ references could be formed in other ways.
In §3.6.2, we test the robustness of our results to some alternate models of reference point
formation.
3.6.1 Upgrade Pricing
Our base model assumes that the firm sells the upgraded product to new and existing
consumers at an uniform price. We observe that firms sometimes offer a special pricing
for existing consumers to upgrade to new products. Here we assess the firm’s upgrade
introduction when it offers the special upgrade pricing. Specifically, in period 2, if the
firm chooses to introduce an upgrade, it sells the upgraded product to new consumers at
pn and to existing consumers at pu.
Without context-dependent preferences, selling the product to existing consumers at
a separate upgrade price is always preferred. This is because after consumers have made
purchase, the firm can offer a low upgrade price to extract more surplus from these con-
sumers. In equilibrium, the firm sets pu low enough that all existing consumers purchase
the upgrade. The resulting consumption pattern is shown in Figure 3.8. This profit is
strictly higher than that from selling the upgrade to new consumers exclusively or selling
the upgrade to new and existing consumers at the same price. However, with context-
dependent preferences, there are situations in which the firm may find it profitable to aban-
don this upgrade pricing policy.
Proposition 12 (Upgrade Pricing) With context-dependent preferences, when w is small
and l is sufficiently strong, selling upgrades to new consumers only strictly dominates
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Figure 3.8: Consumer Choice Pattern With An Upgrade Price
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Figure 3.9: Upgrade Pricing with Context-Dependent Preferences
87
selling upgrades to both new and existing consumers with discriminating prices.
Figure 3.9 shows the region in which upgrade pricing is not profitable given the pres-
ence of context-dependent preferences. This intuition is that when the quality improvement
is small, the upgrade price has to be reasonably low to attract existing consumers to pur-
chase the upgrade. However, when consumers’ loss aversion is strong enough, a low pu
reduces the reference price, imposing a larger loss for new consumers who buy the up-
grade at pn, which in turn decreases the profit of selling the upgrade. In this case, the firm
would rather sell the upgrade to new consumers only. This finding adds new insights to
existing research on a firm’s upgrade policy. For example, Bala and Carr (2009) show
that upgrade pricing can be an effective tool for selling upgrades to strategic consumers.
Sankaranarayanan (2007) shows that offering existing consumers free upgrades can reduce
the firm’s profit from selling an upgrade, thereby alleviating the firm’s upgrade commit-
ment problem. However, such study did not incorporate the contextual effects associated
with upgrade pricing. Our finding suggests that an especially low upgrade price lowers
the reference price perceived by consumers, thereby penalizing new consumers who buy
the upgrade at the high new-user price. As a result, offering special upgrade pricing can
reduce the firm’s profit.
Similar to the basemodel, at a given degree of loss aversion, the firm sells the upgrade
to new consumers only when w is small and to both new and existing consumers when w is
large. In the latter case, the profit from selling the upgrade is reduced by context-dependent
preferences, consistent with the results in the base model.
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3.6.2 Alternative Reference Formulations
In the base model, we defined the reference point as the average value in the cur-
rent market. This parsimonious specification captures the essence of context-dependency
effects. However, the intuition behind our results holds more broadly for alternative spec-
ifications of the reference point. To see this, note that the driving force of our main result
is that context-dependent preferences affect new consumers and existing consumers dif-
ferently. As new consumers do not own the base product, they are affected more by the
reference quality effect which motivates them to buy the upgrade. In contrast, existing
consumers could use the base product as an alternative to buying the upgrade at an extra
cost. Therefore, the positive reference quality effect is dominated by the negative reference
price effect, discouraging existing consumers from buying the upgrade. This aspect would
hold in alternative formulations of reference point and therefore we expect the base nature
of our results to hold. To verify the robustness of our results, we extended our model to
consider three other assumptions of reference point formation: (1) reference point excludes
the outside good; (2) reference point formed by past and future choices; (3) reference point
formed by product offered in the past. We discuss the main results below and details can
be found in the supplementary appendix.
Let us discuss the first alternative assumption. In the base model, the reference point
is defined as the average among products used by all consumers in the current market, in-
cluding consumers not using any products, i.e, choosing the outside good option. This
formulation captures the fact that the presence of consumers not adopting a product drives
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the comparative social/psychological prestige experienced by adopters. In the extreme case
that no consumers choose the outside good and all consumers buy the product, adopters
would not experience comparative gains (Iyer and Soberman 2013). However, one may
argue that reference point is shaped by alternatives in the product category and excludes
the outside option of not buying any product. For example, in period 2, both the upgrade
and the base product are available in the market. The reference quality is 2+w2 . Users of
the two products pay either p2 for buying the upgrade or nothing for continue using the
base product. Hence the reference price is p22 . Given that there is only one product in pe-
riod 1, consumers who buy the product are not affected by context-dependent preferences.
Our main results still hold under this assumption. When w is large such that existing con-
sumers also purchase the upgrade, reference price effect drives period 2 prices to decline
and reduce the profit of introducing upgrades. When w is small that only new consumers
purchase upgrades, reference quality effect dominates andmotivates new consumers to buy
upgrade to enjoy a comparative gain in quality. Period 2 prices increase and introducing
upgrades is more profitable accordingly.
The reference point in our base model is determined by contemporary contextual
factors, i.e., composition of consumers using various products in the current period. Some
research has shown that consumers’ reference point may also be influenced by temporal
factors such as choices available in the past as well as in future expectations (Winer 1986;
Rajendran and Tellis 1994; Mazumdar et al. 2005). To incorporate the temporal informa-
tion, we combine consumer choices made over the two periods to derive the overall refer-
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ence point. In this way, four consumer choices can arise. They are denoted by (1;1+w),
(1;1), (0;1+w), and (0;0) in Figure 3.2. The corresponding total quality provided by each
choice is 2+w, 2, 1+w, and 0 respectively. The reference quality is 5+2w4 . Similarly, the
total price commanded by each of the four choices is p1+ p2, p1, p2, and 0. Hence, the
reference price is p1+p22 . In this case, existing consumers who purchase early experience
a gain in consuming the above-reference quality and a loss in paying the above-reference
prices. New consumers who wait experience a loss in quality and a gain in saving money.
As in the base model, the firm’s profit from selling low-cost upgrades to new consumers
increases whereas the profit of selling high-cost upgrades to existing consumers decreases.
Thus, the basic intuition of our model continues to hold even in this case.
Research shows that reference point is likely formed by the observed product offering
in the recent past (Winer 1986). In the context of our model, the firm offers the base product
to be used over two periods for a price of p1, which sets the reference quality of 2 and
reference price of p1. For new consumers, buying the upgrade in period 2 is associated
with a loss 2  (1+w) = 1 w on the quality dimension and a gain p1  p2 on the price
dimension, whereas not buying would result in a loss 2 in quality and a gain p1 in price.
The loss in quality looms larger, motivating new consumers to buy the upgrade. Existing
consumers could either buy the upgrade to receive a gain w in quality and a loss of paying
extra p2 in price. Alternatively, they could choose the reference option by buying the base
product to use over two periods. Profits of selling upgrades to existing consumers decrease
with context-dependent preferences. Therefore, consistent with the base model, context-
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dependent preferences motivate the firm to introduce small upgrades which targets new
customers and discourage the firm to introduce major upgrades that also attract existing
consumers.
Lastly, it is important to note that the results are driven by the combined impact of
reference price and reference quality, rather than by any one of them alone. Specifically,
reference price effect makes consumers more price sensitive, reducing the firm’s profit of
selling upgrades. Reference quality effect motivates consumers to buy high quality prod-
uct to enjoy the comparative gain from consuming high quality product, which therefore
increasing firm’s profit of selling upgrades. However, the overall impact of the two effects
differ for new and existing consumers. This is the driving force of our results.
3.6.3 w is Endogenous
Thus far, we have assumed that w, quality improvement in the upgrade, is exoge-
nously determined by technology advancement. Now we relax this assumption and allow
the firm to endogenously invest in R&D to increase w. Let R(w) = kw22 denote the R&D in-
vestment required for improving quality of the product by w. Suppose the firm can choose
to increase the quality of the base product by 0%, 20%, or 40%, i.e.,w2f0;0:2;0:4g, where
w = 0 indicates not investing in R&D. Note that this R&D decision is made in the begin-
ning of period 2, hence, the firm in period 1 cannot make a credible commitment about the
level ofw. Suppose k= 1, i.e., R(w) = w22 , without context-dependent preferences, the firm
would be better off choosing w = 0:4, as it yields the highest profit in period 2 (see the
Technical Appendix for details). However, with context-dependent preferences, suppose
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consumers’ loss aversion parameter is l = 1:2 or higher, the firm would prefer to intro-
duce smaller upgrades as w = 0:2. This simple example illustrates that context-dependent
preferences lead firms to introduce smaller upgrades.
3.6.4 Technology for Introducing Upgrade is Available in Period 1
In our main model, we focused on situations in which technology for producing the
upgrade is not available in period 1 and therefore the firm can only introduce successive
generations of improved products over time. We showed that context-dependent prefer-
ences can alter firm’s upgrade introduction strategy and improve firm’s profits. Although
many high-technology products such as computers, telecommunication devices, and elec-
tronics heavily depend on new technology to improve product quality and fall into our
considered context, it may also be interesting to explore the impact of context-dependency
effect on firm’s profits when technology for introducing the upgrade is available in period
1. Specifically, consider that firm can introduce two versions of the product in period 1.
Consumers with heterogenous valuations for quality are either in segment h or l who value
product with quality q at qhq and qlq respectively and qh > ql > 0. The size of the h seg-
ment is a and the size of the l segment is 1 a . The marginal cost for the firm to supply
a product of quality q is q
2
2 . The firm makes a product line decision by setting the quality
and price of the high and low-end products.
Without context-dependent preferences, this problem is a classic one and has been
studied by researchers (see Moorthy and Png 1992 for detailed analysis). When firm si-
multaneously introduces two products, the low-quality product would cannibalize demand
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for the high-quality product. To discourage high-valuation consumers to purchase the low-
quality product, the firm can lower the quality of the low-end product. Now we incorpo-
rate context-dependent preferences into the analysis and verify if context-dependent prefer-
ences can still benefit the firm. Our findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 13 When firm introduces two products in period 1, if l < qhql , i.e, consumers
are not too loss averse, context-dependent preferences increase firm’s profits. Furthermore,
quality of the high-end product increases and quality of the low-end product decreases. If
qh
ql  2, then prices of both products increase.
Detailed analysis are included in the Technical Appendix. The intuition for the result
is as follows. When consumers exhibit context-dependent preferences, choosing the high-
end product induces a gain in quality and a loss in price. Conversely, choosing the low-end
product induces a loss in quality and a gain in price. As high-type consumers value quality
more than low-type consumers, high-type consumers are therefore more sensitive to the
gain and loss on the quality dimension, which discourages high-type consumers to choose
the low-end product and reduces cannibalization between two products. As a result, firm’s
profits by offering two products can increase with context-dependent preferences.
3.6.5 Multiple Time Periods
We model the implication of context-dependent preferences on firm’s upgrade intro-
duction strategy with a two-period model, consistent with existing literature on durable-
good monopolist (Bulow 1982; Dhebar 1994; Desai and Purohit 1998; Kornish 2001; De-
sai et al. 2004). Although we believe this setup is sufficient to reveal the durable nature
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of the product and capture the dynamic implications of context-dependent preferences on
firm, it is helpful to verify the robustness of context-dependency effect over more than two
time periods. Consider a formulation with T time periods where T > 2, in each period
t > 1, the firm can incur a cost ct to introduce an upgraded product with incremental qual-
ity wt 2 (0; 12) and sell it for price pt . Each product is good to consume for two periods. In
period t, the reference quality qrt is the average level of quality consumed by consumers in
period t and the reference price prt is the average price consumers pay in period t. Other
settings in the main model apply.
At the beginning of the last period, i.e, t = T , the firm faces consumers who own the
previous model of the product with quality 1+åT 1t=2 wt . These consumers can continue
using the previous model in the last period. The firm also faces consumers who do not own
an older model that can be used in the last period. These consumers either purchased the
model in period T  2which expires in period T or did not use any product in period T  1.
These consumers are analogous to the new consumers in the main model. The upgrade’s
quality is 1+åTt=2wt and price is pT . Hence the last period consists of consumers using
the latest model, the previous model, and nothing. The reference quality is qT+qT 13 =
2qT+wT
3 . Consumers in the last period either pay pT for the upgraded model or nothing.
The reference price is pT2 . As in the main model, existing consumers can still experience
a gain in quality by consuming the previous model in the last period, whereas replacing
the previous model with an upgrade induces a loss in price. Consumers who do not have
a previous model to consume in the last period experience a comparative loss in quality
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if they do not buy the upgrade in the last period. This comparative loss outweigh the loss
in paying the price for the upgrade. Therefore, context-dependent preferences motivate
new consumers to buy upgrades while dissuading existing consumers to do so. As a result,
firm’s incentive to introduce small upgrades that target new consumers increases and firm’s
incentive to introduce major upgrades that attract existing consumers decreases. For any
period t 2 [2;T   1], the market comprises of consumers who use the latest upgrade, the
earlier product, or nothing, and consumers either pay pt for the upgrade or nothing, as
in the last period. The marginal consumer in the first period chooses to buy the current
model for use over two periods or to wait for the upgraded product in the next period,
as in the first period of the base model. Therefore, we believe this decision is impacted
by context-dependent preferences in a similar fashion as in the base model. When context-
dependent preferences lead to unprofitable future upgrades, firms gain more profits ex ante
by introducing fewer upgrades.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated a monopolist’s optimal upgrade strategy when con-
sumers exhibit context-dependent preferences. We developed a two-period game theoret-
ical model, in which the firm decides whether to introduce an upgraded product in the
second period. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
1. How does the firm’s optimal upgrade strategy change when consumers exhibit
context-dependent preferences? Context-dependent preferences lead to a larger
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range of situations for introducing low-cost upgrades and a smaller range of sit-
uations for introducing high-cost upgrades. Therefore, in response to consumers’
context-dependent preferences, the firm should introduce low-cost upgrades more
aggressively and high-cost upgrades more conservatively.
2. Can the firm benefit from consumers’ context-dependent preferences? Our results
show that context-dependent preferences can directly improve a firm’s total profit
from selling sequentially upgraded products. Even when context-dependent prefer-
ences reduce the firm’s profits from selling upgrades, this negative impact can still
benefit the firm by mitigating its upgrade commitment problem.
3. Can consumers benefit from their context-dependent preferences? As long as con-
sumers’ loss aversion is not too severe, consumer surplus and social welfare can both
increase with context-dependent preferences.
4. How do context-dependent preferences impact a firm’s upgrade pricing policy?
Without context-dependent preferences, selling the upgrade to existing consumers
at a separate upgrade price is always preferred. However, considering context-
dependent preferences, the firm should abandon this pricing policy when the quality
improvement in an upgrade is small and consumers are sufficiently loss averse.
There are several promising directions for future research. First, in order to focus
on the firm’s upgrade introduction decision, we treated the firm’s R&D level as given by
assuming that the magnitude and cost of upgrade improvement are exogenous. In gen-
eral, we would expect that the costs of R&D and the magnitude of product improvement
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would be related. In this case, our results suggest that context-dependence would lead to
more low-cost incremental innovations. Future research can further examine situations in
which firm’s R&D decisions are endogenous. In this paper, we have studied the impact of
context dependence on the decisions of a monopolist. It would be interesting to examine
how the optimal upgrade strategy under context-dependent preferences would change with
competition. Our theoretical model reveals that context-dependent preferences change the
willingness to buy upgrades by new and existing consumers differently. It would be inter-
esting to empirically explore the impact of context-dependent preferences on consumers,
and how such preferences impact firm profits.
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4 SAME OR DIFFERENT? A PRODUCT DESIGN QUESTION
4.1 Introduction
Conspicuous consumption of luxury goods such as cars, handbags, and watches pro-
vides social prestige (Belk 1988, Veblen 1989, Bagwell and Bernheim 1996). According
to a recent industry study, the overall global expenditure on luxury goods exceeded $1.1
trillion in 2014 (Bain 2014, Wahba 2014). In the United States, spending on luxury cars
amounted to $438 billion and spending on personal luxury items, including clothing and ac-
cessories, was estimated to be $81 billion (McCarthy 2015). LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moet
Hennessy), the most valuable luxury brand in the world, was estimated to have a brand
value of about $26 billion. The LVMH Group’s total revenue for the 2013 fiscal year was
about $34 billion (Statista 2015). With a healthy growth of 7% from 2013, the luxury goods
industry is becoming an increasingly important economic sector.
Brands selling luxury goods often carry high-end premium products sold at higher
prices and low-end products that are more affordable. The central question that we ask
in this paper is whether high-end and low-end products should look the same or different.
In other words, should brands unify or diversify the exterior design of their high-end and
low-end products?
Observations suggest that brands have made different choices on this exterior design
decision. Some brands have chosen design unification. For example, the German luxury
automaker, Audi, has long been known for its “Russian doll” design strategy. Its $70,000
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A8 model looks more or less the same as its $30,000 A4 model (see Figure 4.1). In fash-
ion industry, Hermès’ six-figure Birkin bag looks very similar to its less expensive Kelly
bag (Groer 2006, Bureau 2012). Louis Vuitton, Coach, and Michael Kors carry a wide
price range of handbags with the same color and logo design (TFL 2013). In contrast,
other brands have chosen design diversification. For example, Mercedes introduces more
variations in the design of its products. Its high-end S-Class looks very different from its
low-end C-Class (also see Figure 4.1). Burberry sells its classic trench coats with prices
ranging from $750 to $7,500 with distinctive color schemes: Low-end coats are in neutral
colors, such as black and brown, while high-end coats are in bold colors, such as purple
and green. Similarly, when Apple introduced two lines of iPhones in 2013, Apple also
used different color schemes to differentiate the look of its high-end phones and low-end
phones: the high-end iPhone 5s, priced at $199 (with contract), was available in neutral
colors including space grey, gold, and silver, while the low-end iPhone 5c priced at $99
(with contract), was in distinctive bright colors including pink, blue, yellow, and green.
These observations of business practices do not offer an obvious answer to the prod-
uct design questions: Should brands design high-end and low-end products to look the
same or different? It is puzzling why brands choose different design strategies. It is un-
clear which design strategy is optimal and under what conditions brands should choose
one over the other. The existing research on exterior design of products is scarce. There is
little guidance to practitioners on how to make this exterior design decision.
The objective of this paper is to fill this research gap by examining brands’ exterior
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Figure 4.1: Low-end and High-end Car Models of Audi and Mercedes-Benz
These are pictures of 2010 car models from thecarconnection.com.
design differentiation strategy. Specifically, we address the following research questions:
(1) What is the optimal exterior design differentiation strategy? Under what conditions
should brands unify design, and under what conditions should brands diversify design?
Moreover, the exterior design decision is made in the early stage of a product’s devel-
opment process. It is important that we understand the implications of exterior design
decisions on other marketing decisions such as functionalities and prices that are made af-
terward. Specifically, we ask the following research questions: (2) How should brands set
prices of high-end and low-end products based on their design differentiation strategy? (3)
How should brands set functionalities of high-end and low-end products based on their de-
sign differentiation strategy? In addressing these questions, we also provide one possible
explanation to the puzzling dichotomy in brands’ design choices that are observed among
brands in different industries as well as brands in the same industry and face similar market
conditions. Specifically, we answer the questions: (4) Why do some brands use the same
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design while other brands use different designs for high-end and low-end products? Can it
be optimal for competing brands to choose different design differentiation strategies? Can
the criticized “Russian doll” design unification be a profitable design strategy?
These research questions are important for the following reasons: From marketing
researchers’ perspectives, the substantive area of the exterior design of products has not
been fully investigated. It is important that we as marketing researchers understand how
exterior product design, in general, and exterior design differentiation between high-end
and low-end products, in particular, influence consumer preferences and choices as well
as brand profits. From managers’ perspectives, exterior product design is important for
products in a wide range of industries where consumption is conspicuous and provides
social value. Designing a product is a costly investment that has long-lasting impact on the
success of the product. Therefore, managers need to carefully choose the optimal exterior
design strategy for their brand.
In order to address these questions, we first attempt to understand the implications of
a brand’s design differentiation strategy on consumer preferences for the brand’s high-end
and low-end products. Such knowledge will help us analyze the optimal design strategies
that brands should choose, anticipating its impact on consumer preferences and sales. For
this purpose, we use cars as an example of a status good. We empirically examine the
impact of design differentiation of cars on consumers’ preferences for cars. We compile a
comprehensive dataset that comprises of 207 car models owned by 32 brands sold in the
U.S. market from 2001 to 2010. We analyze pictures of all cars with image-processing
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software, and quantify the design differentiation of each car model within each brand. We
infer consumer preferences for cars by modeling consumers’ car choices using a random-
coefficient logit model. Our empirical analysis shows that consumers prefer high-end cars
to look more differentiated but prefer low-end cars to look less differentiated. This finding
suggests that if a brand chooses to diversify design, i.e., increase the design differentia-
tion of high-end and low-end products, it will increase the utility of the brand’s high-end
products but decrease the utility of the brand’s low-end products. This result is intuitively
consistent with behavioral research that shows that high-end consumers prefer to differen-
tiate from low-end consumers while low-end consumers prefer to assimilate with high-end
consumers (Brewer 1991, Fromkin and Snyder 1980). However, the opposing preferences
for design differentiation presents brands a product design dilemma - should a brand unify
design to improve the appeal of its low-end products or diversify design to improve the
appeal of its high-end products?
To answer this question, we build a game-theoretic model to examine competing
brands’ incentives to unify or to diversify design. Based on the empirical finding, we
specify that design diversification within a brand increases the utility of the brand’s high-
end product but decreases the utility of the brand’s low-end product. In the words, we
assume that consumers purchasing a high-end product prefers design diversification so
that the high-end product looks differentiated from its low-end counterpart. On the other
hand, consumers purchasing a low-end product prefers design unification so that the low-
end product looks similar to its high-end counterpart. We analyze consumer choices given
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prices, functionalities, and exterior design of products. We further examine brands’ optimal
exterior design strategy, pricing, and product functionality decisions.
Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis. First, we find that when high-
end consumers strongly prefer design diversification and low-end consumers strongly pre-
fer design unification, the opposing preferences can pull symmetric brands to choose asym-
metric design strategies i.e., one brand unifies design and another brand diversifies design.
Furthermore, the asymmetric design strategies can be a win-win outcome. It is a win-win
outcome in the sense that, by adopting different design strategies, both brands make higher
profits than if they chose the same design strategy. This result provides a rationale for the
dichotomous design choices that brands make, even when they are in the same industry
and face similar market conditions. The general intuition behind this result is the follow-
ing: By adopting different design strategies, brands avoid head-to-head competition in
two markets. Instead, each brand establishes a comparative advantage in a different mar-
ket and makes higher profits. Specifically, the brand that unifies design has a comparative
advantage in the low-end market, whereas the brand that diversifies design has a compar-
ative advantage in the high-end market. Each brand can sell its advantageous product at a
higher price, obtains a higher market share in the advantageous market, and makes higher
profits. This win-win situation can arise as long as the overall market conditions of the
high-end and low-end markets — in terms of market size, intensity of competition, and
product differentiation in functionality — are not too different. Moreover, adopting differ-
ent design strategies is more profitable when competition between brands is more intense
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and competing products are less differentiated in functionality. In these cases, competing
brands have more incentives to avoid competition by choosing different design strategies.
Second, our analysis shows that when high-end consumers have strong preferences
for design diversification while low-end consumers have weak preferences for design uni-
fication, brands face a prisoner’s dilemma: Each brand has incentives to diversify design.
However, when both brands diversify design, the benefit of costly diversification cancels
out. Brands would have been better off if they could both commit to design unification.
Third, our analysis shows that when brands choose different design strategies, brands
should adjust prices of products based on their design strategy. Specifically, the brand
that diversifies design should raise prices of its high-end product and decrease prices of
its low-end product, because diversification in design strengthens the appeal of its high-
end product but weakens the appeal of its low-end product. In contrast, the brand that
unifies design should reduce prices of its high-end product and increase prices of its low-
end product, as unification influences the appeal of products in the opposite direction.
Fourth, we also show that brands adopting different design strategies should further
adjust the functionalities of their products in response to their exterior design strategy.
Specifically, the brand that diversifies design should produce a high-end product that has
more mainstream functionalities and a low-end product that has more niche functionali-
ties. This is because, as more high-end consumers purchase from the brand that diversifies
design, the heterogeneity in consumer taste for functionality increases. The new set of di-
verse consumers can be better served with a more mainstream product. In the meantime,
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fewer consumers purchase from the brand that diversifies design and the consumers who
stay have a similar niche taste. The brand can cater to these consumers better with a prod-
uct that has more niche functionalities tailored to their taste. By the same logic, the brand
that unifies design should produce a more mainstream low-end product and a more niche
high-end product.
Lastly, we consider competing brands that choose design strategies sequentially. We
find that the sequential order of design decisions does not change the equilibrium design
strategies. Furthermore, we show conditions where a first mover has incentives to choose
design unification over diversification. Hence, the seemingly unattractive Russian doll
design unification can be a profitable choice for not only brands that simultaneously choose
design but also a brand that can choose design before the competitor does. We extend the
main model in several dimensions to show the robustness of our results and present new
insights.
4.1.1 Literature Review
This paper adds to the growing stream of marketing research that incorporates con-
sumers’ psychological and social behavior in quantitative models to examine optimal firm
decisions. This stream of research enriches traditional economic models with psychologi-
cal realism and provides new insights. Within this broad area, this paper is closely related
to studies on conspicuous consumption of status goods. When consumers choose a status
good, the decision is influenced by not only the intrinsic value of the good but also so-
cial considerations from consuming the good. In a reference group framework with two
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segments of consumers, i.e., snobs and followers who desire exclusivity and conformity,
respectively, Amaldoss and Jain (2005a, 2005b) examine optimal pricing decisions and
show that the demand curve of snobs can be upward-sloping in the presence of follow-
ers. Amaldoss and Jain (2008, 2010) examine product decisions and show that reference
group effects can induce product proliferation and motivate firms to offer limited editions.
Amaldoss and Jain (2015) further show that when brands adopt symmetric branding deci-
sions, umbrella branding can soften competition and improve profits in situations where it
decreases profits in a monopoly. Our paper differs from the above studies by examining
the exterior design differentiation between high-end and low-end products, a substantively
important decision that has not been studied before. In addition, our analysis reveals a new
mechanism that softens competition, which happens when brands adopt asymmetric design
strategies. Kuksov and Xie (2012) show that a status-good manufacturer can benefit from
a competitor’s cost reduction and entry of a competitor. Yoganarasimhan (2012) investi-
gates firms’ information provision and shows that a firm selling status goods can choose to
either cloak or flaunt information to alter the level of social interactions. Rao and Schaefer
(2014) study a status-good firm’s dynamic pricing decision. They find that consumers’ sta-
tus concerns lead a monopolist to cut prices of durable goods more sharply over time. We
augment this stream of literature by investigating exterior design differentiation between
high-end and low-end products of brands selling status goods. We also investigate the
implications of exterior design on pricing and functionality choices of products.
This paper is also related to the literature on product differentiation. Prior research
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has studied vertical product differentiation (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz and
Thisse 1979, Shaken and Sutton 1982, Moorthy 1988) and horizontal product differenti-
ation (Hotelling 1929, d’Aspremont et al. 1979). Researchers have also studied product
differentiation in multiple attributes (Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995, Ansari et al. 1998,
Irmen and Thisse 1998) or in (uniform and customized) pricing policy (Guo and Zhang
2015). There have been limited studies that analyze product differentiation in the exterior
design differentiation strategy where the exterior design differentiation between high-end
and low-end products influences the status value of these products. We show that by choos-
ing different exterior design strategies, i.e., one unifies design and one diversifies design,
brands can differentiate from each other in the status value of their products, soften com-
petition, and achieve a win-win outcome.
Lastly, this paper is broadly related to the limited marketing research that studies the
visual aspects of products and marketing activities. Wedel and Pieters (2000, 2004) study
the visual characteristics of advertisements on consumers’ memory of brands and atten-
tion to advertisements). Landwehr et al. (2011, 2013) study the visual design aspects of
cars. They show that prototypical and complex designs are fluent to process and positively
impact sales. However, as exposure to design increases, consumers may like atypical de-
sign more. Liu et al. (2015) show that the prototypicality of design has an inverted-U
shaped impact on consumer choices, and moderates the effects of marketing activities on
sales. Different from these studies, we explore the impact of the visual design differenti-
ation between high-end and low-end products of a brand on consumer preferences for the
108
brand’s high-end and low-end products. Moreover, build on the empirical finding, we fo-
cus on examining brands’ optimal design differentiation strategies using a game-theoretic
model. We give the market conditions in which brands should unify or diversify design,
and explain why brands in the same market condition choose different design strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §4.2, we empirically examine the
impact of a brand’s design differentiation strategy on consumer preferences for the brand’s
high-end and low-end products. Based on the finding, we examine how brands should
make the design differentiation strategy. In §4.3, we present the main game-theoretic
model, analyze equilibrium strategies, and discuss results. In §4.4, we relax several as-
sumptions made in the main model to show robustness of results and seek new insights. In
§4.5, we conclude with managerial implications and avenues for future research.
4.2 Consumer Preferences for Design Differentiation
In order to examine brands’ optimal design differentiation strategy, we start by exam-
ining the impact of a brand’s design differentiation strategy on consumers’ preferences for
the brand’s high-end products and low-end products. Specifically, we answer the following
questions: If a brand diversifies design such that high-end and low-end products look more
differentiated or distinctive, do consumers’ preferences for the brand’s high-end products
and low-end products increase or decrease? We expect that a brand’s design differentiation
strategy has an important impact on consumer’s satisfaction from consuming the high-end
and low-end products. Taking Audi as an example, a consequence of its design unification
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is that consumers who spend $70,000 on an A8 may be mistakenly recognized as driving a
$30,000 A4, which is not very pleasing (Ramsey 2012, Martin 2012, Roux 2013). On the
other hand, it may be appealing for consumers who spend $30,000 on an A4 to appear as if
they drive a $70,000 A8. In contrast, design diversification between high-end and low-end
products can meet the needs of high-end consumers who prefer design to be distinctive,
so that design can clearly highlight their costly purchase that others cannot afford. How-
ever, it may come at the cost of reducing the appeal of the brand’s low-end product. For
example, the colorful iPhone 5c that looks different from the high-end iPhone 5c has been
criticized as lacking a premium look and feel (Beavis 2014, Bhasin 2013). The opposing
preferences for design diversification and unification by high-end and low-end consumers
are consistent with the notion that high-end consumers desire uniqueness and separation
from low-end consumers, while low-end consumers desire similarity and association with
high-end consumers (Brewer 1991, Fromkin and Snyder 1980). Hence, our hypothesize
that:
H1: Design differentiation within a brand increases consumer preferences
for the brand’s high-end products but decreases consumer preferences for the
brand’s low-end products.
Weuse secondary data from the automobile industry to test this hypothesis. The automobile
industry is an ideal empirical context to study the exterior design differentiation between
high-end and low-end products for the following reasons: First, car brands carry a range
of high-end and low-end car models that serve different social and demographic consumer
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segments. Second, cars are conspicuously consumed status goods. This allows the exterior
design of cars to play an important role in influencing the social utility that consumers
derive from high-end and low-end cars. We describe the data, model, and results separately
below.
4.2.1 Data
Market Share. We collect monthly sales of 207 passenger car models (e.g., BMW1-
series) that are associated with 32 brands (e.g., BMW) and sold in the U.S. market between
2001 and 2010 from the Automotive News market data books. We calculate the market
size in month t asMt = It Ct12A (see the same approach used in Sudhir 2001, Balachander et al.
2009, Liu and Shankar 2015). The number of households (It) in month t is collected from
the Statistical Abstract of the United States,Ct is the average number of cars per household
in month t collected from Simmons database, and A is the average age of cars that is 10.70
years according toWard’s Automotive Yearbooks. Based on monthly market size and sales
of car models, we derive monthly market share of car models and the market share of the
outside good, i.e., the option of not buying any car models.
Exterior Design. The focal independent variable is the exterior design differentia-
tion of cars within each brand. To construct this design variable, we first collect exterior
design characteristics of all car models in the dataset. To do so, we download pictures of
cars from Edmunds.com, a car-buying resources website. Edmunds provides standard 360
degree views of the exterior design of cars, which allows us to obtain the frontal, side, and
back images of all cars. Design studies show that the frontal design of cars is the most
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of Design Attribute Points
important aspect for car recognition (Ranscombe et al. 2012). Hence, we collect car de-
sign characteristics from the frontal image of cars. We use image-processing software to
analyze the frontal pictures of cars. First, we normalize the size of each car by shrinking
the car picture so that the width of a car is unity (without changing the relative height-to-
width ratio of that car). Second, we define the center of a car’s base to be the origin of
a two-dimensional space, and lay each car picture in that two-dimensional space. Third,
from each car picture, we extract the locations of 50 design attribute points including grill,
headlights, bumper, mirrors, windshield, and the body shape of the car (see Figure 4.2 for
locations of the 50 attribute points and Landwehr et al. 2011, 2013 for this approach). The
location of each attribute point is represented by a vector of (x;y) coordinate values in the
two-dimensional space.
For any two cars, with the coordinate values of their design attribute points, we can
quantify and measure the degree of design differentiation between the two cars. To do so,
for each attribute point, we first compute the Euclidian distance between the location of
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the attribute point in one car and the location of the same attribute point in the other car.
Then we sum the Euclidian distance across all 50 attribute points to derive a measure of
the overall design differentiation. Imagine that each brand sells only two car models — a
more expensive high-end car and a less expensive low-end car. Each car’s design is charac-
terized by (x;y) coordinates ofm= 1; ::;50 attribute points. The design differentiation, dhl ,
between the high-end (h) and the low-end (l) cars can be measured by the formula below:
dhl =
50
å
m=1
q
(xhm  xlm)2+(yhm  ylm)2 (4.1)
However, most car brands carry more than two car models, which brings two com-
plications. First, for a brand that carries more than two car models, it is clear that the most
expensive car is the high-end product and the least expensive car is the low-end product.
However, for cars in the middle, their type as to whether it is a high-end or a low-end car
is less clear. To define the type of these cars, we compare their prices with the average
price in their brand. If a car’s price is higher (lower) than the average price in its brand,
we categorize it to be a high-end (low-end) car. Second, when brands carry more than two
car models, the formula in (4.1) that computes the design differentiation between the most
expensive car and the least expensive car of the brand is inapplicable to measure the design
differentiation of cars in the middle of the brand’s price range. To account for cars in the
middle, we need to operationalize the design differentiation construct in a way that it can
capture the design differentiation of any cars of a brand. The thought process in developing
such design variable is as follows: When a brand carries only a high-end car model and
a low-end car model, the design differentiation between them reflects the distinctiveness
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of each car model relative to the other car model. Conceptually, it also reflects the distinc-
tiveness of each car model relative to the average design in its brand. We can derive the
average design in each brand by averaging the coordinate values for each attribute point
across all car models of the brand. We operationalize the design distinctiveness of a car
model in its brand by computing the design difference between the car model’s design and
the average design in its brand using Equation (4.1). This variable captures the design dis-
tinctiveness of any car model including those that are in the middle price range. A higher
value represents that a car model carries a more distinctive design relative to the average
design of its brand. As a result, it is easier to differentiate the car from the other cars of
the brand based on design and to recognize it as a high-end or a low-end car. A lower
value represents that the car model carries a more similar design to the average design of
its brand and it is less likely that one can differentiate the car model from the other cars of
its brand to recognize it as a high-end or a low-end car.*
Control Variables. We control for the impact of prices, advertising, and func-
tional attributes of car models on consumer preferences and car choices. Prices are mea-
sured by deducting monthly cash rebates issued by manufacturers and dealers from an-
nual manufacturer-suggested retail list price (MSRP), both collected from the Automotive
News. Monthly advertising expenditure data are collected from the Ad$pender database.
* We use an online survey study to verify whether this objective measure of design differentiation captures
the perceived design differentiation by consumers. 120 Mturk participants were recruited to rate on a five-
point scale (1=Not Much, 5 = Very Much) how much a car model looks like car models of its brand. Results
show that participants’ subjective ratings of design differentiation are significantly and positively correlated
with the objective measure of design differentiation (R =  0:43, p < 0:001). Please refer to the Appendix
for detailed stimulus and description.
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We operationalize prices and advertising variables by taking natural logarithm of prices and
advertising expenditure. We collect functional attributes data from Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook and include horsepower, miles per gallon, car type (i.e. regular or sporty/spe-
cialty) and weight. We use horsepower-to-weight ratio of a car model as a measure of
the car model’s power (Berry et al. 1995, Sudhir 2001). We also collect car size data
from cars.com. Car safety ratings are provided on a 4-point scale (i.e., good, acceptable,
marginal, and poor) by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and the predicted relia-
bility ratings are provided on a 5-point scale by Consumer Reports. Table 4.1 summarizes
the descriptive statistics of all variables.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables (nota-
tion)
N Mean Std
Dev
Min Max
Sales (sal) 16,268 4,388 6,375 0 75,537
Market Share %
(shr)
16,268 0.35 0.51 0 6.51
DV* (y) 16,268 -
6.42
2.76 -
15.89
-
0.82
Design Differentia-
tion (dd)
16,268 1.56 0.73 0.47 5.30
High End (hig) 16,268 0.44 0.50 0 1
Horsepower (hp) 16,268 6.65 2.22 3.45 41.43
Miles Per Gallon
(mpg)
16,268 22.45 7.10 12.65 64.15
Size (siz) 16,268 1.31 0.15 0.48 1.71
Reliability (rel) 16,268 3.20 1.12 1 5
Safety (saf ) 16,268 3.62 0.48 1 4
Regular (reg) 16,268 0.73 0.43 0 1
Coupe (cou) 16,268 0.37 0.48 0 1
Price k$ (pri) 16,268 26,705 17,410 5,357 121,347
Advertising mil-
lion$ (ads)
16,268 10,583 11,037 0 92,190
*DV (Dependent Variable) is defined as y jt = ln(s jt)  ln(s0t).
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4.2.2 A Random-Coefficient Aggregate Logit Model
We build an aggregate random-coefficient logit model of consumers’ car choices.
Specifically, there are t = 1; :::;T time periods. In period t, there are j = 0;1; :::;Jt car
models available for purchase, where j= 0 is the outside good, i.e., consumers may decide
not to purchase any car models. Each consumer i 2 f1; ; :::;Ntg chooses a car model j 2
f0;1; ; :::;Jtg in period t 2 f1; ; :::;Tg to maximize utility:
ui jt = gisd jt +a1i pri jt +a2i ads jt +b 0i x jt +h jt + ei jt (4.2)
ui jt denotes the indirect utility that consumer i receives from consuming car model j in
period t. d jt is the degree of design differentiation of car model j in its brand in period t.gis
captures consumer i’s preferences for design differentiation of an s-end car model, where
s2 fh = high-end, l = low-endg. pri jt and ads jt are log-transformed prices and advertising
expenditure of car model j in period t. x jt is a (column) vector of functional attributes of
car model j in period t. It includes horsepower, miles per gallon, size, reliability, safety,
and dummy variables that indicate if the car model is a high-end product (versus a low-
end product), a coupe (versus a sedan), and a regular car (versus a sporty/specialty car).
a1i , a2i , and bi are two scalars and a (column) vector of consumer i’s parameters for prices,
advertising, and functional attributes, respectively. We allow consumer preferences to vary
as a function of unobserved individual characteristics vi. Specifically, we model individual
coefficients to follow a normal distribution with mean coefficients a = [a1a2]0 and b :
ai
bi

=

a
b

+Svi; vi  Pv(v) (4.3)
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where Pv() is the distribution of vi. We assume that it is a standard multivariate normal
distribution. We can rewrite (4.2) as
ui jt = gsd jt +a1pri jt +a2ads jt +b 0x jt +h jt (4.4)
+Dgisd jt +Da1i pri jt +Da2i ads jt +Db 0i x jt + ei jt
where gsd jt +a1pri jt +a2ads jt +b 0x jt +h jt are the mean utility that consumers derive
from car model j in time t, and Dgisd jt +Da1i pri jt +Da2i ads jt +Db 0i x jt are the individual
consumer i’s deviation from the mean utility. Our focal interest is in gs;s 2 fh; lg, i.e.,
the impact of design differentiation on consumer preferences for high-end and low-end
products separately. Our hypothesis H1 states that gh > 0 and gl < 0.†
The term h jt in (4.2) captures unobserved demand factors of car model j in period
t. ei jt is the idiosyncratic error term. We normalize the intrinsic utility of the outside
good to zero and the total utility of the outside good is only the idiosyncratic error term:
ui0t = ei0t . We further assume that ei jt follows an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution.
We assume that each consumer purchases one car model that gives the highest utility. The
set of consumers that purchase car model j in time t is:
A jt =

(vi;ei0t ; :::;eiJt)jui jt  uilt 8l = 0;1; :::;J
	
(4.5)
The market share of the car model j in time t is integrating over the mass of consumers in
†Essentially, we are interested in the main effect of design differentiation (d) on consumer preferences
and its interaction with the dummy variable that indicates if a product is a high-end product (versus a low-
end product). Our hypothesis (H1) is equivalent to that the base effect of design differentiation on consumer
preferences is negative; however, a product being a high-end product positively moderates the main effect
of design differentiation on consumer preferences such that the overall effect of design differentiation of a
high-end product on consumer preferences is positive.
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the region A jt :
s jt =
Z
A jt
dPe(e)dPv(v) (4.6)
We account for potential erogeneity of independent variables in the model. In the follow-
ing subsection, we lay out the identification strategy, discussing sources of endogeneity
problems and how we address them.
4.2.3 Identification
In an ideal and controlled setting, we would like brands to sell the same set of high-
end and low-end car models in two similar geographic markets, where in onemarket brands
use the same design while in the other market brands use different designs. This setting
would allow us to clearly assess the effect of design differentiation on consumer prefer-
ences and choices. However, brands do not vary design across geographic markets, which
can confuse consumers and obscure brand image. With data of 207 car models sold in
120 months, we observe variations in car design across car models and changes in car de-
sign over time. We rely on cross-sectional variations across car models and time-series
variations within car models to identify the parameters of design variables as well as other
structural parameters in Equation (4.2). Particularly, the effect of design differentiation
on consumer preferences is identified by variations in the inverted market share across car
models and across months that change with the variations in the design differentiation vari-
able across car models and across months, after controlling for other factors that impact
market share.
We acknowledge endogeneity problems of short-term decision variables including
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prices and advertising activities. Prices are likely endogenous for two reasons: omitted
variables and simultaneity. First, there may be product quality attributes that are unob-
served to researchers but considered by car makers to set prices and considered by con-
sumers to choose cars. Such unobserved quality is included in the error term, h jt , which
induces correlation between the error term and prices, making prices endogenous. Sec-
ond, prices are simultaneously determined by the demand side and car makers’ profit-
maximizing behavior on the supply side. Without explicitly modeling the supply side,
prices are endogenous due to simultaneity. Similarly, advertising activities may also be
endogenous, as car makers may purposely advertise car models with certain unobserved
characteristics in a period.
We take three steps to address these endogeneity problems. First, we use brand fixed
effects to control for any brand level unobserved factors that impact prices, advertising, and
market shares.‡ Second, we use month fixed effects to control for seasonality and unob-
served month-specific factors that impact prices, advertising, and market shares. However,
there could still be correlations between the error term h jt and prices or advertising on di-
mensions that these fixed effects have not controlled for. We use instrument variables to
control for potential sources of endogeneity on these dimensions.
Cost shifters from the supply side would be ideal instruments for prices and advertis-
‡Alternatively, one could use car model specific fixed effects to control for unobserved factors at the car
model level. However, the drawback of this approach is that car model fixed effects would absorb cross-
sectional variations and only rely on time-series variations within car models for identification. However,
car design does not change frequently. On average, the life cycle of a car design is seven years with a mid-
life refresh (Weber 2009). Certain car models in our dataset have not changed design in the sample period.
Hence, variations in the design variable are largely from the cross-sectional dimension. We use brand fixed
effects to preserve variations in design variable while controlling for unobserved time-invariant factors at the
brand level.
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ing as they are not correlated with unobserved demand factors but correlated with prices
and advertising levels. Positive shifters of production costs are expected to be positively
correlated with prices and positive shifters of advertising costs are expected to be nega-
tively correlated with advertising levels. We use the unit cost of advertising across media
(cable TV, network TV, daily magazines, and national newspapers) that Ad$pender reports
as instruments for advertising expenditure.
However, data on production cost shifters are not available. To address endogeneity
problems of prices, the most popular identifying assumption used in prior research is that
the locations of products in the characteristics space is exogenous, or at least determined
prior to the revelation of consumers’ valuation of the unobserved product characteristics
(Nevo 2000). We adopt this identifying assumption. We assume that car attributes, includ-
ing design characteristics, are determined prior to the revelation of consumers’ valuation
of the unobserved product characteristics. Based on this assumption, we follow prior re-
search and use observed car characteristics to derive proper instruments for prices (Berry et
al. 1995, Sudhir 2001). For example, to create a set of instruments for prices of car model
j of brand i using horsepower, we compute the average horsepower of brand i’s car models
other than j to be the own-brand horsepower instrument variable. We also compute the
average horsepower of all car models of all other brands to be the other-brand horsepower
instrument variable. We derive two sets of own-brand and other-brand horsepower instru-
ments using two ways to group brands, the first based on country of origin and (regular
or non-regular) car type, the second based on country of origin and (luxury or econoour)
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classification. As a result, we derive four instruments based on each functional attribute
variable. With the instruments, we estimate the model using GMM methods (see Nevo
2000 for details). Model estimates are shown in Table 4.2.
4.2.4 Empirical Findings
We begin with estimating a model without design differentiation variables (Model
1) and then add design differentiation variables to the model (Model 2). This sequential
analysis helps us assess the change in the explanatory and predictive power of the model
by incorporating the design aspect of products. Values of AIC and BIC show that Model
2 fits the data better than Model 1, suggesting that including design differentiation vari-
ables helps us better explain consumer preferences and predict consumer choices. Now
we interpret results in Model 2.
Table 4.2: Demand Model Estimates
Variables Model 1 (without d) Model 2 (with d)
Intercept 28:14(3:81)‡ 30:14(4:10)‡
High-End Design Differentiation (dh) 0:24(0:14)
Low-End Design Differentiation (dl)  0:40(0:19)†
High-End (hig) 1:89(0:18)‡ 1:01(0:35)‡
Price (pri)  5:46(0:36)‡  6:08(0:54)‡
Advertising (ads) 1:77(0:12)‡ 1:77(0:13)‡
Horsepower (hp) 0:26(0:05)‡ 0:23(0:04)‡
Miles Per Gallon (mpg)  0:02(0:02)  0:02(0:02)
Size (siz) 3:42(0:42)‡ 3:54(0:48)‡
Reliability (rel) 0:23(0:04)‡ 0:23(0:04)‡
Safety (saf ) 0:29(0:05)‡ 0:32(0:05)‡
Regular (reg) 0:66(0:14)‡ 0:70(0:13)‡
Coupe (cou) 0:63(0:08)‡ 0:60(0:08)‡
AIC 12;270 12;189
BIC 12;686 12;635
p< 0:10, †p< 0:05, ‡p< 0:01. () negative value.
p< 0:10, †p< 0:05, ‡p< 0:01.
Estimates for brand fixed effects and month fixed effects are not reported due to space limits.
First stage regression of prices on instruments: R2 = 0.88, F(83;16184) = 1691, p< 0:001.
First stage regression of advertising on instruments: R2 = 0.51, F(83;16184) = 200:85, p< 0:001.
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We present the effects of design differentiation on preferences for high-end and low-
end products separately. The coefficient of design differentiation for high-end products
(dh) is significantly positive, while the coefficient of design differentiation for low-end
products (dl) is significantly negative, which supports H1. In addition, the coefficient of the
high-end dummy variable (hig) is significantly positive, suggesting that consumers derive
higher utility from consuming a high-end product compared to a low-end product. Price
has a significant and negative effect on preferences, whereas advertising exerts a significant
and positive effect on preferences. Estimates of the coefficients of functional attributes are
all significant and show that consumers prefer higher fuel efficiency, larger sizes, higher
reliability, and safer cars. Consumers also prefer regular cars over sporty/specialty cars,
and prefer coupes over sedans.
Overall, this empirical analysis shows that in making car purchase decisions, design
differentiation plays an important role in shaping consumer preferences for cars. Consis-
tent with H1, if a brand diversifies design, consumer preferences for the brand’s high-end
products increase while preferences for the brand’s low-end products decrease. In other
words, consumers prefer high-end products to look more differentiated but prefer low-end
products to look less differentiated. The opposing preferences presents brands a product
design dilemma - should brands diversify design to improve the appeal of its high-end
products or unify design to improve the appeal of its low-end products? We are going to
address this question using a game-theoretic model in the next section.
122
4.3 A Model of Brands’ Design Differentiation Strategy
In this section, we lay out the setup of the main game-theoretic model, present anal-
ysis, and discuss results. We begin with the simplest possible model to seek qualitative
insights. In §4.4, we will generalize the base model in several ways to show the robustness
of findings and seek new insights.
4.3.1 Model Setup
Consider a market with two competing brands indexed by i 2 fA;Bg that sell status
goods such as cars, watches, and handbags.§ Each brand sells a high-end product and a low-
end product to consumers in two market segments indexed by s 2 fh; lg¶. We standardize
the total size of two markets to 1 and use a to represent the size of the high-end market.
Then the size of the low-endmarket is 1 a . The product is characterized by two attributes:
functionality and exterior design. Functionalities, such as safety features of cars, weight
of watches, and sizes of handbags provide intrinsic utilitarian value to consumers, while
the exterior design influences the status value of consumption. We discuss each aspect
separately.
Intrinsic Utility. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences for the functionality
of products. For example, some consumers may prefer heavier watches, bigger handbags,
safer and heavier cars that are less fuel-efficient while other consumers may prefer the
§For completeness, we also examine the design strategy of a monopolist. Details are included in the
Appendix.
¶In this paper, we use markets or market segments to refer to the social and demographic segments of
consumers that purchase high-end and low-end products respectively. In the base model, we assume that
high-end consumers only purchase a high-end product and low-end consumers only purchase a low-end
product. We will relax this assumption in §4.4.4 to allow consumers to switch between segments.
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opposite. We formulate this consumer heterogeneity by assuming that consumers in market
s are distributed on a Hotelling line with range [0;1], according to a continuous distribution
function fs() with a cumulative distribution function Fs(). A consumer’s location q on
the line represents the ideal functionality for the consumer. The functionality provided by
a product is indicated by the location of the product on the line. We denote the location of
brand A’s product by as and brand B’s product by bs. A consumer incurs a disutility for
consuming a product whose functionality is not ideal. We capture this dis-utility of mis-
match by the formulation that a consumer incurs a mis-match transportation cost from the
consumer’s location to the product’s location. We assume themis-match cost is quadratic in
the consumer’s distance to the product. If a consumer at qs purchases the product located
at as, then the mis-match cost is ts(qs  as)2, where ts measures the degree of consumer
heterogeneity or the intensity of competition in market s. A higher ts represents greater
consumer heterogeneity and less intensive competition. Let pis denote the price of brand
i0s product sold in market s. The intrinsic utility that the consumer at qs derives from
purchasing A’s s-end product at price pas is rs  ts(qs  as)2  pas, where rs is the base
utility from consuming the s-end product. The intrinsic utility from purchasing B’s s-end
product at price pbs is rs  ts(qs bs)2  pbs.
Status Utility. In addition to the intrinsic utility, consumers also derive a status
utility from consuming a status good. The status utility provided by high-end and low-
end products is influenced by the exterior design differentiation between them. To simply
analysis, we assume each brand makes a binary design differentiation decision. Let di
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denote brand i0s exterior design differentiation strategy. If di = 0, it indicates that brand
i unifies design so that its high-end and low-end products look the same. If di = 1, it
indicates that brand i diversifies design so that its high-end and low-end products look
different. Design diversification is costly and the cost is denoted by m> 0.
Based on the empirical results that support H1, we assume that if a brand diversifies
design, it increases the social value of the brand’s high-end product and the magnitude of
increase is denoted by the parameter gh. Meanwhile, design diversifications decreases the
social value of the brand’s low-end product and the magnitude of the decrease is denoted
by gl . Hence, gh represent high-end consumers’ preferences for design diversification gl
represent low-end consumers’ preferences for design unification. We normalize the base
status utility of products to zero. The total utility from consuming a product is the sum-
mation of the intrinsic utility and the status utility. As a result, the total utility that a con-
sumer at qh receives from consuming brand A’s high-end product purchased at price pah
is rh  th(qh ah)2  pah+ ghda. The total utility that a consumer at ql receives from pur-
chasing brand A’s low-end product at price pal is rl   tl(ql   al)2  pal   glda. The total
utility from consuming brand B’s products can be defined analogously.
The sequence of the game is as follows. There are three stages in the game. In the first
stage, brands simultaneously make their exterior design differentiation decision by choos-
ing between unification (di = 0) and diversification (di = 1), which will become common
knowledge to both brands. In §4.4.1, we will consider situations where brands make the
design decision sequentially. In the second stage, brands simultaneously set prices of their
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products. In the last stage, consumers in each market observe design and prices of the two
products that brands offer for their market and decide from which brand to buy the product.
This sequence of moves reflects the process of decision-making in the development of new
products, as brands make product design decisions prior to setting prices. It is also appro-
priate since design strategies are less flexible, while prices are easier to change. In the main
model, we assume that the functionalities of products have been exogenously determined
and are symmetric between brands, i.e., as = 1  bs, s 2 fh; lg. In §4.4.2, we will allow
brands to choose functionalities of products given their exterior design decisions.
Lastly, we account for the fact that it is more costly to produce a high-end product
than a low-end product. We standardize the marginal cost to produce a low-end product
to zero and use c to represent the incremental marginal cost to produce a high-end product.
We will solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium backward.
4.3.2 Analysis and Results
Let qh denote the location of the marginal consumer in the high-end market (see
Figure 4.3). This marginal consumer is indifferent between buying A’s high-end product
and B’s high-end product. We must have that:
rh  th(qh ah)2  pah+ ghda = rh  th(qh bh)2  pbh+ ghdb (4.7)
qh =
ah+bh
2
  pah  pbh
2th(bh ah) +
gh(da db)
2th(bh ah) (4.8)
The left hand side of Equation (4.7) is the total utility of buying the high-end product from
brand A. It comprises of the intrinsic utility rh  th(qh  ah)2  pah and the status utility
ghda that is increasing in da, i.e. design diversification fromA’s low-end product. The right
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hand side of Equation (4.7) is the total utility of buying the high-end product from brand B.
The intrinsic utility is rh  th(qh bh)2  pbh. The status utility ghdb is increasing in db, i.e.,
design diversification from B’s low-end product. Equation (4.8) gives the location of the
marginal consumer. The first two terms represent the location of this marginal consumer
when gh = 0, i.e., high-end consumers have no preferences for design diversification. The
last term suggests that holding prices constant, qh is increasing in da and decreasing in
db. It suggests that design diversification of a brand increases sales of the brand’s high-
end product, as design diversification enhances the status utility provided by a high-end
product.
Now let us examine the low-end market. The location of the marginal consumer in
the low-endmarket is denoted by ql . This marginal consumer is indifferent between buying
A’s low-end product and B’s low-end product. We must have that:
rl  tl(ql al)2  pal  glda = rl  tl(ql bl)2  pbl  gldb (4.9)
ql =
al +bl
2
  pal  pbl
2tl(bl al)  
gl(da db)
2tl(bl al) (4.10)
The left hand side of Equation (4.9) is the total utility of buying brand A’s low-end prod-
uct. Like in the high-end market, the intrinsic utility is rl   tl(ql   al)2  pal . Unlike in
the high-end market, the status utility is decreasing in design diversification denoted by
da. Similarly, the right hand side of Equation (4.9) is the total utility of buying B’s low-
end product. The intrinsic utility is rl   tl(ql   bl)2  pbl , and the status utility is  gldb,
declining with db. Equation (4.10) shows that the location of the marginal consumer in
the low-end market, i.e., ql , decreases with da but increases with db. This suggests that
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holding prices constant, sales of a brand in the low-end market is decreasing in the brand’s
design diversification and increasing in the competitor’s design diversification, opposite to
the effects of design diversification in the high-end market.
Brandsmake exterior design and pricing decisions tomaximize their respective profit
function given below:
Pa = a(pah  c)Fh(qh)+(1 a)palFl(ql) m da (4.11)
Pb = a(pbh  c)(1 Fh(qh))+(1 a)pbl (1 Fl(ql)) m db (4.12)
With this setup, we analyze optimal pricing and profits under symmetric and asymmetric
exterior design differentiation regimes. Then, we will compare brand profits in symmetric
and asymmetric regimes to derive the equilibrium design strategy.
Symmetric Design Strategies. Consider the case that brands adopt symmetric de-
sign strategies, i.e., design strategies of two brands are the same so that da = db = d. We
assume the distribution of consumers in each market, fs(), is a symmetric log-concave
function. Using first order conditions and symmetry, we obtain the equilibrium prices:
ph =
th(bh ah)
fh( 12 )
+ c and pl =
tl(bl al)
fl( 12 )
. In equilibrium, q h = q l =
1
2 . Brand profits under
this symmetric design regime are P = ath(bh ah)
2 fh( 12 )
+ (1 a)tl(bl al)
2 fl( 12 )
 m d. Note that when
two brands adopt symmetric design strategies, the impact of design on sales and prices in
each market cancels out. Consequently, a symmetric change in design strategies by both
brands does not increase equilibrium prices or sales. Hence, costly design diversification
becomes unnecessary and reduces profits. Brands are better off when they both unify the
design of high-end and low-end products. We state this result in Lemma 1 below:
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Figure 4.3: Purchase Pattern with Symmetric Design Strategies
ah 0 qh
jBuy ah 
1
Buy bh 
bh
High-end
al 0 ql
jBuy al 
1
Buy bl 
bl
Low-end
Lemma 2 When brands choose the same design strategy, profits are higher when both
brands unify design than when both brands diversify design.
Asymmetric Design Strategies. Now consider situations where competing brands
adopt asymmetric design strategies. Without loss of generality, assume brand A unifies
design while brand B diversifies design, i.e., da = 0 and db = 1. We consider situations
where the cost of design diversification is not prohibitive, i.e., m < agh3

1  gh9th

so that
brands sometimes have incentives to diversify design. We also consider situations where
brands are active in both markets, which requires that qs 2 (0;1);s 2 fh; lg. To derive
equilibrium in this asymmetric case, we further assume that fs() is uniform. We present
our results blow and detailed proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 14 As long as a1 a  thtl 
bh ah
bl al 2
 1
2 ;3

, adopting asymmetric design strategies
leads to a win-win outcome for competing brands if gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2). gˆ1 and gˆ2 both increase
with gl and gˆ2 > gˆ1 when gl is sufficiently large.
This proposition shows that adopting asymmetric exterior design strategies can lead
to a win-win outcome for symmetric brands. It is a win-win outcome in the sense that, by
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adopting different design strategies, both brands obtain higher profits than if they adopted
the same design strategy in this situation. Hence, it is profitable for competing brands
to choose different design strategies. The main intuition is that the asymmetry in brands’
exterior design strategy allows brands to avoid head-to-head competition in both markets.
Instead, each brand gains a comparative advantage in a different market. Specifically, the
brand that unifies design has a comparative advantage in the low-end market. This is be-
cause, the brand’s low-end product shares the same design as its high-end product and
therefore provides a higher status utility than the competing low-end product that carries a
different design from its high-end counterpart. On the other hand, the brand that diversifies
design has a comparative advantage in the high-end market. This is because compared to
the competing high-end product that looks the same as its low-end counterpart, the high-
end product that carries a distinctive design from its low-end counterpart provides a higher
status utility. As a result, brands sell more of their comparatively advantageous product at
higher prices. At the same time, brands sell less of their comparatively disadvantageous
product at lower prices. The gain in the advantageous market can outweigh the loss in
the disadvantageous market. Therefore, compared to the case that brands choose symmet-
ric design strategies, both brands can make higher profits by adopting asymmetric design
strategies, which is a win-win outcome.
This win-win outcome arises when the counteracting preferences for design differen-
tiation by high-end and low-end consumers are both sufficiently strong (see Region (S,D)
win-win in Figure 4.4). The reason is that when gh is sufficiently strong, the brand that
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diversifies design can establish a comparative advantage in the high-end market, as high-
end consumers strongly prefer the high status utility associated with the distinct design of
its high-end product over the competing product. Hence, a strong gh ensures that adopting
asymmetric design strategies is profitable for the brand that diversifies design. By the same
logic, a strong gl ensures that adopting asymmetric design strategies is profitable for the
brand that unifies design and establishes a comparative advantage in the low-end market.
For asymmetric design strategies to improve profits of both brands, gh and gl need to be
sufficiently strong so that both brands make enough higher profits from its advantageous
market to offset the loss in its disadvantageous market.
A sufficient condition for the win-win situation to arise is that the overall conditions
of the high-end and low-end markets are not too different. Specifically, we measure the
relative market conditions in terms of relative market size, i.e., a1 a , relative intensity of
competition, i.e., thtl , and relative differentiation in functionality, i.e.,
bh ah
bl al . As long as the
overall characteristics of two markets are close to being symmetric, i.e., the product of the
three indices is around 1, specifically, a1 a  thtl 
bh ah
bl al 2
 1
2 ;3

, brands can both be better
off by adopting asymmetric design strategies. Let us understand the intuition behind this
result. Suppose a1 a  thtl 
bh ah
bl al is sufficiently large. It implies that the high-end market
is much more favorable than the low-end market, with either a much larger market share,
much softer competition, or much greater differentiation in the functionality of competing
products than those in the low-end market. These favorable conditions motivate brands to
expand presence in the high-end market instead of the low-end market. Consequently, the
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brand that loses comparative advantage in the high-end market due to design unification
is worse off, and the win-win situation cannot arise. Conversely, if a1 a  thtl 
bh ah
bl al is suf-
ficiently small, then the low-end market becomes much more favorable than the high-end
market. As a result, the brand that loses comparative advantage in the low-end market due
to design diversification is worse off and the win-win situation also cannot arise. In addi-
tion, since diversification is costly, the condition for the diversifying brand to win is more
stringent than the condition for the unifying brand to win. Hence, the market condition of
the high-end market can be much more favorable than the low-end market, which explains
why the range (12 ;3) is skewed in favor of the diversifying brand that has a comparative
advantage in the high-end market.
To summarize, the above discussion suggests that the intra-brand design differenti-
ation strategy can serve as a new dimension of inter-brand differentiation. Choosing dif-
ferent design strategies, competing brands can soften competition and both obtain higher
profits. This insight provides a new perspective for researchers to examine competition and
product differentiation. It also points to a new opportunity for brands to improve profits.
One interesting question that follows is: When is this type of brand differentiation most
beneficial? We address this question in the proposition below.
Proposition 15 Asymmetric design strategies are more profitable than symmetric design
strategies when competing products in the same market are less differentiated in function-
ality and competition is more intense.
This proposition shows that the benefit of differentiation in exterior design strategy is larger
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when brands are not sufficiently differentiated from each other in the functionality attribute
of competing products. This is because when competing products are less differentiated
from each other, consumers’ product choices are more influenced by the status utility pro-
vided by products. As a result, the effects of design strategy become stronger and asymmet-
ric design strategies improve profits to a greater degree. In addition, when competition is
more intense, which happens when consumers have more homogeneous taste for function-
ality, brands have stronger incentives to pursue differentiation in exterior design strategy.
This is despite the fact that intensive competition alone reduces brand profits in either sym-
metric or asymmetric design regime. Compared to adopting symmetric design strategies,
more intensive competition hurts brands that adopt asymmetric design strategies less be-
cause brands can leverage intensive competition to coordinate market power more easily.
To see this, the equilibrium market cutoff points in two markets are qh = 12   gh6th(bh ah)
and ql = 12 +
gl
6tl(bl al) , deviating more from the middle of the line in opposite directions as
competition becomes more intense, i.e., as ts decreases. Although intensive competition
reduces prices that brands can charge in either market, brands gain more market share in
the market in which it sells a competitively advantageous product. Hence, this positive ef-
fect mitigates the negative impact of competition and makes asymmetric design strategies
more profitable compared to symmetric design strategies.
Equilibrium Design Strategies. The above analysis illustrates the benefits of asym-
metric design strategies over symmetric design strategies. Now we compare brands’ equi-
librium profits under symmetric and asymmetric design strategies to solve for brands’ en-
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dogenous design choices in equilibrium.
Proposition 16 Brands’ equilibrium design choices are
(a) asymmetric design strategies when gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ3), where gˆ3 > max(gˆ1; gˆ2) and is in-
creasing in gl;
(b) symmetric diversification when gh  gˆ3, where a prisoner’s dilemma arises;
(c) symmetric unification when gh  gˆ1.
Figure 4.4 depicts the regions of gh and gl where symmetric unification, symmetric diver-
sification, or asymmetric design strategies arise in equilibrium. Part (a) of the proposition
shows that when high-end consumers’ preferences for design diversification are moder-
ately strong, brands choose asymmetric design strategies (see Region (S,D)). Furthermore,
gˆ3 >max(gˆ1; gˆ2). Hence, the region where the win-win situation arises (i.e., gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2)) is
a subset of the region where brands choose asymmetric design strategies (i.e., gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ3)).
This result confirms that the win-win situation can arise in equilibrium. This result also
provides an explanation to the puzzling observations that in the same industry or market
conditions, some brands unify design while other brands diversify design. In addition, it
also suggests that depending on which design strategy the competitor adopts, it may be
beneficial for a brand to adopt either design unification or design diversification that is
asymmetric with the competitor’s design strategy.
It is useful to note that if gh 2 (max(gˆ1; gˆ2); gˆ3), the brand that unifies design loses
and the brand that diversifies design wins, compared to profits with symmetric unification.
This is because in this region, brand A has incentives to deviate from symmetric diversifica-
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium Simultaneous Design Strategies
tion to unify design. However, gh is very strong and decreases brand A’s profit. Although
A’s profit is higher than when it diversifies design and incurs the cost of diversification,
A’s profit is lower than if both brands commit to unifying design. We illustrate these find-
ings with numerical examples in Table 4.3a and Table 3b that show brands’ profits in the
respective regions. In both cases, brands endogenously choose asymmetric design strate-
gies. However, only when gh is not overly strong, i.e., gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2), can both brands make
higher profits than choosing symmetric unification.
When high-end consumers have very strong preferences for design diversification,
i.e., gh  gˆ3, brands face a prisoner’s dilemma. As shown by the numerical example in
Table 4.3c, it is beneficial for one brand to diversify design, because diversification appeals
strongly to high-end consumers. However, when both brands diversify design, both brands
are worse off compared to the case when they could commit to design unification (see
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Lemma 3). In contrast, when high-end consumers have very low preferences for design
diversification, i.e., gh < gˆ1, brands do not have incentives to diversify design. Hence, both
brands unify design. Table 4.3d illustrates this outcome with a numerical example.
4.4 Extensions
In this section, we relax several assumptions made in the main model to generalize
results and look for new insights.
4.4.1 Sequential Design Decisions
The analysis thus far has shown equilibrium exterior design differentiation strate-
gies when brands make design decisions simultaneously. One may argue that competing
products are not always introduced at the same time and brands’ design decisions may be
made sequentially. Here we examine how the sequential nature of decision-making impacts
equilibrium design decisions. Suppose that in the first stage of the game, the first-mover
(Stackelberg leader) chooses its exterior design strategy. After observing the leader’s de-
sign choice, the follower chooses its exterior design strategy. In the second stage, the leader
and the follower observe each other’s design choice and simultaneously set prices.
Proposition 17 When brands choose design strategies sequentially, symmetric unification,
symmetric diversification, and the asymmetric design choices arise under the same condi-
tion as when brands choose design strategies simultaneously. When asymmetric design
choices arise, the first mover makes higher profits than the follower does and chooses
design unification if and only if m+ 2(1 a)gl3 >
2agh
3 .
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Table 4.3: Numerical Illustrations of Equilibrium Design Choices
Table 4.3a: gh and gl Both Strong
gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2)
*(S,D) win-win
gh = 3 Brand B
gl = 3 S D
Brand A S (0:75;0:75) (1:08;0:83)
D (0:83;1:08) (0:50;0:50)
Table 4.3b: gh Strong, gl Moderately Strong
gh 2 (max(gˆ1; gˆ2); gˆ3)
*(S,D) lose-win
gh = 3 Brand B
gl = 1 S D
Brand A S (0:75;0:75) (0:60;1:02)
D (1:02;0:60) (0:50;0:50)
Table 4.3c: gh Strong, gl Weak
gh  gˆ3
*(D,D) lose-lose
gh = 3 Brand B
gl = 13 S D
Brand A S (0:75;0:75) (0:47;1:11)
D (1:11;0:47) (0:50;0:50)
Table 4.3d: gh Weak, gl Strong
gh  gˆ1
*(S,S) baseline
gh = 13 Brand B
gl = 3 S D
Brand A S (0:75;0:75) (1:36;0:22)
D (0:22;1:36) (0:50;0:50)
a = 12 , th = tl = 1, ah = al = 14 , bh = bl = 54 , m= 14
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The first part of the proposition confirms that the optimal exterior design strategies
hold under the same conditions as when brands make design decisions simultaneously. The
second part of the proposition shows that the leader enjoys the first-mover advantage by
selecting design strategy in the region where asymmetric design strategies arise. Hence,
the first mover makes higher profits than the follower. The condition for the first mover
to choose unification over diversification represents the tradeoff that it faces. By unifying
design, the brand can avoid the cost of diversification. In addition, unification is appeal-
ing for low-end consumers. When diversification is more costly, low-end consumers have
stronger preferences for unification; or when the size of the low-end market is larger, the
first mover has stronger incentives to unify design. On the other hand, unification decreases
the status utility of the high-end product. When high-end consumers have stronger prefer-
ences for diversification, or the size of the high-end market is larger, the first mover has
lower incentives to unify design. Overall, the first mover unifies design when the former
aspect dominates the latter, i.e., m+ 2(1 a)gl3 >
2agh
3 (see Figure 4.5).
4.4.2 Endogenous Functionalities
In the above analysis we treat the functionalities, i.e., locations of products, as ex-
ogenous and invariant with brands’ exterior design strategies. Now we examine whether
brands have incentives to adjust functionalities of products in response to exterior design
strategies. To do so, we allow brands to simultaneously choose locations as and bs where
s 2 fh; lg, after observing exterior design strategies but before setting prices, as functional
aspects of products are less flexible to change than prices. I solve for the equilibrium func-
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium Sequential Design Strategies
tionalities using first order conditions (see details in the Appendix).
Proposition 18 When brands choose different design strategies, the brand that diversifies
design produces a more mainstream high-end product and a more niche low-end product;
the brand that unifies design produces a more niche high-end product and a more main-
stream low-end product.
The intuition is as follows: Suppose brand A unifies design and brand B diversifies
design, then the status value of B’s high-end product increases while the status value of its
low-end product decreases. As a result, B’s high-end product becomes more appealing and
attracts more consumers; then, qh shifts to the left. This expansion in consumer base leads
to a more diverse set of consumers buying B’s high-end product and gives B incentives to
provide more mainstream functionalities in its high-end product to cater to the diverse taste
of consumers. At the same time, B’s low-end product becomes less attractive and ql shifts
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Figure 4.6: Asymmetric Design Strategy and Endogenous Functionalities
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to the right, resulting in a smaller consumer base for B in the low-end market. Moreover,
the remaining low-end consumers have a concentrated taste and preference for B’s prod-
uct. In response to this change, B should provide more niche functionalities in its low-end
product to better serve the remaining low-end consumers (see Figure 4.6). However, when
brands choose symmetric design strategies, as shown in §4.3.2, the impact of symmetric
design strategies on consumer choices cancel out. The set of consumers that buy from each
brand does not change with brands’ symmetric design decisions. Hence, brands’ optimal
functionalities remain the same in either symmetric unification or symmetric diversifica-
tion (ah = al = 14 and bh = bl = 54 and see Figure 4.3).
4.4.3 Endogenous Preferences for Design Differentiation
In the main model, we represent the degree of consumers’ preferences toward design
diversification with exogenous parameters gs, s 2 fh; lg. Design diversification increases
the status utility experienced by high-end consumers by gh and decreases the status utility
experienced by low-end consumers by gl . This formulation is consistent with our empirical
findings. However, one may argue that the impact of design diversification on the status
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utility may depend on how many consumers buy the counterpart product under the same
brand. For example, high-end consumers may benefit more from design diversification
when there are more low-end consumers who buy the brand’s low-end product. However,
when there are only a handful of low-end consumers who buy the low-end product, design
diversification may not be that beneficial. We modify the main model to account for this
possibility. Specifically, we allow diversification to increase the status utility of a brand’s
high-end product more when there are more low-end consumers that buy the brand’s low-
end product. In this setup, the location of the marginal high-end consumer at qh becomes:
rh  th(qh ah)2  pah+ gh(1 a)q el da = rh  th(qh bh)2  pbh+ gh(1 a)(1 q el )db(4.13)
qh =
ah+bh
2
  pah  pbh
2th(bh ah) +
gh(1 a)

daq el  db(1 q el )

2th(bh ah) (4.14)
where q el is the rational expectation of the location of the indifferent low-end consumer. On
the other hand, we also allow diversification to decrease the status utility of a brand’s low-
end product more when there are more high-end consumers that buy the brand’s high-end
product. The location of the marginal low-end consumer at ql becomes:
rl  tl(ql al)2  pal  glaq ehda = rl  tl(ql bl)2  pbl  gla(1 q eh)db (4.15)
ql =
al +bl
2
  pal  pbl
2tl(bl al)  
gla

daq eh  db(1 q eh)

2tl(bl al) (4.16)
where q eh is the rational expectation of the location of the indifferent high-end consumer.
Equations (4.14) and (4.16) show that the direction of the impact of design diversification
on locations of marginal consumers is consistent with that in the main model, though the
magnitude of the impact is moderated by the brand’s market share in the other market. We
impose rational expectations condition, i.e., q eh = q h and q el = q l , and solve for brand
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decisions as in the main model (see the Appendix for details). My main results still hold
qualitatively. Particularly, asymmetric design strategies can still be a win-win equilibrium
outcome when gh and gl are sufficiently strong, although this region becomes smaller. En-
dogenous preferences weaken the benefit of asymmetric design choices in two ways. Let
us take brand B as an example to illustrate the two effects. B adopts design diversification
and the high-end market is its advantageous market. However, B’s comparative advan-
tage in the high-end market is mitigated by the decrease in its market size in the low-end
market, because as there are fewer low-end consumers that buy from B, B’s high-end con-
sumers value design diversification less. This reduces B’s profit from the high-end market.
Meanwhile, as B’s high-end market share increases, design diversification hurts its low-
end consumers more, reducing B’s profit in the low-end market. As a result, brands gain
less profit from adopting asymmetric design strategies.
4.4.4 Intra-brand Switching
In the base model, we assumed that the two market segments are separate, i.e., con-
sumers in the high-end market only buy a high-end product and do not consider buying
a low-end product; consumers in the low-end market only buy a low-end product and do
not consider buying a high-end product. This assumption is plausible when high-end and
low-end consumers have sufficiently different valuations for quality where the quality lev-
els of the high-end and low-end products are sufficiently differentiated (Amaldoss and
Jain 2015). In this section, we relax this assumption and consider situations where some
consumers may switch between buying the high-end and low-end products when brands
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choose different design strategies. Specifically, we assume that b fraction of the low-end
consumers have strong preferences for design unification, i.e., g 0l = gl+d . d is sufficiently
large so that if a brand diversifies design, the utility of the brand’s low-end product is suffi-
ciently low that these consumers are better off buying a high-end product than the brand’s
low-end product. When a brand unifies design, these consumers would buy a low-end
product that resembles the design of its high-end counterpart. In this setting, (1 a)b
fraction of consumers buy high-end products if both brands diversify design, and buy a
low-end product as long as a brand unifies design. The remaining (1 a)(1 b ) fraction
of consumers always buy a low-end product.
First consider the symmetric cases. When both brands unify designs, the (1 a)b
fraction of consumers buy low-end products, as in the main model. Hence, the equilibrium
result with symmetric unification in the main model applies. When both brands diversify
designs, the (1 a)b fraction of consumers buy high-end products. Assuming that the
profit margin in the high-end market is larger than the profit margin in the low-end market,
i.e., th > tl , profits when both brands diversify design are higher as consumers switch to
buying high-end products. Now consider the asymmetric design strategies. When brand
A unifies design while brand B diversifies design, the (1 a)b fraction of consumers
buy brand A’s low-end product, as these consumers place low values to quality and high
values to social image. My analysis shows that the presence of the switching consumers
strengthens the main finding that asymmetric design strategies lead to a win-win outcome.
We state the finding in the proposition below.
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Proposition 19 As b increases, i.e., more consumers switch between brands, brands make
higher profits from adopting asymmetric design strategies.
The intuition is the following. When brand A unifies design and brand B diversifies design,
brand A attracts (1 a)b fraction of switching consumers to buy its low-end product that
resembles the design of A’s high-end product. Given that brand A does not compete with
brand B in the switching segment and brand A sells low-end products to these switchers,
brand A has incentives to raise the price of the low-end product to exploit the monopoly
power in the switching segment. Given that brand A also competes with brand B in the
low-end segment, A’s incentive to raise the low-end price induces brand B to raise the low-
end price. Both the direct effect of a price increase in the low-end segment and strategic
effect of softened competition enable both brands to make higher profits from the low-end
segment. As b increases, the positive effects on brand profits are stronger. Hence, both
brands can make higher profits from adopting asymmetric design strategies. Given that
brand profits from adopting the symmetric unification remains the same as in the main
model, the above result suggests that asymmetric design strategies lead to stronger win-
win outcome, i.e., profits with asymmetric design strategies are much higher than profits
with symmetric unifications.
4.5 Conclusion
Luxury products in a wide range of industries are conspicuously consumed and pro-
vide status value to consumers. Global expenditure on luxury products exceeded $1.1 tril-
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lion and continues to grow. The exterior design of luxury products is a critical attribute that
influences the status value that consumers receive from consuming these products, which
in turn affects consumer choices and brand profits. In this paper, we study the optimal
exterior design differentiation between high-end and low-end products. We build a game-
theoretic model in which design diversification between high-end and low-end products of
a brand increases consumer preferences for the high-end product but decreases preferences
for the low-end product. We investigate design strategies that brands choose in equilibrium.
We also analyze the implications of the exterior design differentiation strategy on equilib-
rium prices and functionalities of products. Our analysis shows the following insights and
provides important managerial implications:
What is the optimal exterior design differentiation strategy? Our results suggest
that when low-end consumers strongly prefer design unification and high-end consumers
strongly prefer design diversification, brands should choose different design strategies to
obtain higher profits. When high-end consumers have weak preferences for design diversi-
fication, competing brands should all choose design unification. However, when high-end
consumers have strong preferences for design diversification but low-end consumers have
weak preferences for design unification, brands have incentives to diversify design; how-
ever, both brands make higher profits if they could commit to design unification.
How should brands adjust prices of products based on their design differentiation
strategy? We show that when brands adopt different design strategies, brands should ad-
just prices based on their design strategy. Specifically, the brand that diversifies design
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should raise prices of their high-end product and reduce prices of their low-end product.
In contrast, the brand that unifies design should raise prices of their low-end product and
reduce prices of their high-end product.
How should brands adjust functionalities of products based on their design differen-
tiation strategy? We also find that the exterior design decision has important implications
on how brands should set the functionalities of products. Specifically, when brands adopt
different design strategies, the brand that diversifies design should produce high-end prod-
ucts that have more mainstream functionalities and low-end products that have more niche
functionalities; whereas the brand that unifies design should produce low-end products
that have more mainstream functionalities and high-end products that have more niche
functionalities.
Why do some brands use the same design while other brands use different designs for
their high-end and low-end products? Our analysis shows that brands may choose design
unification or diversification in different market conditions. Generally, strong preferences
for diversification by high-end consumers and favorable market conditions in the high-end
market lead brands to diversify design, whereas weak preferences for diversification by
high-end consumers and favorable market conditions in the low-end market lead brands
to unify design. Moreover, even when brands are in the same industry and face the same
situation, it can be profitable for brands to choose different design strategies. We show that
when the market conditions of high-end and low-end markets are not too different and the
opposing preferences for design diversification by high-end and low-end consumers are
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both sufficiently strong, competing brands choose different design strategies.
Can design unification be a profitable design strategy? Our analysis shows that
when brands choose the same design strategy, unification yields higher profits than diver-
sification. When brands choose different design strategies, some brands need to choose
unification while other brands choose diversification to achieve a win-win outcome. In ad-
dition, under some conditions, a design leader who can choose design before competitors
choose design finds it profitable to unify design. Hence, design unification can, in fact, be
a profitable design strategy.
There are several avenues for future research. First, in this paper, we have focused
on one specific aspect of exterior product design, i.e., the exterior design differentiation
between high-end and low-end products. Future research can investigate other aspects
of exterior product design and their implications on consumer choices, brand decisions,
and profits. Second, the analysis provides one possible explanation to the dichotomous
design choices that brands make. It may be interesting to further explore brand specific
characteristics that make one particular design strategy to become more profitable than the
other.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I show that consumers’ social and psychological considerations
such as fairness concerns, context-dependency, and social status concerns affect con-
sumers’ decision making, which in turn affect firms’ strategic marketing decisions such
as pricing, upgrade introductions, and design differentiation between product lines. Future
research can examine the impact of other social and psychological factors on consumers’
decision making and firms’ other important decisions.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 1
Proof of Lemma 1
Without customer recognition, the two-period model is a repetition of a static game.
In each period, the consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm A at a price pa
and firm B at a price pb is indexed by q1 where
r  tq1  pa = r  t(1 q1)  pb
q1 =
1
2
  pa  pb
2t
(A1)
The profit functions of the two firms are
Pa1 = q1  pa
Pb1 = (1 q1)  pb (A2)
First order conditions give the equilibrium outcomes: pa = pb = t, q 1 =
1
2 , and P

a1 =
Pb1 =
t
2 . The total discounted profits over the two periods are P

a =Pb =
(1+d f )t
2 . 2
Proof of the claim that following a symmetric first period equilibrium, poaching
prices are lower than past-customer prices
We prove the above claim by considering two types of pricing policy. We first
consider symmetric second period pricing policy, i.e., either both firms give discounts to
switchers or both firms give discounts to own customers. Then we allow for asymmetric
pricing policy, i.e., one firm gives discounts to switchers and another firm gives discounts
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to own customers. We focus on pure strategy equilibrium.
Claim 1 With symmetric second period pricing policy, in any pure strategy equilibrium,
poaching prices must be lower than past-customer prices.
Proof: Suppose the claim does not hold and both firms set poaching prices to be strictly
higher than past-customer prices, i.e., ac > ao and bc > bo, then switching customers ex-
perience fairness concerns. The indifferent customer at qa becomes:
r  tqa ao = r  t(1 qa) bc l (bc bo) (A3)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2t
+
l (bc bo)
2t
(A4)
Similarly, the indifferent customer at qb becomes:
r  tqb ac l (ac ao) = r  t(1 qb) bo (A5)
qb =
1
2
+
bo ac
2t
  l (ac ao)
2t
(A6)
It follows that in equilibrium
q a  q b =
(1+l )(ac ao+bc bo)
2t
> 0 (A7)
by the assumption that ac > ao and bc > bo.
However, for both firms to poach, we need q a < q1 < q b which cannot be satisfied
in this case. Assume without loss of generality that only firm A poaches i.e., q b > q1. This
implies that q a > q1 and A can increase its profit by increasing ao by some e > 0. This
increases profits from its own segment while also decreasing the perceived unfairness by
the switcher segment and therefore potentially increasing sales and profits in this segment
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too. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium. Assume neither firm poaches, without loss
of generality assume q b  q1 < q a . Like the previous case, this cannot be an equilibrium
as A can raise ao by e > 0 to increase profit.2
Claim 2 With asymmetric second period pricing policy, for q1 2 (13 ; 23), in any pure strat-
egy equilibrium poaching prices must be lower than past-customer prices.
Assume that Firm A sets a strictly higher poaching price while Firm B sets a weakly
higher past-customer price, i.e., ac > ao and bo bc . ThenA’s switching customers and B’s
past customers exhibit fairness concerns. The indifferent customer at qa and qb becomes:
r  tqa ao = r  t(1 qa) bc (A8)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2t
(A9)
and
r  tqb ac l (ac ao) = r  t(1 qb) bo l (bo bc) (A10)
qb =
1
2
  ac bo
2t
  l (ac ao)
2t
+
l (bo bc)
2t
(A11)
We focus on interior solutions. Firms’ profit functions are
Pa = aoqa+ac(qb q1) (A12)
Pb = bo(1 qb)+bc(q1 qa) (A13)
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First order conditions with respect to prices give that:
ac(q1) =
t(2l 2 6lq1+12q1 9)
3(2l 2 3l  3) (A14)
ao(q1) =
t(4l 2 6l  6q1 3)
3(2l 2 3l  3) (A15)
bc(q1) =
t(2l 2+6lq1 6l  12q1+3)
3(2l 2 3l  3) (A16)
bo(q1) =
t(4l 2 6l +6q1 9)
3(2l 2 3l  3) (A17)
For ac(q1) > ao(q1) to be true, we need q1 < 3 3l+l
2
3(3 l ) which cannot hold for q1 >
1
3
because 3 3l+l 23(3 l )  13 . By the same logic, if firm B sets a strictly higher poaching price
while firm A sets a weakly higher past-customer price, i.e., bc > bo and ao  ac , then
bc(q1)> bo(q1) cannot be true if q1 < 23 . Hence, for q1 2 (13 ; 23), the claim holds. 2
Claim 3 Following a symmetric first period equilibrium, there exists a pure strategy sec-
ond period pricing equilibrium where ao  ac and bo  bc .
ByClaim 1 andClaim 2, the equilibrium, if it exists, must involve both firms charging
lower poaching prices. It remains to be shown that such an equilibrium exists. In this case,
past customers experience fairness concerns. The marginal consumer at qa becomes:
r  tqa ao l (ao ac) = r  t(1 qa) bc (A18)
qa =
1
2
  ao bc
2t
  l (ao ac)
2t
(A19)
Similarly, the marginal consumer at qb satisfies:
r  t(1 qb) bo l (bo bc) = r  tqb ac (A20)
qb =
1
2
+
bo ac
2t
+
l (bo bc)
2t
(A21)
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Firms’ profit functions in the second period are:
Pa2 = aoqa+ac (qb q1) (A22)
Pb2 = bo (1 qb)+bc (q1 qa) (A23)
The first order conditions with respect to prices lead to the results in Table 1. The equilib-
rium prices are:
ac(q1) =

  4(1+l )
3+3l  2l 2q1+
9+21l +10l 2 4l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2)

t (A24)
ao(q1) =

2(1 l )
3+3l  2l 2q1+
3+9l +2l 2 2l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2)

t (A25)
bc(q1) =

4(1+l )
3+3l  2l 2q1 
3+3l +2l 2+4l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2)

t (A26)
bo(q1) =

  2(1 l )
3+3l  2l 2q1+
9+9l  4l 2 2l 3
3(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2)

t (A27)
The second order conditions for second period prices hold as ¶
2Pa2
¶a2o
= ¶
2Pb2
¶b2o
= 
h
l+1
t
i
< 0
and ¶
2Pa2
¶a2c
= ¶
2Pb2
¶b2c
=  1t < 0. For a

o  ac and bo  bc to hold, we require that 0 < q1 2
3+6l+4l 2 l 3
3(1+l )(3+l ) ;
6+6l l 2+l 3
3(1+l )(3+l )

. In this range, we also have 0 < qa < q1 < qb < 1. For
l 2 [0;1], this range is symmetric around 12 and non-empty. Hence, this equilibrium exists
following a symmetric equilibrium in the first period. 2
Proof of Equilibrium Results Presented in Tables 1 and 2
Proof of Claim 2 above shows how we obtain results in Table 1 of the paper. Here
we show how we obtain the equilibrium results given in Table 2 of the paper.
The First Period
In the first period, the marginal consumer at q1 is indifferent between buying from
A at price a1 and buying from B at price b1, rationally expecting the second period prices
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that they will face in the second period. We must have
r  tq1 a1+dc [r  t(1 q1) bc(a1;b1)] =
r  t(1 q1) b1+dc (r  tq1 ac(a1;b1)) (A28)
where bc(a1;b1) and ac(a1;b1) are the consumer’s rational expectation of poaching prices
in the second period, given the first period prices. Imposing the rational expectations condi-
tions bc(a1;b1) = bc(q1(a1;b1)) and ac(a1;b1) = ac(q1(a1;b1)) where ac(q1(a1;b1)) and
bc(q1(a1;b1)) are the equilibrium poaching prices as a function of q1 that are given in the
second column of Table 1. It follows that
q1 =
1
2
  a1 b1
2t

1+ 1+l+2l
2
3+3l 2l 2dc
 (A29)
Firms set first period prices to maximize the total discounted profits over two periods.
Hence, the profit functions are
Pa = Pa1+d fPa2(q1) = a1q1+d fP

a2(q1)
Pb = Pb1+d fPb2(q1) = b1 (1 q1)+d fPb2(q1) (A30)
The first order condition solves for the first period prices. We obtain that:
Table 2: Period 1 Price, Period 1 Profits, and Total Discounted Profits
a1
3dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f l (7+7l 2l 2)+3(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
3(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
Pa1
3dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f l (7+7l 2l 2)+3(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
6(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
Pa
9dc(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)+d f (15+51l+23l 2 19l 3+2l 4)+9(3+6l+l 2 2l 3)
18(1+l )(3+3l 2l 2) t
The second order condition is satisfied as
¶ 2Pa
¶a21
=
N
(2dcl 2 2l 2+3l +dcl +3+dc)2t < 0 (A31)
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where N = (4l 4 4l 3 7l 2 6l  3)dc+(5+9l +3l 2 l 3)d f  4l 4+12l 3+3l 2 
18l  9 and the inequality follows since l  1. 2
Proof of Proposition 1
We analyze the impact of l on second period prices. Since firms are symmetric, we
analyze the impact from firm A’s perspective. The equilibrium second period prices are
given in the last column of Table 1. Taking the partial derivative with respect to l , we have
¶ao
¶l
=   t
3(1+l )2
< 0 (A32)
¶ac
¶l
=
t
3(1+l )2
> 0 (A33)
Hence, as l increases, the prices charged to past customers decrease and the poaching
prices increase, by the same magnitude. From A’s perspective, the segment of switchers
is in the range [q a ;q 1 ] as in equilibrium, q 1 = 12 . q

a =
2+l
6 . Hence, as l increases, q

a
increases and fewer consumers switch. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
In equilibrium, the second period profits arePa2 =
5+5l l 2
18(1+l ) t as shown in the second
column of Table 1. Partial derivative with respect to l gives that
¶Pa2
¶l
=  l (l +2)t
18(l +1)2
< 0 (A34)
Hence, a higher l leads to lower second period profits. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
In the symmetric equilibrium, two firms split the market equally. Hence, sales are
fixed and profits increase as a result of an increase in prices. We show that first period
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prices increase with l . The equilibrium first period prices are given in Table 2. Partial
derivative with respect to l gives that
¶a1
¶l
=
24dcl (2+5l +4l 2+l 3)+d f (21+42l +17l 2+4l 3+12l 4)
3(1+l )2(2l 2 3l  3)2 t > 0 (A35)
Hence first period prices increase with l . Consequently, first period profits also increase
with l . 2
Proof of Proposition 4
Without customer recognition, the total discounted profits over two periods are given
in Lemma 1. Let Pn denote the total discounted profits with no recognition.
Pn =
(1+d f )t
2
(A36)
With customer recognition, the total discounted profits over two periods are given in Table
2. Let Pr denote the total discounted profits with recognition.
Pr =
Nt
18(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) (A37)
where N = 9dc(1+2l +3l 2+2l 3)+d f (15+51l +23l 2 19l 3+2l 4)+9(3+6l +
l 2 2l 3). Comparing these two profits, we have
Pr  Pn =
9dc(1+2l +3l 2+2l 3) d f (12+3l  14l 2+l 3 2l 4)
18(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) t (A38)
which is positive if 9(1+2l+3l
2+2l 3)
12+3l 14l 2+l 3 2l 4 >
d f
dc . As l increases from 0 to 1,
9(1+2l+3l 2+2l 3)
12+3l 14l 2+l 3 2l 4 increases from
3
4 to infinity. When d f = dc, this condition is satis-
fied for l > l  0:14. When d f 6= dc, this condition holds as long as l > l where l is
such that 9(1+2l+3l
2+2l 3)
12+3l 14l 2+l 3 2l 4 =
d f
dc . 2
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Proof of Proposition 5
Here we prove that consumer surplus decreases with l . LetCS denote the consumer
surplus derived based on the monetary payoff only, and CS f denote the consumer surplus
that also includes the fairness components. By symmetry, we have the following.
CS = 2
Z qa
0
[r q  a1+dc(r q  ao)] dq
+ 2
Z q1
qa
fr q  a1+dc [r  (1 q) bc ]g dq
=
N1
36(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) (A39)
where N1 = (4l 5 + 36rl 2 + 216rl   246l   18l 4   6l 3 + 108r   129   72rl 3  
109l 2)dc+(24l 3  84l 2  84l )d f + 90l 3  270l + 108r+ 216rl   45l 2  72rl 3 
135+36rl 2. As l increases,CS is impacted as follows.
¶CS
¶l
=  N2d f  N3dc
9(1+l )2(2l 2 3l  3)2 (A40)
where N2 = 63+126l +51l 2+12l 3+36l 4 > 0 and N3 = 9 99l  309l 2 318l 3 
122l 4+15l 5+12l 6 4l 7. N3 is monotonically decreasing in l and becomes negative
for l > l1  0:07. When N3 is negative, ¶CS¶l < 0. Even when N3 is positive, ¶CS¶l < 0 if
d f
dc >
N3
N2
. N3N2 is monotonically decreasing from
1
7 as l increases. Hence, as long as
d f
dc >
1
7 ,
consumer surplus is decreasing in l . This condition is always satisfied when d f  dc, i.e.,
firms are weakly more patient than consumers.
The consumer surplus including the fairness component is:
CS f = CS 2
Z qa
0
dcl (ao ac)dq = 
N4
36(1+l )(3+3l  2l 2) (A41)
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where N4 = (4l 5   36rl 2 + 270l   216rl + 14l 4   34l 3   108r + 129 + 72rl 3 +
121l 2)dc + (84l + 84l 2  24l 3)d f   90l 3 + 270l   108r  216rl + 45l 2 + 72rl 3 +
135 36rl 2.
¶CS f
¶l
=  N5dc+N6d f
9(1+l )2(2l 2 3l  3)2 (A42)
where N5 = 9+117l +231l 2+210l 3+130l 4+31l 5 4l 6 4l 7 > 0 and N6 = 63+
126l+51l 2+12l 3+36l 4> 0. Hence, ¶CS f¶l < 0. Therefore, consumer surplus decreases
with l . 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Let SW and SW f denote the social welfare derived excluding and including the fair-
ness component respectively.
SW = 2
Z qa
0
(1+dc)(r q)+ao(d f  dc)dq
+ 2
Z q1
qa
r q +dc [r  (1 q)]+bc(d f  dc)dq (A43)
SW changes with l as follows.
¶SW
¶l
=
(1+3l  l 3)dc d fl (l +2)
9(1+l )2
(A44)
which is weakly positive if dcd f 
l (l+2)
1+3l l 3 . The term on the right hand side ranges between
[0;1]. If dc = d f , the condition is always satisfied.
If we were to include the fairness component, the social welfare is
SW f = SW  2
Z qa
0
l (ao ac)dq = SW  2l (ao ac)q a (A45)
SW f changes with l as follows.
¶SW f
¶l
=
(l 3+4l 2+5l  1)dc d fl (l +2)
9(1+l )2
(A46)
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l 3 + 4l 2 + 5l   1 > 0 if l > l2  0:17. In this case, ¶SW f¶l  0 if and only if dcd f 
l (l+2)
l 3+4l 2+5l 1 . If dc d f , then dcd f  1.
l (l+2)
l 3+4l 2+5l 1  1 if l > lˆ  0:26. Hence, ¶SW
f
¶l  0
if l > lˆ  0:26 and dcd f 
l (l+2)
l 3+4l 2+5l 1 , where the second condition always holds if dc= d f .
2
175
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
Benchmark Case:
We solve for the equilibrium outcome in the benchmark case where consumer pref-
erences are context-independent.
The Firm Does Not Introduces Upgrades
If the firm does not introduce upgrades, it sells the base product over two periods. In
this case, each consumer has three options. First, the consumer can buy the base product
in period 1 at pˆ1 and use it for two periods. We denote this option by (1;1). Second, the
consumer can wait to buy the base product in period 2 at pˆ2 and use it for one period only.
We denote this option by (0;1). Alternatively, the consumer can refrain from buying any
products. We denote this option by (0;0). The pattern that reflects these three decisions
is shown in Figure A1. In this pattern, consumers with higher valuations consume more
quality over two periods. We solve for consumers’ and the firm’s decisions in period 2
first.
Figure A1: Consumer Choice Pattern When There are No Upgrades

0
ˆ
q2
j(0;0) ˆ
q1
j(0;1) (1;1) 
1
Period 2. In period 2, consumers and the firm observe the sales volume in period 1, that
is 1  qˆ1. Obviously, the consumer who has bought the base product in period 1 will not
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purchase it again. These are the consumers whose q > qˆ1. The consumer in the region
q < qˆ1 did not buy the base product in period 1. He would buy the product in the second
period if the utility of buying and consuming it in one period is positive, when the following
is true.
q   pˆ2 > 0
q > pˆ2 = qˆ2 (B1)
The firm’s profit function in period 2 is:
Pˆ2 = pˆ2(qˆ1  qˆ2) (B2)
First order condition with respect to pˆ2 gives that:
pˆ2 =
qˆ1
2
(B3)
Period 1. In period 1, consumers decide whether to buy the product now or not. The
consumer prefers buying the product in period 1 over waiting to buy it in period 2 if the
following is true:
2q   pˆ1 > q   pˆ2
q >
2 pˆ1
3
= qˆ1 (B4)
The firm in period 1 sets pˆ1 to maximize its total profit from selling the base product in
two periods. The profit function is
Pˆ1 = pˆ1(1  qˆ1)+ pˆ2(qˆ1  qˆ2) (B5)
The first order condition with respect to pˆ1 gives that:
pˆ1 =
9
10
(B6)
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In equilibrium, Pˆ1 =
9
20 , Pˆ

2 =
9
100 , pˆ

1 =
9
10 , and pˆ

2 =
3
10 . qˆ

1 =
3
5 and qˆ

2 =
3
10 . The
equilibrium volume sale is 25 in period 1 and
3
10 in period 2.
In the next section we will examine if the firm can achieve a higher profit by selling
an upgraded product in period 2.
The Firm Introduces Upgrades
Now consider that the firm introduces an upgraded product to replace its base prod-
uct in period 2. When the firm introduces the upgrade, the firm sells the base product in
period 1 and the upgraded product in period 2. Four consumer segments can arise. First,
a consumer can buy both the base product and the upgraded product. The consumption
utility of this choice is q(2+w)  p1  p2. Second, the consumer can buy the base product
to use in two periods and refrain from buying the upgraded product. The corresponding
consumption utility is 2q  p1. Third, the consumer can forgo purchase of the base product
and wait to buy the upgraded product. The utility of this choice is q(1+w)  p2. Fourth,
the consumer can choose to buy nothing and forego consumption completely. Obviously,
doing so, the consumer receives zero consumption utility. We again solve for the equilib-
rium outcome backward.
Case A: p2  w.
We first consider that all four consumer choices can arise. The firm sells the upgrade to both
new and existing consumers in period 2. The consumption pattern is shown as follows.
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Figure A2: Consumer Choice Pattern A When the Firm Introduces Upgrades

0

q3
j(0;0) 
q1
j(0;1+w) 
q2
j(1;1) (1;1+w) 
1
Period 2. In the beginning of period 2, q1, i.e, the consumer who is indifferent between
buying the base product and waiting to buy the upgrade, has been observed. The consumer
whose q > q1 has bought the base product in period 1. He prefers to buy the upgraded
product rather than using the base product in period 2 if the following is true.
q(1+w)  p2 > q
q >
p2
w
= q2 (B7)
The consumer whose q < q1 has not purchased the base product. He prefers to buy the
upgraded product rather than using nothing in period 2, if the following holds.
q(1+w)  p2 > 0
q >
p2
1+w
= q3 (B8)
In Case A, the firm can sell the upgraded product to existing consumers in (q2;1) and new
consumers in (q3;q1). This pattern occurs if q2  1 which reduces to p2  w. In this case,
the firm’s profit function in period 2 is
Pa2 = p
a
2(1 q2+q1 q3)  c (B9)
The firm in period 2 sets pa2 to maximize the period 2 profit. The first order condition gives
pa2 =
w(1+w)
2(1+2w)
(1+q1) (B10)
At this price, the profit in period 2 is Pa2 =
w(1+w)(1+q1)2
4(1+2w) .
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Period 1. In period 1, the consumer would rather buy the base product to use over two
periods rather than to wait for the upgraded product, if the following is true.
2q   pa1 > q(1+w)  pa2
q >
w2+w 2pa1(1+2w)
3w2 3w 2 = q
a
1 (B11)
The firm’s overall profit from selling two products is
P1 = pa1(1 q a1 )+ pa2(1 q a2 +q a1  q a3 )  c (B12)
The first order condition with respect to pa1 gives the equilibrium outcome as follows. pa1 =
 w4 10w3+3w2+8w+2
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) , p
a
2 =
(5w2 4w 3)w(1+w)
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) , q
a
1 =
3w2 3w 2
7w2 5w 4 , q
a
2 =
(5w2 4w 3)(1+w)
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) ,
q a3 =
(5w2 4w 3)w
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) , P
a
1 =
3w4+6w3 6w2 6w 1
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4)   c, Pa2 =
(5w2 4w 3)2(1+w)w
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4)2   c. We
can verify that pa1 > pa2 > 0, and 1> q a2 > q a1 > q a3 > 0.
Case B: p2 > w.
Period 2. Alternatively, the firm can raise p2 in period 2 such that q2 > 1, i.e., p2 > w. In
this case, the consumption pattern is shown below.
Figure A3: Consumer Choice Pattern B When the Firm Introduces Upgrades

0

q3
j(0;0) 
q1
j(0;1+w) (1;1) 
1
For this case, the profit function in period 2 is
Pb2 = p
b
2(q
b
1  q b3 )  c (B13)
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The first order condition gives
pb2 =
1+w
2
q b1 (B14)
At this pb2 , the resulting profit in period 2 isPb2 =
1+w
4 q
2
1 . Suppose q b1 is fixed. Pa2 >Pb2
if and only if q b1 <
w+
p
2w2+w
1+w = q¯1. q¯1 ranges from (0;1) for w 2 (0; 12) and is increasing
in w. Therefore, as w increases, it is more likely thatPa2 >Pb2 for Case A to apply. As w
decreases, it is more likely that Pa2 <Pb2 and Case B applies.
Period 1. Suppose Case B applies. In period 1, the consumer would rather buy the base
product to use over two periods rather than towait for the upgraded product, if the following
is true.
2q   pb1 > q(1+w)  pb2
q >
2pb1
3 w = q
b
1 (B15)
The firm’s overall profit from selling two products is
Pb1 = p
b
1(1 q b1 )+ pb2 (q b1  q b3 )  c (B16)
The first order condition with respect to pb1 gives the equilibrium outcome as fol-
lows. pb1 =
(3 w)2
2(5 3w) , p
b
2 =
(1+w)(3 w)
2(5 3w) , q
b
1 =
3 w
5 3w , q
b
2 =
(3 w)(1+w)
2w(5 3w) , q
b
3 =
3 w
2(5 3w) ,
Pb1 =
(3 w)2
4(5 3w)   c, Pb2 =
(3 w)2(1+w)
4(5 3w)2   c. We can verify that pb1 > pb2 > 0, and
q b2 > 1> q
b
1 > q
b
3 > 0.
Lemma 3 Suppose context-dependent preferences do not exist and the firm introduces an
upgrade. There exists a w 2 (0; 12) such that for w 2 (0;w) Case B applies and for w 2
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(w; 12) Case A applies.
The firm sets p2 to maximize profit in period 2. We compare the profits obtained from
Cases A and B. Pa2 =
(5w2 4w 3)2(1+w)w
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4)2   c. Pb2 =
(3 w)2(1+w)
4(5 3w)2   c. Pb2  Pa2 =
(1+w)(1478w4+2546w3 1295w2 348w+144 5500w5+3761w6 802w7)
4(5 3w)2(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4)2 which is positive for w = 0,
negative for w = 12 and is decreasing in w. Therefore, there exists a w
 2 (0; 12) such that
at w, Pb2  Pa2 = 0. For w 2 (0;w), Pb2  Pa2 > 0 so Case B applies. For w 2 (w; 12),
Pb2  Pa2 < 0 so Case A applies. 2
We depict the operating case and profit in period 2 in the figure below.
Figure A4: Period 2 Profit Varies with w
w
P2
0 12
w
No Upgrades
(w= 0)
With Upgrades
(w> 0)
P2 = 9100
9
100 + c
Pa2
Pb2
w
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first show that the period 2 profit from selling the upgraded product is increasing
in w.
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If Case A applies, the profit is given in Equation B9.
dPa2
dw
= pa2

 ¶q
a
2
¶w
+
dq a1
dw
  ¶q
a
3
¶w

= pa2

pa2
w2
+

¶q a1
¶w
+
¶q a1
¶ pa1
¶ pa1
¶w

+
pa2
(1+w)2

(B17)
Obviously p
a
2
w2 > 0 and
pa2
(1+w)2 > 0.
¶q a1
¶w =
2( 3w2 2w 1+6pa1 w2+6pa1 w+pa1 )
(3w2 3w 2)2 =
  2(2w4 2w3 8w2 w+1)
(3w2 3w 2)(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) , whose sign is ambiguous.
¶qa1
¶ pa1
=   2(1+2w)3w3 3w 2 > 0 for
w 2 (0; 12).
¶ pa1
¶w =   6w
5 51w4+20w3+14w6+21w2 12w 6
(1+2w)2(7w2 5w 4)2 > 0 for w 2 (0; 12). Overall, for
w 2 (0; 12),
¶q1
¶w +
¶qa1
¶ pa1
¶ pa1
¶w > 0. Therefore,
¶Pa2
¶w > 0.
If Case B applies, the profit is given in Equation B13.
dPb2
dw
= pb2
 
dq b1
dw
  ¶q
b
3
¶w
!
= pb2

¶q b1
¶w
+
¶q b1
¶ pb1
¶ pb1
¶w
+
pb2
(1+w)2

(B18)
¶qb1
¶w > 0,
¶qb1
¶ pb1
> 0, and p
b
2
(1+w)2 > 0. The sign of
¶ pb1
¶w is ambiguous. Overall,
dPb2
dw > 0.
Profit is increasing in w.
We discussed in Lemma 3 that Case B applies forw2 (0;w) and whenw= 0,Pb2 =
9
100   c. For w 2 (w; 12), Case A applies and when w= 12 , Pa2 = 6752888   c
:
= 0:23  c. We
have shown that the firm can obtain the profit of 9100 in period 2 if it does not introduce
the upgrade. Therefore, as long as 6752888   c> 9100 , i.e., c< 6752888   9100
:
= 0:14= cmax, then
there exists a w such that at w, the firm is indifferent between introducing the upgrade and
not introducing it. Since the profit of introducing the upgrade is increasing in w, the firm
introduces the upgrade if any only w> w. 2.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
We prove Proposition 2 by showing two results: period 2 profit under context-
dependent preferences is increasing in w; context-dependent preferences increase (de-
creases) the period 2 profit if and only if w < wˆ (w > wˆ). Define the cost for introducing
the upgrade with w= wˆ to break even as cˆ. It follows that the firm introduces upgrades in
a larger (smaller) range of situations if and only if c< cˆ (c> cˆ).
Lemma 4 Under context-dependent preferences, the period 2 profit is increasing in w.
As in the base model, we solve for the equilibrium outcome backwards.
Period 2. In period 2, the reference price is p22 , where p2 is the price of the upgraded
product. The reference quality is 2+w3 . The consumer at q2 chooses between buying the
upgraded product and using the base product in period 2. Buying the upgraded product
induces a gain in quality and a loss in price. Using the base product induces a smaller gain
in quality and a gain in price as the consumer can receive some quality but does not need to
pay again. The consumer prefers to purchase the upgraded product rather than consuming
the base product if
q (1+w)  p2+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2
> q +q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2
q >
3+l
4w
p2 = q2 (B19)
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The consumer who has not purchased the base product would buy the upgraded product if
q(1+w)  p2+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2
=  lq 2+w
3
+
p2
2
q =
3(3+l )
2(4+5w+2l +wl )
p2 = q3
(B20)
Case A: Period 2 profit is increasing in w.
The firm sets p2 to maximize the period 2 profit. If Case A applies (see Figure A2), the
profit function in period 2 is
P2 = p2(1 q2+q1 q3)  c (B21)
The first order condition gives that
p2 =
2w(4+5w+2l +wl )
(3+l )(4+11w+2l +wl )
(1+q1) (B22)
Period 1. In period 1, the consumer would rather buy the base product to use over two
periods rather than to wait for the upgraded product, if the following is true.
2q   p1+ q2  l
p1
2
+q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2
> q(1+w)  p2 l q2 +
p1
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2
q >
(3+l )(p1  p2)
3 4w+l = q1 (B23)
The firm’s overall profit from selling two products is
P1 = p1(1 q1)+ p2(1 q2+q1 q3)  c (B24)
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The first order condition gives the equilibrium solution p1 =
U1
2(l+3)(2l+wl+4+11w)D1
,*
p2 =
U2w(2l+wl+4+5w)
(l+3)(2l+wl+4+11w)D1
,† P1 =
U3
4(l+3)(2l+wl+4+11w)D1
  c,‡ and P2 =
U22w(2l+lw+4+5w)
4(l+3)(2l+wl+4+11w)D21
  c. As w increases, the change in period 2 profit is given
by
dP2
dw
= p2

 ¶q

2
¶w
+
dq 1
dw
  ¶q

3
¶w

= p2

(l +3)p2
4w2
+
¶q 1
¶w
+
¶q 1
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶w
+
3(l +3)(l +5)p2
2(2l +lw+4+5w)2

(B25)
where q2, q3, and q1 are given in Equations B19, B20, and B23 respectively. We can verify
that dq

1
dw > 0. Hence,
dP2
dw > 0.
Case B: Period 2 profit is increasing in w.
If Case B applies (see Figure A3), the profit function in period 2 is
P2 = p2(q1 q3)  c (B26)
The first order condition gives that
p2 =
4+5w+2l +wl
3(3+l )
q1 (B27)
*U1 = 4l 4 + 4l 4w + l 4w2 + 28l 3w2 + 76l 3w + 40l 3 + 134l 2w2 + 148l 2 + 436l 2w   8w4l 2  
80l 2w3   896lw3 + 996lw+ 316lw2   80w4l + 240l + 792w+ 144+ 385w2   1904w3 + 376w4 and
D1 = 2l 2+wl 2 3lw2+8lw+10l  39w2+21w+12.
†U2 = 3l 2w+6l 2 8lw2+26lw+30l  112w2+67w+36.
‡U3 = 4l 4 + 4l 4w+ l 4w2 + 8l 3w3 + 60l 3w2 + 108l 3w+ 40l 3   32w4l 2   24l 2w3 + 454l 2w2 +
660l 2w+ 148l 2   512w4l   1128lw3 + 1404lw2 + 1508lw+ 240l   1184w4   2312w3 + 1537w2 +
1176w+144.
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Period 1. In period 1, the consumer would rather buy the base product to use over two
periods rather than to wait for the upgraded product, if the following is true.
2q   p1+ q2  l
p1
2
+q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2
> q(1+w)  p2 l q2 +
p1
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2
q >
2p1
3 w = q1 (B28)
The firm’s overall revenue from selling two products is
P1 = p1(1 q1)+ p2(q1 q3)  c (B29)
The first order condition gives the equilibrium solution as follows. p1 =
(5l+wl+13 7w)2
3(l+3)(8l+wl+22 19w) , p

2 =
(5l+wl+13 7w)(2l+wl+4+5w)
3(l+3)(8l+wl+22 19w) , P

1 =
(5l+wl+13 7w)2
6(l+3)(8l+wl+22 19w)  
c, P2 =
(5l+wl+13 7w)2(2l+wl+4+5w)
6(l+3)(8l+wl+22 19w)2   c, q 1 = 5l+wl+13 7w8l+wl+22 19w , q 2 =
(5l+wl+13 7w)(2l+wl+4+5w)
12w(8l+wl+22 19w) , and q

3 =
5l+wl+13 7w
2(8l+wl+22 19w) . The profit of selling an
upgrade is given in Equation B26. As w increases, the change in this profit is given by
dP2
dw
= p2

dq 1
dw
  ¶q

3
¶w

= p2

3(l 2+16l +31)
(8l +lw+22 19w)2 +
3(l +3)(l +5)p2
2(2l +lw+4+5w)2

(B30)
where q 3 , and q 1 are given in Equations B20 and B28.
3(l 2+16l+31)
(8l+lw+22 19w)2 +
3(l+3)(l+5)p2
2(2l+lw+4+5w)2 > 0, hence
dP2
dw > 0.
Lemma 5 There exists a positive cˆ such that context-dependent preferences increase (de-
crease) the period 2 profit if c< cˆ (c> cˆ).
Lemma 3 has shown that without context-dependent preferences, Pb2 = Pa2 at
w = w. We denote the profit that applies without context-dependent preferences by Pn2
(see Figure A5). We show that with context-dependent preferences, the profit in Case B
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increases while the profit in Case A decreases, which implies that Case B applies in a larger
range of situations under context-dependent preferences. Hence, there exists a wr > w
such that the period 2 profit in Cases A exceeds that in Case B if and only if w> wr.
It is useful to recall that context-dependent preferences exist as long as the loss aver-
sion parameter l > 1. If l = 1, then the model reduces to that preferences are independent
of context. In this way, the impact of context-dependent preferences is equivalent to the
impact of an increase in l where l  1.
Case A: Context-dependent preferences decrease period 2 profit.
The profit of selling an upgrade is given in Equation B21. As l increases, the change in
this profit is given by
dP2
dl
= p2

 ¶q

2
¶l
+
dq 1
dl
  ¶q

3
¶l

= p2

  p

2
4w
+
¶q 1
¶l
+
¶q 1
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l

+ p2

3(1 w)p2
(2l +wl +4+5w)2

(B31)
¶q2
¶l +
¶q3
¶l =
(4l 2+4l 2w+16l+28lw+l 2w2+10lw2+16+28w+37w2)p2
4w(2l+wl+4+5w)2 > 0. Furthermore it can be
verified that dq

1
dl < 0. Hence,
dP2
dl < 0, i.e., the profit from selling upgrades decreases with
context-dependent preferences. 2
Case B: Context-dependent preferences increase period 2 profit.
In this case, the profit of selling an upgrade is given in Equation B26. As l increases, the
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change in this profit is given by
dP2
dl
= p2

dq 1
dl
  ¶q

3
¶l

= p2

¶q 1
¶l
+
¶q 1
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l
+
3(1 w)p2
(2l +wl +4+5w)2

= p2

  6(1+5w)p

1
(5l +lw+13 7w)2 +
3(l +3)
5l +lw+13 7w
¶ p1
¶l

+p2

3(1 w)p2
(2l +wl +4+5w)2

(B32)
  6(1+5w)p1
(5l+lw+13 7w)2 < 0,
3(l+3)
5l+lw+13 7w > 0, and
3p2(1 l )
(2l+lw+4+5w)2 > 0.
¶ p1
¶l has the same sign
with ¶
2P1
¶ p1¶l
by the implicit function theorem and concavity ofP1. ¶
2P1
¶ p1¶l
is positive. There-
fore, ¶ p

1
¶l > 0. The last two positive terms in Equation B32 offset the first negative term
whenw is not too large. In this case, dP

2
dl > 0, i.e., the profit of selling upgrade is higher with
context-dependent preferences. Even if w is large enough that dP

2
dl < 0, this occurs when
Case A applies without context-dependent preferences. Hence, period 2 profit decreases
as discussed in Case A above.
It follows that under context-dependent preferences, Case B applies in a larger range
of parameters, i.e., there exists a wr > w such that Case B applies if and only if w <
wr. Furthermore, there exists a wˆ 2 (w;wr) such that the Case B profit with context-
dependent preferences is equal to the Case A profit without context-dependent preferences.
Define cˆ = P2(w = wˆ)  9100 at which the upgrade with a w = wˆ breaks even. Since the
profit is increasing in w, it is higher with context-dependent preferences for c< cˆ and the
reverse is true for c> cˆ (see Figure A5 below).
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Figure A5: Period 2 Profit Varies with Context Dependence
w
P2
0 12
cˆ
wwˆ wr
Pn2
P2(l = 2)
Lemma 6 Context-dependent preferences have no impact on the firm’s profit if the firm
does not introduce upgrades.
We show that under context-dependent preferences, the cut-off points qˆ1 and qˆ2 in
Figure A1 do not change.
Period 2. In period 2, the reference price is pˆ22 . The reference quality is
1
2 . The consumer
prefers buying the upgraded product over nothing if
q   pˆ2+ q2  l
pˆ2
2
> 0 l q
2
+
pˆ2
2
q > pˆ2 = qˆ2 (B33)
Period 1. In period 1, the reference price is pˆ12 and the reference quality is again
1
2 . The
consumer prefers to buy early than to wait if
2q   pˆ1+ q2  l
pˆ1
2
> q   pˆ2 l q2 +
pˆ1
2
q >
2pˆ1
3
= qˆ1 (B34)
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Given that the cut-off points do not change, consumer choices remain the same as when
preferences are context-independent. Therefore, context-dependent preferences do not
affect the firm when it does not introduce upgrades. 2.
Given that the period 2 profit is increasing inw and is higher under context-dependent
preferences for c< cˆ, w needs to exceed a lower threshold for the period 2 profit to exceed
9
100+c, the profit from selling the base product plus the fixed cost for upgrade introduction.
Let wr denote the threshold of w for upgrade introduction. As long as c< cˆ, wr < w. The
converse is true for c> cˆ. 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We prove Proposition 3 by showing two lemmas as follows.
Lemma 7 Without context-dependent preferences, there exists a w¯ > w such that if w 2
(w;min(w¯; 12)), the firm introduces upgrades and the total profit is less than
9
20   c.
Suppose context-dependent preferences do not exist. If the firm does not introduce an
upgrade, the equilibrium result is given after Equation B6. The total profit is Pˆ1 = 920 . If
the firm introduces an upgrade, Case B applies when w is small. The equilibrium result is
given after Equations B16 and the total profit is Pb1 =
(3 w)2
4(5 3w) c, which is strictly lower
than 920   c for w 2 (0; 12). If Case A applies, then the equilibrium outcome is given after
Equation B12 and the total profit isPa1 =
3w4+6w3 6w2 6w 1
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4)  c, increasing inw. Suppose
c= 0 for now. If w= 0:3, then Pa1 <
9
20 . If w=
1
2 , then P

1 >
9
20 . Therefore, there exists
a unique w¯ such that if w = w¯, P1 = 920 . Since P
a
1 increases with w, it exceeds
9
20 if and
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only if w> w¯. Recall that if c= 0, w := 0:24< 0:3. Therefore, w¯> w. If c> 0, w¯ needs to
be even higher for introducing upgrade to maximize total profit. The proof is complete. 2
Proposition 1 shows that the firm in period 2 introduces the upgrade as long asw>w.
Here we show that introducing upgrades maximizes total profit only if w> w¯.
Lemma 8 With context-dependent preferences, as long as c< min(c¯;cmax), there exists a
region (w;min
 
w¯; 12)

, a positive l , and a monotonically increasing function g : (0; 12)!
R+ such that ifw2 (w;min(w¯; 12)) and l >max(l ;g(w)), then the monopolist’s total profit
is higher than 920   c.
If the firm introduces an upgrade, with context-dependent preferences, the firm’s equilib-
rium period 2 profits in Cases A and B are
Pa2 =
N
D
  c
Pb2 =
(5l +lw+13 7w)2(2l +lw+4+5w)
6(8l +lw+22 19w)2(l +3)   c (B35)
where N = (3l 2w+ 6l 2  8lw2+ 26lw+ 30l   112w2+ 67w+ 36)2w(2l +lw+ 4+
5w) and D = 4(2l +lw+ 4+ 11w)(l + 3)(2l 2+ l 2w  3lw2+ 8lw+ 10l   39w2+
21w+ 12)2. If l = 1, these profits reduce to that without context-dependent preferences.
Lemma 3 shows that for w > w, Case A applies and for w > w, Case B applies. Let
g : (0; 12) ! R+ denote the threshold of l above which Case B applies, then g(w) = 1
for w = w. Define DP2 = Pb2  Pa2 . g(w) is monotonically increasing in w because
¶l
¶w = 
¶DP2
¶w
¶DP2
¶l
> 0 in the relevant region.
Consider the region that l > g(w) so that Case B applies. Suppose wr < w then the
firm introduces upgrades for w > w. In this case, if l = 1, Pb1 =
(3 w)2
4(5 3w)   c < 920   c
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for w 2 (0; 12). If l = 2, Pb1 = (23 5w)
2
30(38 17w)   c > 920   c. Pb1 is increasing in l . Hence,
there exits a l 2 (1;2) such that for l >max(l ;g(w)),Pb1 > 920 c. Supposewr >w. For
w2 (wr;min(w¯; 12)), the firm introduces an upgrade and the total profit is higher than 920 c
as in the previous case. For w 2 (w;wr), the firm under context-dependent preferences
doesn’t introduce the upgrade and receive the total profit 920 , which is also higher than
9
20   c. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
Case A: Selling the upgrade to existing consumers and new consumers.
In this case, prices of the base product (p1) and the upgraded product (p2) both decrease
with l . With context-dependent preferences, p2 is given in Equation B22.
dp2
dl
=
¶ p2
¶l
+
¶ p2
¶q 1
dq 1
dl
=
¶G
¶l
(1+q 1 )+G

¶q 1
¶l
+
¶q 1
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l

< 0 (B36)
where G = 2w(4+5w+2l+wl )(3+l )(4+11w+2l+wl ) . It is easy to verify that
¶G
¶l < 0 and
dq1
dl < 0. Therefore,
dp2
dl < 0, i.e., price of the upgraded product decreases with context-dependent preferences.
p1 is solved from taking the first order condition of Equation B12. We determine the sign
of ¶ p

1
¶l using the implicit function theorem that gives
¶ p1
¶l =  
¶2P1
¶ p1¶l
¶2P1
¶ p21
. The profit function
is concave in price, i.e., ¶
2P1
¶ p21
< 0. In the region of considered parameters, ¶
2P1
¶ p1¶l
< 0.
Therefore, ¶ p

1
¶l < 0.
l decreases p2 to a larger degree than it decreases p1. Given that q 1 is a function of
p1, we can write the effect of l on p2 as a function of the effect of l on p1 as follows.
dp2
dl
=
¶ p2
¶l
+
¶ p2
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l
(B37)
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The two terms correspond to the direct and strategic effects of l on p2 directly and through
affecting p1 strategically.
¶ p2
¶l < 0 and
¶ p1
¶l < 0 reflecting the price sensitivity effect.
¶ p2
¶ p1
>
0 reflecting the strategic competition. Over the considered region of w and l , dp

2
dl <
¶ p1
¶l ,
i.e, price of the upgrade decreases more than the price of the base product with context-
dependent preferences. 2
Case B: Selling the upgrade to new consumers only.
In this case, prices of the base product (p1) and the upgraded product (p2) are given after
Equation B16. By the implicit function theorem and concavity of the profit function, the
sign of ¶ p

1
¶l is the same as the sign of
¶ 2P1
¶ p1¶l
=  6p1( 46w+113w2+lw2 26lw 11l 31)
(5l+lw+13 7w)3 > 0.
Hence, ¶ p

1
¶l > 0.
dp2
dl
=
¶ p2
¶l
+
¶ p2
¶q 1
dq 1
dl
=
2(1 w)q 1
3(l +3)2
  2l +lw+4+5w
3(l +3)
6(2w2 1+5w)
(8l +lw+22 19w)2(B38)
2(1 w)q1
3(l+3)2 > 0,
2l+lw+4+5w
3(l+3) > 0, and
6(2w2 1+5w)
(8l+lw+22 19w)2 can take either sign. Overall
dp2
dl > 0
if w is lower than a threshold and dp

2
dl < 0 if w exceeds that threshold. If p2 decreases, since
p1 increases, the price dispersion is larger. Even if p2 increases, we show that it increases
to a smaller degree than the increase in p1.
dp2
dl
=
¶ p2
¶l
+
¶ p2
¶q 1

¶q 1
¶l
+
¶q 1
¶ p1
¶ p1
¶l

=
2(1 w)q 1
3(l +3)2
+
2l +lw+4+5w
3(l +3)
  6(1+5w)p

1
(5l +lw+13 7w)2 +
3(l +3)
5l +lw+13 7w
¶ p1
¶l

(B39)
All terms are positive except that   6(1+5w)p1
(5l+lw+13 7w)2 < 0, driving
¶ p2
¶l <
¶ p1
¶l . 2
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose c < cˆ, i.e., w 2 (0; wˆ). Three cases for which consumer surplus changes
differently can arise. (1) w < wr < w. The firm doesn’t introduce upgrade either context-
dependent preferences exist or not. (2) w 2 (wr;w). The firm would introduce an upgrade
only under context-dependent preferences. (3)w 2 (w; wˆ). The firm introduces an upgrade
even without context-dependent preferences. If c> cˆ, i.e.,w> wˆ, then there are three cases.
(4) w< w< wr. The firm does not introduce upgrades in either case. (5) w 2 (w;wr). The
firm introduces an upgrade only if context-dependent preferences do not exist. (6)w >
wr > w. The firm introduces an upgrade in either case.
We show that consumer surplus increases when the firm introduces upgrades and
Case A applies. Proof for the other cases can be derived analogously.
First, we show that holding l = 1, i.e, prices and consumption pattern remain the
same as in the absence of context-dependent preferences, consumer surplus with context-
dependent preferences (denoted by CSr) is higher than the consumer surplus without
context-dependent preferences (denoted byCS). In Case A, consumer surplus can be writ-
ten as below. To conserve notations, we omit the superscript  that indicates equilibrium
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outcome.
CSr =
Z q3
0

p1+ p2
2
 lq

1
2
+
2+w
3

f (q)dq
+
Z q1
q3

q(1+w)  p2+ p12  
lq
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2

f (q)dq
+
Z q2
q1

2q   p1+ q2  l
p1
2
+q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2

f (q)dq
+
Z 1
q2

q(2+w)  p1  p2+ q2  l
p1
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

 l p2
2

f (q)dq
= CSr(0;0)+CS
r
(0;2)+CS
r
(1;1)+CS
r
(1;2) (B40)
where the CSr is decomposed into four terms of CSr(;) that correspond to the consumer
surplus in the separate regions in Figure A2. Let l = 1. We analyze each term separately.
CSr(0;0)(l = 1) =
Z q3
0

p1+ p2
2
 q

1
2
+
2+w
3

f (q)dq
=
Z q3
0

p1+ p2
2
 q 7+2w
6

f (q)dq (B41)
CSr(0;0)(l = 1) > 0 as long as q <
3(p1+p2)
7+2w = q˜3 > q3. Therefore, CS
r
(0;0)(l = 1) > 0 in
the region (0;q3).
CSr(0;2)(l = 1) =
Z q1
q3

q(1+w)  p2+ p12  
q
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

  p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(0;2)+
Z q1
q3

p1
2
  q
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

  p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(0;2)+
Z q1
q3

p1  p2
2
+q
4w 1
6

f (q)dq (B42)
Because p1 > p2, if 4w  1 > 0 then p1 p22 + q 4w 16 > 0. If 4w  1 < 0, then p1 p22 +
q 4w 16 > 0 as long as q <
3(p1 p2)
1 4w = q˜4. Forw2 (0; 14), q˜4> q1. Therefore, over the region
q 2 (q3;q1), p1 p22 +q 4w 16 > 0. It follows that in this regionCSr(0;2)(l = 1)>CS(0;2).
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CSr(1;1)(l = 1) =
Z q2
q1

2q   p1+ q2  
p1
2
+q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(1;1)+
Z q2
q1

q
2
  p1
2
+q

1  2+w
3

+
p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(1;1)+
Z q2
q1

q
5 2w
6
  p1  p2
2

f (q)dq (B43)
q 5 2w6   p1 p22 > 0 as long as q > 3(p1 p2)5 2w = 3(w 1)( 2 3w+3w
2)
(2w 5)(7w2 5w 4) = q˜1. For w 2 (0; 12),
q˜1 < q1. Therefore, for q 2 (q1;q2), q 5 w6   p1 p22 > 0. It follows that CSr(1;1)(l = 1)>
CS(1;1).
CSr(1;2)(l = 1) =
Z 1
q2

q(2+w)  p1  p2+ q2  
p1
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

  p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(1;2)+
Z 1
q2

q
2
  p1
2
+q

1+w  2+w
3

  p2
2

f (q)dq
= CS(1;2)+
Z 1
q2

q
5+4w
6
  p1+ p2
2

f (q)dq (B44)
q 5+4w6   p1+p22 > 0 as long as q > 3(p1+p2)5+4w = 3(4w
4+11w3 10w2 11w 2)
(5+4w)(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) = q˜2. Over the
region that w 2 (0; 12), q˜2 < q2. Therefore, q 5+4w6   p1+p22 > 0 is always satisfied for
q 2 (q2;1). It follows thatCSr(1;2)(l = 1)>CS(1;2)
Since each component of CSr(l = 1) is higher than the corresponding component
ofCS,CSr(l = 1)>CS. Consequently, if l is close to 1,CSr >CS.
Second, we show that as l increases,CSr decreases. Again we analyze each compo-
nent separately.
dCSr(0;0)
dl
=
q3
2

¶ p1
¶l
+
dp2
dl

+
p1+ p2
2
dq3
dl
  7+2w
6

l
dq3
dl
q3+
q 23
2

(B45)
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where ¶ p1¶l < 0,
dp2
dl < 0, and
dq3
dl < 0. The sign of
dCSr(0;0)
dl is ambiguous.
dCSr(0;2)
dl
=

2+2w  l
2
  2+w
3

q1
dq1
dl
 q3dq3dl

 q
2
1  q 23
4
 

dq1
dl
  dq3
dl

p2  p12 +l
p2
2

 (q1 q3)

dp2
dl
  1
2
¶ p1
¶l
+
p2
2
+
l
2
dp2
dl

(B46)
whose sign is negative.
dCSr(1;1)
dl
= (q1 q2)

¶ p1
¶l
+
p1
2
+
l
2
¶ p1
¶l
  1
2
dp2
dl

+

 p1 l p12 +
p2
2
¶q2
¶l
  ¶q1
¶l

+

7
2
  2+w
3

q2
¶q2
¶l
 q1¶q1¶l

(B47)
whose sign is ambiguous.
dCSr(1;2)
dl
=  

7
2
+2w  2+w
3

q2
¶q2
¶l
 

¶ p1
¶l
+
dp2
dl

1+
l
2

(1 q2)
 (p1+ p2)1 q22 +(p1+ p2)

1+
l
2

dq2
dl
(B48)
whose sign is negative. All four components combined are negative. Therefore, CSr is
decreasing with l .
Given that CSr > CS when l = 1 and CSr is decreasing in l , it follows that there
exists l˜ > 1 such that if l does not exceed l˜ ,CSr >CS remains valid.
Now we discuss social welfare. In the considered region, the firm introduces up-
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grades regardless whether context-dependent preferences exist or not. First, without
context-dependent preferences, the firm’s total profit is Pˆ1 = 3w
4+6w3 6w2 6w 1
(1+2w)(7w2 5w 4) as given
in the analysis of the benchmark case. With context-dependent preferences, if l = 1, the
firm’s total profit reduces to Pˆ1. Therefore if l = 1, the social welfare is higher with
context-dependent preferences because the consumer surplus is higher and the firm’s total
profit is the same as that without context-dependent preferences. As l increases, the firm’s
total profit decreases on top of the decrease in consumer surplus. Therefore, in a subset
of the region where consumer surplus is higher with context-dependent preferences, the
increased consumer surplus offsets the decrease in the firm’s profit and social welfare is
improved by the context-dependent preferences. Here we show that the firm’s total profit
under context-dependent preferences is decreasing in l .
P1 = p1(1 q1)+ p2(1 q2+q1 q3)  c
dP1
dl
= (1 q2+q1 q3)dp2dl   (p1  p2)
dq1
dl
  p2

dq2
dl
+
dq3
dl

+
dp1
dl
(1 q1)(B49)
In equilibrium, (1 q2+q1 q3)> 0 and dp2dl < 0, hence, the first term is negative. p1> p2
and dq1dl < 0, hence the second term  (p1  p2)¶d1dl is positive. dq2dl + dq3dl is negative. The
third term  p2

dq2
dl +
dq3
dl

is positive. dp1dl is negative. The negative terms dominate the
positive terms. Overall, dP1dl < 0. 2
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
Details of the Random-Coefficient Logit Model
Specifically, we model individual coefficients in the utility function to follow a nor-
mal distribution with mean coefficients:
gi
ai

=

g
a

+Svi; vi  Pv(v) (C1)
where Pv() is the distribution of vi. We assume that it is a standard multivariate normal
distribution. We can rewrite the utility function as
ui jt = gsd jt +a1pri jt +a2ads jt +b 0x jt +h jt (C2)
+Dgisd jt +Da1i pri jt + ei jt
where gsd jt +a1pri jt +a2ads jt +b 0x jt +h jt are the mean utility that consumers derive
from car model j in time t, and Dgisd jt+Da1i pri jt are the individual consumer i’s deviation
from the mean utility. Our focal interest is in gs;s 2 fh; lg, i.e., the impact of design dif-
ferentiation on consumer preferences for high-end and low-end products separately. Our
hypothesis H1 states that gh > 0 and gl < 0.*
The term h jt in (C2) captures unobserved demand factors of car model j in period
*Essentially, we are interested in the main effect of design differentiation (d) on consumer preferences
and its interaction with the dummy variable that indicates if a product is a high-end product (versus a low-
end product). Our hypothesis (H1) is equivalent to that the base effect of design differentiation on consumer
preferences is negative; however, a product being a high-end product positively moderates the main effect
of design differentiation on consumer preferences such that the overall effect of design differentiation of a
high-end product on consumer preferences is positive.
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t. ei jt is the idiosyncratic error term. We normalize the intrinsic utility of the outside
good to zero and the total utility of the outside good is only the idiosyncratic error term:
ui0t = ei0t . We further assume that ei jt follows an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution.
We assume that each consumer purchases one car model that gives the highest utility. The
set of consumers that purchase car model j in time t is:
A jt =

(vi;ei0t ; :::;eiJt)jui jt  uilt 8l = 0;1; :::;J
	
(C3)
The market share of the car model j in time t is integrating over the mass of consumers in
the region A jt :
s jt =
Z
A jt
dPe(e)dPv(v) (C4)
Robustness Check
In the main empirical model, we adopt the identifying assumption in previous litera-
ture that car characteristics including design and functional attributes are exogenous, or at
least determined prior to the revelation of consumers’ valuation of the unobserved product
characteristics (Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2000, Sudhir 2001). In this section, we show that
our results that support H1 still hold when we control for potential endogeneity of design
characteristics.
Endogenous Design Variables
We draw upon the institutional details about the car development process to look for
proper instruments for design differentiation variables. Very briefly, a typical car develop-
ment process comprises of three stages (Sörenson 2006, Weber 2009, Whitefoot et al.2012,
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The Toronto Star 2010). In the first stage, firms make long-term product positioning strate-
gies for a new car, such as the segment the new car competes in (i.e. luxury and economy),
the vehicle size (i.e. full size, midsize and compact), the product classification schemes
(i.e. regular and sporty/specialty), and country of origin (i.e. US, Europe, Japan and South
Korea). These long-run product positioning strategies are relatively fixed over time and
serve as guidelines as well as constraints for the later design and marketing decisions. In
the second stage, firms make mid-term car design decisions by setting the exterior aesthetic
design and internal technological attributes of cars. The last stage of the car design pro-
cess is the production and sales of vehicles. In this stage, firms make short-run marketing
decisions, including pricing and advertising, to support sales.
Given the sequence of decisions made throughout the car design process, we make
two identification assumptions. First, we assume that long-term decision variables includ-
ing cars’ country of origin, size, product classification, product segmentation and safety
rating are exogenous. This assumption is plausible because the long-term decisions are
made ex ante prior to firms making design decisions or marketing decisions. Thus, they
are not correlated with ex post short-term and mid-term demand shocks affecting market-
ing and design decisions. Moreover, they are fixed or rarely change over the life cycle of
a car model. Second, we assume that the mid-term decision variables on cars’ technical
attributes including horsepower, fuel efficiency, and reliability are exogenous. These tech-
nical attributes are uncorrelated with design differentiation variables. This is because the
two sets of decisions are made separately by different design divisions and do not necessar-
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ily change at the same time. Even when they both change at the same time, the direction
and magnitude of change in design and technical attributes may not be correlated (see Ta-
ble 2). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a firm’s decisions on technical attributes,
including HP, fuel efficiency and reliability, are independent of its decisions on product de-
sign. In other words, the mid-term technical attribute variables can be treated as exogenous
in our study, when we account for the endogeneity of product design.
Specifically, We use functions of long-run car attributes determined in the first stage
of the product design process as instruments for mid-run endogenous design differentiation
variables that are determined later in the process. We first identify the long-run car attribute
that is correlated with design differentiation variables: product classification (regular and
sporty/specialty). While sports cars (e.g. Ford Mustang) and specialty cars (e.g. Mini
Cooper) usually have more unique designs, regular cars (e.g. Toyota Camry) tend to have
more typical designs. Indeed, we find a significant negative correlation between product
classification and the product design variable, d(see Table 2), meaning that regular cars are
less differentiated in design than sporty or specialty cars. Following a similar logic as creat-
ing instruments for marketing activities, we create two similarity subsets for each car based
on country of origin and (Luxury vs. Economy) classifications. We compute the within-
brand average and across-brand average of the product classification for the two similarity
subsets. We then use own characteristics minus the within-brand average (across-brand av-
erage) as instruments. Such instruments reflect the difference between own characteristics
and the average characteristics, just like design differentiation is operationalized as the dis-
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tance between own look and the average look in own brand. We estimate the model using
the instruments for design differentiation variables. Results are presented in Table A1 and
are quantitatively consistent with results in the main model (Model 2). Particularly, design
differentiation has a significantly positive impact on consumers’ preferences for high-end
cars and a significantly negative impact on consumers’ preferences for low-end cars.
Quadratic Prices
We determine the standing of a car model in its brand to be either high-end or low-
end by comparing the price of the car model with the average price in its brand. Although
prices change over time, the relative standing of a car model in its brand, as to whether it is
a high-end car or a low-end car does not change over time. In order to rule out the impact
of price variations on the estimates of the coefficients of design differentiation variables
for high-end and low-end car models, we add a quadratic term of the price variable in the
model. Results are presented in Table A2 and are qualitatively consistent with those in the
main model.
Analysis of a Monopoly
For completeness, we consider the case of a monopoly that sells high-end and low-
end status products and needs to decide whether to use the same or different designs for
two types of products. To be consistent with the duopoly setting, we consider fully-covered
market. Prices for the high-end and low-end products are:
ph = rh  th(ah 1)2+ ghd (C5)
pl = rl  tl(al 1)2  gld (C6)
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The monopoly profits are P = a

rh  th(ah 1)2+ ghd  c

+ (1  
a)

rl  tl(al 1)2  gld
  m  d. It follows that the monopolist diversifies design if
and only if:
P[d = 1] P[d = 0] = gha  gl(1 a) m> 0 (C7)
In a competitive setting, brands’ incentives to diversify or to unify design deviate from
the above condition that guides a monopolist’s design decision. Particularly, we show that
brands want to strategically avoid competition by adopting a different design strategy that
that the competitor chooses. The asymmetric design choices can emerge in a duopoly
setting, which is the focus of our main analysis.
Proof of Proposition 1
We show that when gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2), brand profits are higher with asymmetric design
strategies than with symmetric design strategies. By Lemma 1, with symmetric design
strategies, brand profits are the highest when brands choose symmetric unification and
the profits are given in Table A3. We denote brand profits under the symmetric regime
by Pa(U;U) or Pb(U;U). In the asymmetric regime, A unifies design and B diversifies
design. We denote their profits by Pa(U;D) and Pb(U;D) respectively.
Comparing brand profits in asymmetric and symmetric regimes, we obtain that:
Da = Pa(U;D) Pa(U;U) =
1
18

ag2h
th(bh ah) +
(1 a)g2l
tl(bl al)

  agh  (1 a)gl
3
(C8)
Db = Pb(U;D) Pb(U;U) =
1
18

ag2h
th(bh ah) +
(1 a)g2l
tl(bl al)

+
agh  (1 a)gl
3
 m
(C9)
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With asymmetric design strategies, q h =
1
2   gh6th(bh ah) and ql =
1
2 +
gl
6tl(bl al) . For brands
to be active in both markets, i.e., qs 2 (0;1);s 2 fh; lg, it requires that gl < 3tl(bl al) and
gh < 3th(bh ah). We prove the proposition through a series of claims.
Claim 4 As long as (1 a)tl(bl al)< 3ath(bh ah) 2m, there exists a gˆ1 2 (0;3th(bh 
ah)) such that Db > 0 iff gh > gˆ1.
¶Db
¶gh
= agh9(bh ah)th +
a
3 > 0, i.e., Db is increasing in gh. If gh = 0, then Db =
  (1 a)gl [6tl(bl al) gl ]18tl(bl al)  m < 0. Given that gh < 3th(bh  ah), if when gh = 3th(bh  ah),
Db > 0, then there exists a gˆ1 2 (0;3th(bh ah)) such that if gh = gˆ1, Db = 0, and given that
Db is increasing in gh, it will also imply thatDb> 0 iff gh> gˆ1. Dbjgh=3th(bh ah)= 3th(bh ah)2  
(1 a)gl
3

1  gl6tl(bl al)

 m, which is decreasing in gl for gl < 3tl(bl al). A sufficient con-
dition for Dbjgh=3th(bh ah) > 0 for any value of gl < 3tl(bl al) is that when gl = 3tl(bl al),
Dbjgh=3th(bh ah) > 0. This condition is equivalent to that Dbjgh=3th(bh ah);gl=3tl(bl al) =
1
2 [3ath(bh ah)  (1 a)tl(bl al)] m> 0 or (1 a)tl(bl al)< 3ath(bh ah) 2m.
Claim 5 gˆ1 is concave and increasing in gl .
By the implicit function theorem, we have
¶ gˆ1
¶gl
= 
¶Db
¶gl
¶Db
¶gh
> 0 (C10)
where ¶Db¶gl = 
(1 a)[3tl(bl al) gl ]
9tl(bl al) < 0 given the condition that gl < 3tl(bl al), and
¶Db
¶gh
=
a[gh+3th(bh ah)]
9th(bh ah) > 0.
¶ 2gˆ1
¶g2l
=  (1 a)th(bh ah)
atl(bl al) [3th(bh ah)+ gh] < 0 (C11)
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Hence, gˆ1 is a concave function of gl .
Claim 6 There exists a gˆ2> 0 such thatDa> 0 iff gh< gˆ2. If (1 a)tl(bl al)> 13ath(bh 
ah), then there exists gh < 3th(bh ah) and gl < 3tl(bl al) such that Da > 0.
¶Da
¶gh
= a[gh 3th(bh ah)]9th(bh ah) < 0 given that gh < 3th(bh   ah). Hence, Da is decreasing
in gh. If gh = 0, then Da =
(1 a)g2l
18tl(bl al) +
(1 a)gl
3 > 0 for gl > 0. Hence, there exists a
gˆ2 > 0 such that when gh = gˆ , Da = 0 and Da > 0 iff gh < gˆ2. When gh = 3th(bh  ah),
Dajgh=3th(bh ah) =  
ath(bh ah)
2 +
(1 a)gl
3

gl
6tl(bl al) +1

which is increasing in gl . When
gl = 0, Dajgh=3th(bh ah);gl=0 < 0. When gl = 3tl(bl   al), Dajgh=3th(bh ah);gl=3tl(bl al) =
1
2 [3(1 a)tl(bl al) ath(bh ah)], which is positive if and only if (1 a)tl(bl al)>
1
3ath(bh  ah). In this case, there exists gl < 2tl(bl   al) and gh = 2th(bh  ah) such that
Da > 0. Given that Da is decreasing in gh. Let g 0h = gh  e for a small e , then there exists
gl < 2tl(bl al) and gh = g 0h < 2th(bh ah) such that Da > 0.
Claim 7 gˆ2 is convex and increasing in gl .
By the implicit function theorem, we have
¶ gˆ2
¶gl
= 
¶Da
¶gl
¶Da
¶gh
> 0 (C12)
where ¶Da¶gh =
a[gh 3th(bh ah)]
9th(bh ah) < 0 as shown above, and
¶Da
¶gl
= (1 a)[3tl(bl al)+gl ]9tl(bl al) > 0.
¶ 2gˆ2
¶g2l
=
(1 a)th(bh ah)
atl(bl al) [3th(bh ah)  gh] > 0 (C13)
Hence, gˆ2 is a convex function of gl .
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Claim 8 gˆ2 > gˆ1 iff gl is sufficiently large, i.e., gl > gˆl .
Consider gl = 0. If gh = e > 0 where e is small, Da < 0 and Db < 0, which implies
that gh > gˆ2 and gh < gˆ1. Hence, when gl = 0, gˆ1 > gˆ2. By Claim 5, gˆ1 is concave and
increasing in gl . By Claim 7, gˆ2 is convex and increasing in gl , hence, there exists a gˆl > 0
such that when gl = gˆl , gˆ1 = gˆ2, and gˆ2 > gˆ1 iff gl > gˆl .
Claim 9 If (1 a)tl(bl   al) 2
 1
3ath(bh ah);3ath(bh ah) 2m

, the set defined by
gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2) is non-empty given that gh < 3th(bh ah) and gl < 3tl(bl al).
Consider g 0h = 3th(bh ah) e and g 0l = 3tl(bl al) e for a small e > 0. It satisfies
that g 0h < 3th(bh ah) and g 0l < 3tl(bl al).
lim
e!0
Da jgh=g 0h;gl=g 0l =
3(1 a)tl(bl al) ath(bh ah)
2
(C14)
lim
e!0
Db jgh=g 0h;gl=g 0l =
3ath(bh ah)  (1 a)tl(bl al)
2
 m (C15)
The above two equations are positive if and only if (1   a)tl(bl   al) 2 1
3ath(bh ah);3ath(bh ah) 2m

. lime!0 Da jgh=g 0h;gl=g 0l > 0 implies that
lime!0 g 0h < gˆ2. lime!0 Db jgh=g 0h;gl=g 0l > 0 implies that lime!0 g 0h > gˆ1. Hence, when
e is sufficiently small, there exists at least a point (g 0h;g 0l ) that lies in the region defined
by g 0h 2 (gˆ1; gˆ2) when g 0h < 3th(bh  ah) and g 0l < 3tl(bl   al), such that the set where the
win-win situation arises is non-empty.
Claim 10 gˆ1 is increasing in m, ts, bs as, where s 2 fh; lg, and decreasing in a .
By the implicit function theorem, we have
¶ gˆ1
¶m
= 
¶Db
¶m
¶Db
¶gh
> 0 (C16)
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where ¶Db¶m = 1 and ¶Db¶gh > 0 as proved above. Similarly,
¶Db
¶ ts < 0, and
¶Db
¶ (bs as) < 0. By the
implicit function theorem, gˆ1 is also increasing in ts, bs as, where s 2 fh; lg. In addition,
¶ gˆ1
¶a
= 
¶Db
¶a
¶Db
¶gh
< 0 (C17)
as ¶Db¶a =
g2h
18th(bh ah) +
gh
3 +
gl [6tl(bl al) gl ]
18tl(bl al) > 0 given that gl < 3tl(bl   al). Hence, gˆ1 is
decreasing in a .
Claim 11 gˆ2 is invariant withm, decreasing in ts, bs as, where s2 fh; lg, and decreasing
in a .
By the implicit function theorem, we have
¶ gˆ2
¶m
= 
¶Da
¶m
¶Da
¶gh
= 0 (C18)
where ¶Da¶m = 0.
¶Da
¶ ts < 0, and
¶Da
¶ (bs as) < 0. By the implicit function theorem, gˆ2 is decreas-
ing in ts, bs as, where s 2 fh; lg. In addition,
¶ gˆ2
¶a
= 
¶Da
¶a
¶Da
¶gh
< 0 (C19)
as ¶Da¶a =
gh[gh 6th(bh ah)]
18th(bh ah)  
gl
3  
g2l
18tl(bl al) < 0 given that gh < 3th(bh  ah). Hence, gˆ2 is
decreasing in a .
Proof of Proposition 2
Da and Db (given in Equations C8 and C9) are the changes in brand A’s and brand B’s
profits by adopting asymmetric design strategy instead of the symmetric unification, and
Da+m and Db+m are the changes in brand A’s and brand B’s profits by adopting asymmet-
ric design strategy instead of the symmetric diversification. Da and Db are increasing with
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an decrease in ts and bs as where s 2 fh; lg. Hence, the benefit of adopting asymmetric
design strategies is higher when ts and bs as are smaller.
Proof of Proposition 3
By Claim 4, brand B has incentives to deviate from symmetric unification (U;U) to
asymmetric designs (U;D) if and only if gh> gˆ1. LetDa2 =Pa(U;D) Pa(D;D) represent
brand A’s incentive to deviate from symmetric diversification (D;D) to the asymmetric
design (U;D). Given that Pa(D;D) = Pa(U;U) m, it follows that Da2 = Da+m. We
have the following results:
Claim 12 There exists a gˆ3 > 0 such that Da2 > 0 iff gh < gˆ3.
¶Da2
¶gh
= ¶Da¶gh
< 0 by proof of claim 6. If gh = 0, then Da2 =
(1 a)g2l
18tl(bl al)+
(1 a)gl
3 +m> 0.
Hence, there exists a gˆ3 > 0 such that if gh = gˆ3 then Da2 = 0. Given that Da2 is decreasing
in gh, Da2 > 0 iff gh < gˆ3.
Claim 13 gˆ3 >max(gˆ1; gˆ2).
I first show gˆ3 > gˆ2. Dajgh=gˆ2 = 0, and Da2jgh=gˆ2 = Dajgh=gˆ2 +m = m > 0. Da2 is
decreasing in gh and Da2jgh=gˆ3 = 0, hence gˆ3 > gˆ2. Now I show gˆ3 > gˆ1, which is true
if gh > gˆ3 implies that gh > gˆ1. This is equivalent to that if Da2 < 0 implies that Db > 0.
If Da2 < 0, it implies that agh (1 a)gl3  m > 118
h
ag2h
th(bh ah) +
(1 a)g2l
tl(bl al)
i
, which implies that
Db > 19
h
ag2h
th(bh ah) +
(1 a)g2l
tl(bl al)
i
> 0. Hence, Da2 < 0 implies that Db > 0, which proves that
gˆ3 > gˆ1.
Claim 14 gˆ3 is increasing in gh.
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¶ gˆ3
¶gh
= ¶ gˆ2¶gh
> 0 where the inequality is given by Claim 7.
Claim 15 When gh 2 (gˆ1; gˆ3), brands choose asymmetric design differentiation.
When gh > gˆ1, Db > 0 by Claim 4. Hence, brand B has incentives to deviate from
(U;U) to (U;D). When gh < gˆ3, Da2 > 0. Hence, brand A has incentives to deviate from
(D;D) to (U;D). It follows that the asymmetric design is an equilibrium. Also by Claim
12, gˆ3 > gˆ2 and Claim 9 the set that brands choose asymmetric design contains the set that
asymmetric design leads to a win-win situation which is non-empty. Hence, the set where
brands choose asymmetric design strategies is non-empty.
Claim 16 When gh  gˆ3, brands choose symmetric diversification.
When gh  gˆ3, Da2  0. Hence, brand A has incentives to deviate from (U;D) to
(D;D). It follows that if B chooses D, A prefers D. When Da2  0, it implies that Db > 0
by proof of Claim 13. Hence brand B has incentives to deviate from (U;U) to (U;D).
Therefore, the equilibrium is (D;D).
Claim 17 When gh  gˆ1, brands choose symmetric unification.
When gh  gˆ1, Db < 0 by Claim 4. Hence, brand B has incentives to deviate from
from (U;D) to (U;U), i.e., when A chooses U , B prefers U over D. Given that gˆ1 < gˆ3
by Claim 13, gh  gˆ1 implies that gh < gˆ3. Hence, when gh  gˆ1, Da2 > 0 and brand A has
incentives to deviate from (D;D) to (U;D). Therefore, the equilibrium is (U;U).
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Proof of Proposition 4
We prove the regions of gh and gl that lead to symmetric unification (U,U), symmetric
diversification (D,D), and asymmetric design (U,D) or (D,U) under simultaneous design
decisions are the same as the corresponding regions under sequential decisions. Without
loss of generality, let brand A be the first mover and brand B be the follower.
Claim 18 Brands simultaneously choose (D,D) if and only if they sequentially choose
(D,D).
Define S1(DD) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ : (D;D)g and S2(DD) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ : (D;D)g as the
respective set of gh and gl in which brands choose (D,D) in simultaneous and sequen-
tial moves. I show S1(DD) = S
2
(DD) in two steps. First, I show S
1
(DD)  S2(DD). Suppose
(g 0h;g
0
l ) 2 S1(DD). Then by Proposition 4, g 0h  gˆ3 such that Pa(D;D) > Pa(U;D) in si-
multaneous moves. This implies that Pb(D;D) > Pb(D;U), which shows that in se-
quential moves, if A chooses D, then B prefers D that leads to (D,D) over U that leads
to (D,U). By Claim 13, gˆ3 > gˆ1. Hence, g 0h  gˆ3 implies that g 0h > gˆ1 which suggests
Pb(U;D) > P

b(U;U). Hence, if A chooses U first, then B prefers D that leads to (U,D)
over U that leads to (U,U). Comparing A’s payoff in (U,D) and (D,D), A prefers (D,D) as
Pa(D;D)>Pa(U;D). Hence, (D,D) is the equilibrium and (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(DD) which implies
S1(DD)  S2(DD). Next, I show S2(DD)  S1(DD). Consider (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(DD). Then it follows that
Pb(D;D)>P

b(D;U) hence when A chooses D, B chooses D. This implies that g 0h gˆ3 and
(D,D) is the equilibrium in simultaneous move by Proposition 4. Therefore, (g 0h;g 0l )2 S1(DD)
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which implies S2(DD) S1(DD). Given that S1(DD) S2(DD), we have proven that S1(DD) = S2(DD)
and the claim is true.
Claim 19 Brands simultaneously choose (U,U) if and only if they sequentially choose
(U,U).
Define S1(UU) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ : (U;U)g and S2(UU) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ : (U;U)g be the
set of gh and gl where brands choose (U,U) in simultaneous and sequential moves respec-
tively. I prove the two sets are equivalent, i.e., S1(UU) = S
2
(UU) in two steps. First, I show
S1(UU)  S2(UU). Consider (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S1(UU). By Proposition 4, g 0h < gˆ1 and Pb(U;U) >
Pb(U;D). This implies that in sequential moves, if A chooses U, then B prefers U that
leads to (U,U) over D that leads to (U,D). If A chooses D, then B can chooses U that leads to
(D,U). Given that Pb(U;D)<Pb(U;U), we know Pa(D;U)<Pa(U;U), i.e., A is worse
off in the asymmetric case than when A chooses U that leads to (U,U). Alternatively, B can
choose D that leads to (D,D), in which case A’s profit is also lower than in (U,U). Hence,
A chooses U and B chooses U, and (U,U) is the equilibrium. Therefore, (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(UU)
which implies S1(UU)  S2(UU). Next, I show S2(UU)  S1(UU). Suppose (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(UU). It
implies that when A chooses U, B prefers U over D, i.e., Pb(U;U)>Pb(U;D). It implies
that g 0h < gˆ1. By Proposition 4, (U,U) is the equilibrium in the simultaneous move. Hence,
(g 0h;g
0
l ) 2 S1(UU) and S2(UU)  S1(UU). Therefore, S1(UU) = S2(UU) and the claim is true.
Claim 20 Brands simultaneously choose the asymmetric design strategies if and only if
they sequentially choose the asymmetric design strategies (U,D) or (D,U).
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Define S1(UD) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ : (U;D);(D;U)g and S2(UD) = f(gh;gl) 2 R2+ :
(U;D);(D;U)g be the set of gh and gl where brands choose asymmetric design strategies
in simultaneous and sequential moves respectively. I prove the two sets are equivalent,
i.e., S1(UD) = S
2
(UD) in two steps. First, I show S
1
(UD)  S2(UD). Consider (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S1(UD).
By Proposition 4, (U,D) is the equilibrium in the simultaneous move when g 0h 2 (gˆ1; gˆ3)
such that Pb(U;D) > Pb(U;U) and Pa(U;D) > Pa(D;D). Pb(U;D) > Pb(U;U) im-
plies that in sequential move if A chooses U, then B chooses D, hence (U,D) arises.
Pa(U;D)>Pa(D;D) implies that if A chooses D then B chooses U such that (D,U) arises.
Therefore, the equilibrium is an asymmetric design choice. Hence, (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(UD) which
implies S1(UD)  S2(UD). Next, I show S2(UD)  S1(UD). Consider (g 0h;g 0l ) 2 S2(UD). Then it
follows that either (U,D) or (D,U) is the equilibrium. Suppose (U,D) is the equilibrium.
It implies that Pb(U;D) > Pb(U;U) or g 0h > gˆ1 so that when A chooses U, B chooses D.
Given that (D,D) is not an equilibrium, it implies thatPb(D;U)>Pb(D;D), hence gh < gˆ3.
By proposition 4, brands simultaneously choose asymmetric designs if g 0h 2 (gˆ1; gˆ3). Hence,
(g 0h;g
0
l ) 2 S1(UD) which implies S2(UD) S1(UD). Therefore, S1(UD) = S2(UD) and the claim is
true.
In the asymmetric case, we compare brand profits from choosing unification versus
profits from choosing diversification and obtain that:
Pa(U;D) Pa(D;U) = m 
2 [agh  (1 a)gl]
3
(C20)
which is positive and A chooses unification if and only if m+ 2(1 a)gl3 >
2agh
3 .
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Proof of Proposition 5
We solve for the equilibrium functionality locations as and bs, s2 fh; lg after solving
the pricing stage of the game (see Table 2 for equilibrium prices).
Under symmetric designs, using first order conditions we obtain that:
ah = a

l = 
1
4
(C21)
bh = b

l =
5
4
(C22)
Under asymmetric designs, the optimal functionality choices are:
ah(U;D) = 
1
4
  gh
3th
(C23)
al (U;D) = 
1
4
+
gl
3tl
(C24)
bh(U;D) =
5
4
  gh
3th
(C25)
bl (U;D) =
5
4
+
gl
3tl
(C26)
Comparing the functionality choices under asymmetric design strategies with those under
symmetric design strategies, we obtain that the brand A that unifies design produces a
low-end product that has more mainstream functionalities and a high-end product that has
more niche functionalities, whereas the brand B that diversifies design produces a high-
end product that has more mainstream functionalities and a low-end product that has more
niche functionalities.
Proof of Proposition 6
Case 1: Symmetric Unification. In this case, switching consumers buy low-end products,
as in the main model. Results in the main apply and brand profits are given in Table 2 of
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the paper.
Case 2: Symmetric Diversification. In this case, switching consumers buy high-end
products. This is because these consumers care strongly about social image of consump-
tion. If they were to consume a low-end product, they incur a social loss of g 0l > gl that
is sufficiently strong that they are better off buying a high-end product. In this situation,
these consumers switch to buy high-end products and experience an increase of gh in the
social value of consuming the high-end product that looks different from the brand’s low-
end product. Essentially, the size of high-end consumers becomes a +b (1 a) and the
size of the low-end consumers becomes (1  b )(1 a) after these consumers switch to
buy high-end products. Locations of the marginal consumers are the same as in the main
model. Brands’ profit functions become:
Pa = [a+b (1 a)] (pah  c)qh+(1 b )(1 a)palql m (C27)
Pb = [a+b (1 a)] (pbh  c)(1 qh)+(1 b )(1 a)pbl (1 ql) m (C28)
First order conditions solve for equilibrium prices: pah = pbh = th(bh   ah) + c and
pal = p

bl = tl(bl   al). Plug these prices into the above profit functions, we can derive
the equilibrium profits in this case.
Case 3: Asymmetric Design Strategies. Without loss of generality, suppose brand A
unifies design while brand B diversifies design. Switchers buy the low-end product from
brand A for its design similarity with A’s high-end product. In this case, brands’ profit
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functions are:
Pa(S;D) = a(pah  c)qh+(1 b )(1 a)palql +b (1 a)pal (C29)
Pb(S;D) = a(pbh  c)(1 qh)+(1 b )(1 a)pbl (1 ql) m (C30)
First order conditions solve for equilibrium prices: pah= th(bh ah)  gh3 +c, pbh= th(bh 
ah)+
gh
3 + c, p

al =
4gl(1+b 2) 8bgl 3tl(1+4b )
12tl(1 b ) , and p

bl =
4gl(1+b 2) 8bgl+3tl(5 4b )
12tl(1 b ) . Plug these
prices into the above profit functions, we can derive the equilibrium profits in this case.
Now we show that the partial derivative of brand profits with respect to b are positive. By
assumption, functionalities of products are symmetric, i.e., bh = 1 ah and bl = 1 al .
¶Pa(S;D)
¶b
=
(1 a)(2baltl +bgl b tl  gl +6altl 3tl)N
18(1 b )2tl(2al 1) (C31)
where N = (2baltl + bgl   b tl   gl   10altl + 5tl). We can rewrite pal =
2baltl+bgl b tl gl+6altl 3tl
3(b 1) > 0. It follows that the term in the numerator of (C31) 2baltl +
bgl b tl  gl +6altl 3tl < 0. We can also rewrite q l = 10baltl bgl 5b tl 6altl+gl+3tl6tl(1 b )(1 2al) . We
consider situations there brands compete in the low-end market, i.e., q l 2 (0;1). The
condition q l < 1 requires that
2baltl+bgl b tl gl 6altl+3tl
6tl(1 b )(1 2al) > 0, which implies that 2baltl +
bgl b tl gl > 3tl(2al 1). The term in the numerator of (C31) (2baltl+bgl b tl gl+
6altl 3tl) > 2tl(1 2al) > 0. Hence, the sign of (C31) is positive. Similarly, the partial
derivative of brand B’s profits with respect to b is also positive. To see this,
¶Pb(S;D)
¶b
=
(1 a)(2baltl +bgl b tl  gl 6altl+3tl)N
18(1 b )2tl(2al 1) (C32)
whereN =(2baltl+bgl b tl gl+2altl tl). The term in the numerator of (C32) 2baltl+
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bgl b tl gl+2altl tl < 0 because 2baltl+bgl b tl gl = b tl(2al 1)+gl(b 1)< 0
and 2altl   tl = tl(2al   1) < 0. Therefore, (C31) and (C32) are both positive, i.e., as b
increases, brand profits from adopting asymmetric design strategies increase.
Consumer Preferences for Design Differentiation are Endogenous
Locations of the marginal consumer are given in the paper as: qh = ah+bh2  
pah pbh
2th(bh ah) +
gh(1 a)(da db)
2th(bh ah) , ql =
al+bl
2   pal pbl2tl(bl al)  
gla(da db)
2tl(bl al) . We solve for the brand deci-
sions backward. Brands’ profit functions are: Pa = a(pah c)qh+(1 a)palql andPb =
a(pbh c)(1 qh)+(1 a)pbl(1 ql). First order conditions give the equilibrium prices:
pah(ah;bh;da;db) =
(bh ah)(2+ah+bh)th
3 +
gh(1 a)[daq el  db(1 q el )]
3 + c, p

bh(ah;bh;da;db) =
(bh ah)(4 ah bh)th
3 +
gh(1 a)[db(1 q el ) daq el ]
3 + c, p

al(al;bl;da;db) =
(bl al)(2+al+bl)tl
3  
gla[daq eh db(1 q eh )]
3 , and p

bl(al;bl;da;db) =
(bl al)(4 al bl)tl
3  
gla[db(1 q eh ) daq eh ]
3 . The sec-
ond order conditions are satisfied. Then we solve for brands’ functionality decisions.
For ease of exposition, we endogenize functionality decisions. First order conditions
give that ah(da;db) =  14 +
gh(1 a)[daq el  db(1 q el )]
3th
, al (da;db) =  14  
gla[daq el  db(1 q el )]
3tl
,
bh(da;db) =
5
4  
gh(1 a)[db(1 q el ) daq el ]
3th
, and bl (da;db) =
5
4 +
gla[db(1 q el ) daq el ]
3tl
. Equilib-
rium marginal consumers are at q h (da;db) =
1
2 +
2gh(1 a)[q el da (1 q el )db]
9th
and q l (da;db) =
1
2  
2gla[q ehda (1 q eh )db]
9tl
. By rational expectations assumption, q el = q l (da;db) and q eh =
q h (da;db), we obtain that q h (da;db) =
1
2   gh(db da)(1 a)[9tl 2agl(da+db)]4ghgl(da+db)2a(1 a)+81thtl and q

l (da;db) =
1
2 +
gl(db da)a[9th+2gh(da+db)(1 a)]
4ghgl(da+db)2a(1 a)+81thtl . We summarize the equilibrium outcome under symmet-
ric and asymmetric design strategies in Table A1 below. There exist a region of gh and gl
where asymmetric design differentiation can arise in equilibrium and be awin-win outcome
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Figure C1: Equilibrium Design Strategy with Endogenous Preferences
(a = 12 , th = tl = 1, ah = al = 14 , bh = bl = 54 , m= 120 )
(see Figure C1).
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